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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THOMAS E. LANHAM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and 
KEITH C. LANHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 45488 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
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BOISE, IDAHO 
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 06/27/2016 03:30PM) 
Notice 
Notice Of Bankruptcy Filing 
Civil Disposition Entered 
Civil Disposition entered/or: Fleenor, Douglas E, Defendant; Lanham, Keith C, Plaintiff; 
Lanham, Thomas E, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/17/2016 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: inactive 
Stipulation 
Stipulation For Briefing Schedule For Defendants Motion To Dismiss 
Amended 
Amended Notice of Filing Bankruptcy 
Amended Judgment - Bankruptcy Stay 
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Notice ofBankruptcy Filed 5.31.16 (Amended Notice) 
Party (Lanham, Keith C) 
Memorandum 
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss 
Declaration 
Declaration Of Allen B. Ellis 
Declaration 
Declaration Of Keith C. Lanham 
Order 
Order Re Stipulation for Briefing Schedule 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 06/27/2016 03: 30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Vacating Hearing 
Answer 
Answer And Demand For Jury Trial (Stubbs For Defendant) 
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Vacated 
Motion 
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Notice of Hearing 
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Events: 08/04/2016 Notice of Hearing 
for Leave Substitue 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
Order 
Miscellaneous 
Response to Plaintiffs' Note of Issue 
Notice of Hearing 
10.17.16@3:00pm 
~ Motion for Summary Judgment 
ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment 




for Scheduling Conference and Order Re Motion Practice 
CANCELED Scheduling Conference (4:01 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
Vacated 
ffl Stipulation 
for Scheduling and Planning 
ffl Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
~Order 
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
ffl Brief Filed 
Plaintiffs' Answering Brief to Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment 
ffl Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment 
mAffidavit 
Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Affidavit in Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion/or Partial Summary I 
Judgment 
ffl Motion for Disqualification of Judge 
Defendant's Motion/or Disqualification of Judge G.D. Carey 
m Brief Filed 
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
ffl Brief Filed 
Defendant Douglas F/eenor's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
Events: 09/02/2016 Notice of Hearing 





















~ Court Minutes 
fflorder 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment 
fflorder 
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
m Notice of Service 
fflNotice of Service 
Notice of Service of Discovery 
mRequest 
Plaintiffs' First Request for Production 
ffl Notice of Service 
~Motion 
Joint Motion to Continue Trial Date 
fflNotice of Hearing 
(01/26/2017 03:00 pm) 
m Witness Disclosure 
Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses 
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Notice of Service of Discovery 
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Notice of Service 
fflNotice of Service of Discovery Requests 
Motion to Continue (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
'fa Motion 
to Release Court Records 
morder 
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
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m Notice of Service of Discovery Requests 
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Stipulation for Substitution of Parties 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
ffl Order 
of Substitution of Parties 
ffl Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Thomas Lanham 
ffl Notice of Taking Deposition 
of Keith Lanham 
ffl Witness Disclosure 
Defendant's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure 
fflMotion 
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Based on Newly Obtained Evidence 
ffl Affidavit of Service 
4/19/17 
ffl Order 
Re Supplemental Briefing 
fflMotion 
Motion for Sequential Briefing 
ffl Motion to Continue 
Trial 
ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion 
for Continuance of Trial 
ffl Declaration 
Second Declaration of Allen Ellis 
ffl Notice of Service 
of Discovery 
fflNotice 
Notice of Opposition to Motion for Sequential Briefing 
fflNotice 
Notice of Non-Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Trial 
ffl Affidavit of Service 
4/27117 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
Motion Hearing - Civil (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
To Continue Trial & Sequential Briefing 
~ Court Minutes 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion 
Supplemental for Summary Judgment 
ffl Affidavit 
of Samantha L. Lundberg in Support of Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
ffl Memorandum 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
fflReply 
Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
Vacated 
fflorder 
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
fflMotion 
to &tend &pert Disclosure Deadlines 
~ Declaration 
Third Declaration of Allen B. Ellis 
CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
Vacated 
4 days 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
(7/31/17@330pm) 
fflNotice 
Notice of Change of Address (Attorney, Allen Ellis) 
ffl Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to &tend &pert Disclosure Deadlines 
Motion Hearing - Civil (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
To &tend &pert Disclosure Deadline 
~ Court Minutes 
fflorder 
Memorandum and Order Re: Renvewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
ffl Judgment of Dismissal 
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CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Greenwood, Richard D.) 
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
ffl Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees 
fflMotion 
Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees 
mMemorandum In Support of Motion 
Memorandum in Support of Mtn to Disallow Attorney Fees 
ffl Notice of Appeal 
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Vacated 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS LAW, PLLC MAR 1 7 2016 
P.M. 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
CANYON COUNTY CLER!< 
K BRONSON, DEPUTY 
208/345-7832 (Tel) 
208/345-9564 (Fax) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON * ~\J-OC- \ l!? - 0<3L5L 




DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 










COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
Come now plaintiffs Thomas E. Lanham and Keith C. Lanham, through their attorney of 
record, and allege and complain against defendant Douglas E. Fleenor as follows: 
I 
At all times relevant, defendant Douglas E. Fleenor was an attorney at law duly licensed as 
such by the State of Idaho and was retained by plaintiff Thomas E. Lanham ("Thomas L.") to 
invalidate, through adjudication, a document purporting to be the last will and testament ("Will") 
of plaintiffs' father, Gordon T. Lanham which said Will sought to disinherit plaintiff Thomas L. and 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
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• • 
his brother, the plaintiff Keith C. Lanham ("Keith L."). 
II 
At all times relevant, an attorney/client relationship existed between defendant Fleenor and 
plaintiff Thomas L. in the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham (Gem County Case No. 
CV-2013-886) ("estate case") and other matters. 
III 
At all times relevant, the following conditions existed: (1) it was reasonably foreseeable that 
were plaintiff Thomas L. disinherited by the aforesaid Will, that such harmful consequence would 
be likewise imposed on plaintiff Keith L.; (2) the certainty that plaintiff Keith L. suffered financial 
loss by the conduct of defendant Fleenor as hereinafter alleged; (3) the proximate causation which 
existed between defendant's conduct, as hereinafter alleged, and plaintiff Keith L.' s financial loss; 
( 4) holding defendant responsible for plaintiff Keith L. 's financial loss will serve to increase the legal 
profession's sense of responsibility to non-clients with a concomitant deterrent effect; (5) and to 
impose a duty of care toward non-client Keith L. will not unduly burden defendant, i.e., defendant's 
burden in fulfilling his professional duty of care to his client plaintiff Thomas L. is not enhanced by 
recognizing that such duty is also owed to non-client plaintiff Keith L. 
IV 
By reason of the relationship and circumstances alleged above in paragraphs II and III, 
respectively, defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to plaintiffs. 
V 
On June 25, 2014, the Honorable Tyler D. Smith entered judgment in the estate case against 
defendant's client plaintiff Thomas L. by denying his motion for summary judgment and granting 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
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the personal representative's motion for summary judgment, i.e., holding that the Will is "legal, 
valid, and binding". 
VI 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid judgment, the Will was defective in several respects including, 
inter alia, failing to set forth dispositive provisions, failing to include a residuary clause, bestowing 
unlimited donative powers of a non-charitable nature on the personal representative, failing to reflect 
the requisite testamentary intent, and having other foundational defects. 
VII 
Spbsequent to entry of the aforesaid judgment and in breach of his duty to plaintiffs, 
defendant Fleenor negligently filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 2014, in the estate case, forty-
nine days from entry of the judgment. As a proximate result of defendant's negligence, the District 
Court, acting in its appellate capacity dismissed the appeal on the jurisdictional grounds that the 
appeal was not filed within the requisite time period, i.e., forty-two days from entry of judgment. 
In a subsequent appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and as a further proximate result of defendant's 
negligence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal. 
VIII 
As a further proximate result of defendant's negligence, the estate of plaintiffs' father was 
distributed in accordance with the defective Will, which disinherited plaintiffs, rather than by 
intestate succession by which succession the plaintiffs would have been the sole heirs at law, all to 
the plaintiffs' financial detriment in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court. 
IX 
Plaintiffs have retained the services of Ellis Law, PLLC, to prosecute this matter and, in the 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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event they are the prevailing parties, they are entitled to recover their attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3). 
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
I. For compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court. 
2. For costs and reasonable attorney fees; 
3. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
Dated this 16th day of March, 2016. 
Allen~ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 16th day of March, 2016. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
APR 2 9 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
8y ROSE WRIGHT ' 
DEPUTY 
f:,~I A~ 5 g ieM. 
APR 2 0 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C. 
LANHAM, IV O C 16 0 8 2 5 2 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-16-2623 
ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE 
The court having received the parties' stipulation, and with good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action shall be forthwith 
transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
of Ada. 
ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE- 1 
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• • v--
DATED this ,cc day of April, 2016. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d 
O
day of April, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE by delivering the same 
to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Samantha L. Lundberg 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 








U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 





Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239 
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Atto'rneys for Defendant 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C. 
LANHAM, 
A.M. ~ l-bfi(A NO·----=~---P!-~~-
MAY 06 2~ 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 




Case No. CV-OC-16-08252 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG, having been first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am a member of the law firm of Carey Perkins LLP, counsel of record 
for Defendant in the above-captioned action, and the following statements are made of my . 
own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the Last 
Will and Testament of Gordon Lanham, which we obtained from the court file of In the 
Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem County Case No. CV2013-886. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a certified copy of Keith Lanham's 
Petition for Removal of Personal Representative and for Declaration of Intestacy and Other 
Relief from the court file of In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem , 
County Case No. CV2013-886. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a certified copy of Memorandum in 
Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss from the court file 
of In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem County Case No. 
CV2013-886. Exhibit 3 to the Memorandum is an Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 22, 
2014. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -1.L_ day of May, 2016. 
(SEAL) 
MELANIE S. HILL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise 
Commission expires ¥' 61.,, / ~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -1.L day of May, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS LAW, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
208/345-7832 (Tel) 
208/345-9564 (Fax) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NO.-"'"'rr7 r.ii.eo --q llL ~'r'.M,_.-
A.M.--()--
JUN \ .j 20\6 
i:= D RICH, Clerk 
CHRISTO:~E~ ATKINSON 
By o'.:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
(J.1 
















ALLEN B. ELLIS 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
I, Allen B. Ellis, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(d) and LC. § 9-1406, declare as follows: 
Attached hereto as exhibits are true and correct copies of the following documents: 
Document Exhibit No. 
Deed to Joseph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Fleenor' s Memorandum in Support of Mtn. for SJ .............................. 2 
Callahan's Memorandum in Support of Cross Mtn. for SJ ........................ 3 
DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 1 
000019
Document Exhibit No. 
Fleenor' s Motion for Reconsideration ........................................ 4 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ..................................... 5 
Judgment .............................................................. 6 
Notice of Appeal ........................................................ 7 
Memorandum Re: Appeal of Attorney Fee Award .............................. 8 
Ellis summary of audio disc received from Keith Lanham ........................ 9 
Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Amended Opinion ...................................................... 11 
Notice of Withdrawal of Petition for Removal of Personal Representative .......... 12 
Exhibit No. 9 was prepared by me while listening to the audio disc of the decedent Gordon 
Lanham's verbal narrative. The 2011 entries (except January 7) are my accurate paraphrasing of 
each entry. The Will, dated February 19, 2011, appears to be an accurate transcription of the 
dictation made upon multiple dates, commencing November 6, 2010 and ending January 7, 2011. 
Paragraph 11 of the Will which names Judd Lanham as the "executor" is not included in the 
dictation. 
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho that the foregoing 
is true and correct. 
Dated this 13th day of June, 2016. 
AllenB.~ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13th day of June, 2016, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Samantha L. Lundberg 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
300 N. 6th Street, Ste. 200. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
DECLARATION OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 3 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
X Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
__ Facsimile (345-8660) 
~ Allen B. Ellis 
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lnstru..A. # 294756 
EMMETT~'Z, IDAHO 
11-5-2013 03:11:08 No. of Pages: 2 
Recorded for: LAW OFFICE OF NANCY CALLAHAN J 
SHELL y TILTON 72::!.oo ~ 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy ~r 
Index to: DEED 
This Deed is made on this ~ay of November, 2013, between the Grantor 
Gordon Thomas Lanham of 3555 Butte Road, Emmett, Idaho 83617 and the 
Grantee Beneficiary Joseph "Joe" Lanham of 1457 E. Park Street, Emmett, Idaho 
83617. 
For good and valuable consideration paid by the Grantee Beneficiary, the 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Granter does transfer and convey the 
following described property, subject to payment. of any mortgage or other 
encumbrance thereon, to the Grantee Beneficiary effective on the Grantor's death: 
Property Address: 3555 Butte Rd, Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Legal Description: Attached Exhibit A 
The Grantor reserves a life estate for himself during the Grantor's lifetime 
coupled with an unrestricted power to convey during the Grantor's lifetime, which 
includes the power to sell, gift, mortgage, lease and otherwise dispose of the 
property, and to retain the proceeds from the conveyance. 
EXECUTE~ this ~ay of Nov.ember, 2013 
. . 
:.. ! 
Granter Name: Gord9n Thomas Lanham 
Gr?)ntor Si9natµ·re:£\.0l.,v,. ';\ ~-o ~1\i:t5 Sc._J<----
. ··-:·· . , ... ·· . . . . . ·. 
On this day, personally appeared before me, Gordon Thomas Lanham, known to be 
the person described in and who executed this instrument, and acknowledged that 
he signed the same as his voluntary act and deed, for the. uses and purposes 
therein mentioned. 




My commi · n expires~~---+--==....._..,..__ 




A t:e~c~ of land in the 1tti 1/4 NE l/4, Sect.ion 10~ Twp. 7 
il.., R .. 1 W., .B .M. , GalU County,. . Idaho, o.ora putj,cul.a;ly 
l.f~•~ibed u fo-ll'*1ll: atartil;tg at tha se ~r of the 
D' 1/'- l'm l/4, Sectio~ 10. 'twp. 7 H., .R.1 W. r B.M.. run 
S¢rt:h "° feet,; t:hlmce N. 49° s,, w .. sso f~t.1 thenca B> 
~· 2,, lf. SJC fM~J thence~- 1~· 1,•w. 87S f&at tQ cll~ 
tf.eart ~ida o! l!lf l/t. tm 1/t# Se.<:. 10, Twp .. i B.· ~. l. w • ., 
i.M.i tbenc-A SOU.th 1271 fqt to tlJft Sogtb~t. c:orneJ;" of 
tl:ie a. l./f. & l.lt. •a.id Sttct:ion 10; tllem:e s. 8.9• 50' E .. 
. ll2Q fee'! t~ the true point of ~. Ineluding all 
v&tc Pd ditc:h rights ap~•:imt thereto or 11aed iti. 
C¢.Jmeetioft tlwrawith,. Bul)j~ to ea.ae1118%1tJJ, rlghts of 
~, n•sn..U.~ and azc•pt.lons .. if any .. 
. .............. . 




Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Cowiselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-472-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
• 
IN lHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lan1uµn, by and through his attorney, Douglas 
E. Fleenor, and submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Petitioner seeks summary judgment declaring that property of the decedent passed 
intestate to the decedent's heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent 
fails to dispose of all of decedent's property. 
FACTS 
The personal representative filed a purported Last Will and Testament of the above 
named decedent dated January 19, 2011. 
Decedent's Last Will and Testament fails to make any d.ispositive provisions or give 
direction regarding the residue of his estate. 
In paragraph four on page two, the Will states, "1 want (Judd] to be able to distribute my 
property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will 1ry to put all the wording 




about the personal effects." Then again in the last paragraph, the Will reiterates, "I want [Judd} 
to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will and 
Testament." 
Page 3 of the Will contains the only possible devise, stating " .. .I gotta $3,000 sheep head 
that Judd can hang up in his cabin ifhe wants to." 
The remainder of the Will discusses the ownership of certain property located at his 
residence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate with the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Failure of a party to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that 
party bears the bmden of proof entitles the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has thoroughly addressed the standards governing motions for SUlilllUUY 
judgment. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Comt is generally required to 
liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions, drawing 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Construction Management Systems, 
Inc. v. AssW'ance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). However, Rule 
56(3) requires the non-moving party to go beyond pleadings through affidavit, depositions, etc., to 
demonstrate that there are genuine issue of material facts, Doe v. Durischi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d 
1238 (1986). If the non-moving party fails to do so, then the moving party is entitled to summary 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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judgment as a matter oflaw. Id at 46, 716 P2d at 1241; see also Sparks v. St. Lukes Reg. Medical 
Ctr. Ltd, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho has adopted of the Uniform Probate Code, which allows decedents to pass their 
property upon death through a validly executed Will. 
A will should be interpreted, if possible, in such manner as to prevent intestacy when it 
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1. 6,383 P.2d 
339, 341 (1963). 
However, a devisee must be identified so that the courts can be certain that the testator's 
intents and purposes are being carried out Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 108, 416 P.2d 
164, 167 (1966), quoting 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, pg. 18, § 363. 
In order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to place 
on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based on supposition as to the 
intention of the testator in the disposition of his estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 
P.2d 339,341 (1963); In re Hoytema's Estate, 180 Cal. 430, 181 P. 645; In re Beldon's Estate, 11 
Cal.2d 108, 77 P.2d 1052; 95 C.J.S. Wills§ 615c. 
Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or bequeath his property, but it does not permit 
him to delegate to another the power to make such disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala 
Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241,250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 (1938). Such testamentary efforts have 
been likened unto powers of attorney to make wills, which the law does not pennit. Id 
Each of the above cases held that a devise fails when a devisee is not designated with 
sufficient legal certainty. Examples of failed devises included a gift to any charitable 
organization chosen by a spouse (Hedin), devising the residue to any worthy charity selected by 
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the executor (Yribar), and a failure to dispose of half the estate (Corwin). Without a defined 
devisee, the court cannot ascertain or enforce a decedent's intent. 
Idaho Statutes also state that any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed 
ofby his will passes to his heirs. I.C. §15-2-101. In addition, if any devise fails for any reason, it 
becomes part of the residue. LC.§ 15-2-606. 
When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through 
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339,341 (1963). 
In this case, even if the Will is vali~ the decedent clearly failed to name devisees for his 
property. Therefore, as a matter of law, decedent's entire estate, with the possible exception of 
one specific devise, passes to his heirs by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 2, Title 15 of 
the Idaho Code. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Petitioner, 
finding the property of decedent passes to his heirs by intestate succession. 
DATED this '21.._ day of April, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARYJUDGMENTAND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
p.4 
This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in 
support of the Personal Representative's CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO THOMAS EVERETT 
LANHAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Gordon Thomas Lanham executed a Last Will and Testament on 
January 19, 2011 naming his cousin, Judd Lanham executor giving him 
Power of Attorney over all of his personal and real property. The Last 
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Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically provided for 
his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to each receive a dollar and 
a bed made by their grandfather. The children of Keith Lanham were 
also specifically disinherited. The Last Will and Testament was 
transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a period of time. 
On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a Transfer 
on Death Deed naming Petitioner's son, Joe Lanham, beneficiary, 
subject to payment of a mortgage to his former girlfriend and his 
brother Rex Lanham Jr.'s ex-wife, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham(aka) 
Linda Louise Andrews, . Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 
2013. The original Will was filed with the Court on December 20 1 2013 
and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas -Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se 
an "Application to Attest Personal Representative" in the probate case 
with a claim that the will was not valid and that the personal 
representative was not qualified. On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, 
by and through his attorney William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove 
Personal Representative with claims contesting the validity of the will 
and removal of the personal representative. The matters were set for 
hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On or about January 15, 2014, the personal representative 
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in 
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the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the personal representative 
in a POD account. He was verbally instructed by the dec€dent prior to 
his death that Joe Lanham would take the ranch free and clear of any 
encumbrances. Linda Andrews Lanham refused to accept payment of 
the mortgage. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith 
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court in the 
probate case. Judd Lanham was present with counsel. Also present 
were the two witnesses to the decedent's Will, Rebecca Clift, notary, 
Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This 
Court advised the parties that two matters were before the Court; the 
issue of removal of the personal representative and the validity of the 
Will. The Court_ advised the parties that it was not inclined to remove 
the personal representative and that the matters concerning the 
construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2, 
2014. 
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda 
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage. 
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case 
on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham in the probate case and in the 
quiet title action on behalf of Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. In the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS- PAGE 3 
------------------- ·····-----·---- . 
000031
Nancy Cal' :, - p.7 
probate case he filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative, Construing Will 2nd Determining Heirs and a Petition of 
Order Restraining Persona! Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett 
Lanham. 
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, Judd Lanham, 
filed his affidavit concerning the audio recording of the decedent which 
was the basis for the Will in contest and because the recording included 
additional instruction to the personal representative for distribution of 
his personal property. 
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham, 
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and Keith's 
claim contesting the validity of the will. 
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to 
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the 
Will, a trial that was pending since January 21, 2014. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, 
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a 
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having 
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for 
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition 
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the 
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estate attorney's fees. 
On April 9, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim in the quiet title action alleging the deed transferring the 
ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the ranch should be included in the 
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed 
that the decedent failed to make any principle payments on the 
December 17, 2002 mortgage entitling her to $137,369.46. Paragraph 
6 of the Counterclaim alleges that: 
"On August 19, 2004, Gordon Thomas Lanham coerced Linda Lanham 
into signing a "Mortgage Payment", by threatening to expose and 
distribute personal, private and revealing photographs of Linda Lanham. 
The purported amount of the interest payment was $23,400.00." 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 further allege: 
\\That on December 11, 2006, Gordon Thomas Lanham fraudulently 
caused Linda Lanham to enter into an accord and satisfaction agreement 
by promising her payment of cash in the amount to $50,000. The 
accord and satisfaction consisted of Linda Lanham signing a Satisfaction 
of Mortgage for the December 17, 2002 Mortgage, in exchange for 
Gordon Thomas Lanham paying Linda Lanham $50,000 in cash and 
executing a new Promissory Note and Mortgage in the amount of 
$50r000 bearing interest at the rate of 3% annum. Upon obtaining 
Linda Lanham's signatures, Gordon Thomas Lanham left the premises 
without paying Linda Lanham any of the promised amounts." 
On April 21, 2014 the personal representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a reply to Linda Andrew's counterdaim alleging any claims of fraud 
made by Linda Andrews is barred by the statute of limitations and the 
only amount due to Linda Andrews is $54,625.00. 
On about April 21, 2014, an estate check in the amount of 
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$54,625.00 was sent to Mr. Fleenor and Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. 
On April 23, 2014, Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Gem County Case No.2014-187 on behaif of Linda Louise 
Andrews Lanham on the issue that the Deed to Joe Lanham is void and 
claims that the ranch should be included in the decedent's estate. On 
that same day Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham on the issue that 
the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions or give direction 
regarding the residue of his father's estate and should pass intestate to 
decedent's heirs. 
ARGUMENT 
The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham clearly 
and unambiguously and for independent reason, specifically 
bequeathed that his sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby 
Lanham, each receive one dollar and a bed that there grandfather 
made for them each as children be returned to them, with the intent 
that .his sons take nothing from his estate. The will also specifically 
states that the children of Keith Colby Lanham would receive nothing 
from his estate. 
On the first page of the will Gordon Thomas Lanham states that: 
"This is a new day. It's the 29th of November. Thanksgiving is over and 
I just wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all that he needs to have 
and that I am going to leave $1 (sic) more dollar against whatever is 
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legal to him and then he is going to be on his own," 
On Page 2 paragraph 1 the Will states: 
"It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first 
snow out back. I am not really looking forward to it, .... but anyway, I 
want to go on about my son, Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, Amy 
Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down or leave it in this 
recording that... what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my 
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off his alcoholism or 
drugs .... 
Track 7 and 8 of the audio recording previously submitted allows 
one to hear this decision he made to disinherit his sons in the decedent's 
own words. 
Track 8 of the audio recording made by the decedent (the entry 
dated March 19, 2011) on the CD previously submitted to the Court, 
clearly and unambiguously instructed that the lots at Big Creek property 
were to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek 
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for 
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham 
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only 
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed etc. 
However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going to do 
with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on it, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for his 
2 7" acres ... " 
The Court should take judicial notice of the quiet title action 
concerning the decedent's real property, Gem County Case No. CV2014-
187. In that case the issue is payment of the "$50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on it", her counterclaim states· that she is entitled to 
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$137,369.49, her claim the deed intended to gift the ranch to Joe 
Lanham is void, and claiming that the ranch shou:d be included in this 
estate case, presumably as part of the residuaf estate. Then in this 
case, Thomas Everett is challenging the validity of the will to claim an 
intestate portion of the residual estate. 
Trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a 
"threshold question" to be answered before addressing the merits of 
motions for summary judgment. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992), Ryan v 
Beisner, 123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27 (Ct.App. 1992), Gem State 
Ins. Co. v Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.2d. l 72(2007), 
Montgomery v Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 at 6 (Idaho 2009). 
When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material 
which would be admissible at trial. Petricevich v Salmon River 
Canal,Co., 92 Idaho 865-,869, 452 P.2d 362,366 (1969) I.R.C.P. 
56(e). 
In addressing the evidentiary issues raised concerning the 
statements attributed to Gordon Thomas Lanham on the CD recording 
concerning the distribution of his estate, and the Affidavits of 
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham and Keith Lanham inform the 
court of the decedent's reasons and intent to completely disinherit 
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remaining property after his specific bequests would be personal 
property items to be distributed in-kind, if possible. 
The intended beneficiaries of this estate are the sons of Thomas 
Everett Lanham, namely Joseph "Joe" Lanham and Robert "Robby" 
Lanham. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing argument and the evidence submitted 
herewith, the Court should dismiss Thomas Everett Lanham's claim, 
find that Gordon Thomas Lanham fully disposed of his estate in his will 
and his audio recordings and the personal property remaining in the 
decedent's estate should be distributed by the personal representative 
at his discretion for the reasons set forth herein and as intended by 
Gordon Thomas Lanham. Further, that the Court should order that 
Thomas Everett Lanham reimburse the estate the attorney1s fees 
incurred herein. 
Dated this ~ay of May 2014. 
f!i~4= 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-4 72-8846 
208-94 7-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney of record, 
Douglas E. Fleenor, and moves this Court to reconsider its ruling on his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The deceased, Gordon Thomas Lanham, left a Will naming his cousin Judd Max Lanham 
as Personal Representative, and stating that his two sons, Thomas and Keith were each to receive 
one dollar and a bed .. However, the Will fails to dispose of all of decedent's property. Thus, any 
property not disposed of by the Will, passes through intestate succession according to Idaho's 
probate statutes. 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS 
Paragraph 1 of the Will is simple exordium clause, where the testator identifies himself. 
In Paragraph 2, the testator states that he has children and grandchildren, and states that he 
is going to make Judd Max his executor and give him Power of attorney over his property. 
In Paragraph 3, the testator names his two sons, identifies deeds and some personal 




In Paragraph 4, the testator states that Judd Max is his executor and gives him Power of 
Attorney, "now and even after I am dead." Testator states that he wants Judd to be able to 
distribute property "any way that he sees fit." Testator also states he has property in Big Creek 
Idaho. 
In Paragraph 5, Testator states he is leaving one dollar to his son, Tom. 
In Paragraph 6, which begins page two of the Will, the Testator leaves one dollar to his 
other son, Keith and Keith's heirs. 
In Paragraph 7, the Testator discusses property that belonged to Linda Lanham ( or her son, 
Todd), and property that belonged to the Testator. The Testator states that, "I haven't decided 
where to disperse of it lately." 
In Paragraph 8, beginning on the bottom of page two and continuing on page three, the 
Testator discusses property that belonged to his sister, Kathy (and her family), and states that 
Kathy can disperse them with Judd's help. The Testator also discusses his personal property, 
including books and an antique cabinet, and states that Kathy and Judd can "sort thru some of that 
stuff however they want." Testator also identifies an antique table and chairs, and antique rocker 
that belonged to "Lizzie," and an antique radio. Testator then states he has guns, and that a bed 
belongs to Keith and another bed belongs to Tom. Testator identifies a sand painting that belongs 
to "Lizzie" and a "$3,000 sheep head that Judd can hang up in his cabin." Testator then states that 
there is property in his safe that Judd can "disperse of how ever he wants." 
In Paragraph 9, the Testator discusses the 47 acres in Big Creek Idaho and states that he 
was to give"½ to one person and½ to another." Testator then states that he has picture, furniture 
and household good, and owes a mortgage to Linda Andrews. Testator identifies checks, cash, 
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coins, and guns in a safe. 
In Paragraph 10, on page four, the Testator states that he received a receipt for money owed 
on a $50,000 mortgage, and states that the guns could be sold to pay part of the mortgage off. 
In Paragraph 11, the Testator again names Judd Max Lanham as his executor and gives him 
Power of Attorney. Testator states again that he want Judd to be able to distribute his property as 
stated in his Will. 
In summary, the Testator names Judd Max Lanham as his executor (paras 2, 4, and 11) and 
states that he wants Judd to have power of attorney (paras, 2, 4, and 11) and for Judd to distribute 
his property as he sees fit (paras 4, 8) or as stated in the Will (para 11 ). 
Testator then disposes of one dollar to each of his two sons, Tom and Keith (paras 5 and 6). 
Testator identifies personal property belonging to other people: Linda (para 7), Kathy, 
Lizzie, Keith, & Tom (para 8). This identification of ownership could be interpreted as 
dispositions to these people. 
Testator also allows Judd to hang a sheep head in his cabin (para 8), which is likely 
disposition of the sheep head to Judd. 
Testator also states that his guns "can be sold" to pay of a $50,000 mortgage (para 10), 
which is likely a precatory statement, rather than a command. 
Besides the dollar to each son, the personal property belonging to other persons, and the 
sheep head, Testator failed to dispose of any other property in his Will. Although Testator 
identifies some of his property, he does not state how to dispose of it (paras 3, 7, 8, and 9). 
Further, Testator identifies property and states he does not know how he wants to dispose of it 
(paras 7 & 9). 
Besides Judd's authority, Testator also allows Kathy to decide where certain of his 
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personal property will go, including plates, china, coffee grinding machine, and tables (para 8). 
Finally, this Court may interpret the last two sentences of paragraph 8 as giving the content 
of the safe Judd. However, Testator later directs the guns in the safe to be sold to pay the 
mortgage (para 10). 
At best, the Will only disposes of the aforementioned personal property. By its terms, the 
Will does not dispose of any of Testator's real property, banking accounts, or accounts receivable,. 
According to the Inventory filed by the Personal Representative, these assets have a combined 
value of more than $300,000. Since the Testator did not dispose of all his property via his Will, 
"particularly in the absence of a residuary clause, then the omitted property must descend 
according to the laws of succession. LC.§§ 14-102 and 14-103; Page on Wills, Vol. 2, § 927; 95 
C.J.S. Wills§ 615 c.; In re Peabody's Estate, 21 Cal.App.2d 690, 70 P.2d 249." In re Corwin's 
Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339, 341 (1963). The issue in Corwin's Estate was nearly 
identical to this case. The decedent had disposed of part of his property through his will, but 
failed to dispose of all of his property. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that property not disposed 
of through the will passed through the laws of succession. Id. Since the Testator in our case has 
not disposed of all of his property through his Will, this Court should determine which property 
remains to pass to Testator's heirs through intestate succession. 
' PAROLE EVIDENCE 
Respondents argue, without citing any known law, that this Court should consider parole 
evidence when determining the intent of the Testator. However, as cited by the Petitioner during 
oral arguments, Idaho Law does not allow for parole evidence to be considered when determining 
a testator's intent. The Idaho Supreme court has stated: 
Courts are not permitted in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy 
to adopt a construction based on conjecture as to what the testator 
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may have intended, although though [sic] not expressed.' In re 
Hoytema's Estate, supra. See also In re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal.2d 
42, 237 P.2d 505; In re Searl's Estate, 29 Wash.2d 230, 186 P.2d 
913, 173 A.L.R. 1247; 2 Schouler on Wills, Executors and 
Administrators, (6th ed.),§ 862, p. 980. Courts cannot speculate as 
to what was in the mind of the testator, what he intended to do, or 
what he intended to declare in his will, but our task herein is to 
determine what was meant by what the testatrix did declare in her 
will by the words she actually used therein. Presumptions and 
auxiliary rules applicable to probate matters are all subordinate to 
the cardinal rule just enunciated.' In re Watson's Estate, 32 
Cal.App.2d 594, 90 P.2d 349. See also In re Maloney's Estate, 27 
Cal.App.2d 532, 80 P.2d 998; In re Klewer's Estate, 124 Cal.App.2d 
219,268 P.2d 544, 41 A.L.R.2d 941; Blattv. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57,243 
P. 1099, 57 A.L.R. 221; Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v. 
Kerner, 305 Ill.App. 237, 27 N.E.2d 310. 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho I, 6, 383 P.2d 339,342 (1963). 
Again, Corwin's estate is very similar to our case. In Corwin, testimony was presented as 
to the testator's intent in distributing his property which did not pass via his will. The Court ruled 
that parole testimony of testator's intent was not allowed, only the words actually used by the 
testator in his will could be used in determining his intent. Id Likewise, any parole evidence 
offered by Respondents should not be considered by this Court. Only the actual words in the 
Will, which conform to the formalities required when making a will, should be considered when 
determining Testator's intent. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
Since the Will does pot dispose of the bulk of Testator's property, this Court may be 
tempted to recognize Testator's statements that Judd or Kathy be able to dispose of his assets as 
they saw fit. Respondent's did not argue or cite any law which would allow such a provision in 
either their brief or in oral arguments. On the contrary, Idaho law specifically prohibits a Testator 
from disposing of his assets in this fashion. Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or 
bequeath his property, but it does not permit him to delegate to another the power to make such 
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disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 
(1938). Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105,108,416 P.2d 164, 167 (1966). In Hedin and Yriba, 
the testators directed their executors to give assets to worthy charities. In Hedin, the executor was 
decedent's spouse, who would certainly know his intentions. However, the Court in both cases 
ruled such dispositions did not distribute assets according the intent of the testator, but only as to 
the intent of other persons, and therefore were disallowed, Id. Our case is obviously comparable. 
The Testator states that Judd or Kathy can pick how to distribute his property, not how he would 
distribute his property. As such, no court could ever enforce whether Testator's intent was 
followed. And as ruled by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hedin and Yriba, this type of distribution 
is not allowed. 
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court reconsider its opinion that the Will disposes of 
all of Testator's property, and that parole evidence can be used to ascertain the Testator's intent in 
disposing of his property. 
DATED this ~day of June, 2014. 
Douglas . ee 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON MOTION AND CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for 
Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and 
on a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal 
Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits 
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral 
arguments of counsel made at the hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 




FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away December 5th ' 
2013, after long-declining health problems. In the time leading up to his 
death, decedent met ·with friends and family and his attorney and discussed 
his various kinds of assets and his intent for transferring them upon his 
death. Some of those people who participated in those discussions signed 
affidavits that were included in the record. 
2. Decedent periodically dictated his thoughts into an audio 
recorder. That audio was transcribed and typed into the form of a will. 
Decedent signed the will before witnesses. Decedent's and the witnesses' 
signatures were notarized and that will was submitted for probate. 
3. Decedent made additional recordings after he executed the will. 
The audio recordings made by decedent were part of the record before the 
Court as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Judd Lanham, the Personal 
Representative. The record also included affidavits from Keith Colby Lanham 
and Cathy Lanham Gillihan, submitted by the Personal Representative. 
4. The Court finds no reason to doubt the validity of the will. From 
the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that decedent 
Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the 
time of he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the 
extent and nature of his assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his 
potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound reasons for 
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treating each as he did. There is no evidence suggesting that anyone 
exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent. In fact, in spite of 
decedent's failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a strong 
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed the will. 1 
5. Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but 
he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, 
admissible evidence. Based upon the language of the will itself, the 
affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the Court finds in 
favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The will of decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and 
binding. 
2. Decedent's intent is sufficiently clear from the language of the 
will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if 
necessary, judicial enforcement. As to the claimant, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, decedent's intent is very clearly that claimant take by the will only 
one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful reason to frustrate 
c" 
decedent's intent. 
1. The Court notes that a court trial had been scheduled for early April on the issue 
of the will's validity but that neither claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, Jr., nor his attorney, 
Mr. Douglas Fleenor appeared at the time and date scheduled. The Personal 
Representative's request for costs and attorney fees is pending. 
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3. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be determined 
by the Court and the Personal Representative is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and the Court therefore GRANTS the Personal 
Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ATTORNEY FESS AND COSTS 
The issue of an award of costs and attorneys fees will be taken up at 
a future time and date. 
SO ORDERED this _Jj_r-ltay of June, 2014. 
Hon.~ryler D. Smithat 
FINDINGS OF l=ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 4 
000047
-
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated. 
[ XX ] Deposit in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Douglas Fleenor 
Attorney For Claimant, 
Thomas Everett Lanham 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[XX] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket: 
Nancy Callahan 
Attorney for Personal Representative, 
Judd Lanham 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan. 
101 Canal St. 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 -dJ__ 





Deputy Court Clerk 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
- ill~ E 9.M. 
JUN l 5 2014 
Laura SHE1J-tT1LTON, CLERK -uoason. oEPurv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 










CASE NO. CV2013-886 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for 
Summary judgment filed by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and 
on a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal 
Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits 
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral 
arguments of counsel made at the hearing. The Court having entered 
written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and having 
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announced in open Court the granting of the Personal Representative's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Claimant 
Thomas Everett Gordon take nothing by his Motion for Summary Judgment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Personal Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
and the Personal Representative may continue to administer the estate in 
accord with the Decedent's intent and according to law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that consideration of an award of costs and 
fees is reserved for decision at a future time and date. 
so ORDERED this ..J!i!!fav of June, 2014. 
Hori. tylerti. Smith 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies services of the foregoing FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS upon the following in the manner indicated. 
[ XX] Deposit in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Douglas Fleenor 
Attorney For Claimant, 
Thomas Everett Lanham 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[ XX ] Deposit in her Gem County Courthouse Mail basket: 
Nancy Callahan 
Attorney for Personal Representative, 
Judd Lanham 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan. 
101 Canal St. 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
0c_tb-
Service accomplished and this Certificate signed on this ..Qij!day of 
June, 2014. 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attomey & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-472-8846 
208-947-5910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
SHELLY TILTON, CLERK 
Laura DGQSGA--DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND ms ATTORNEY OF RECORD 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, appeals the Decision and Order of the Magistrate Court in 
this matter as follows: 
1. Petitioner appeals from the Order of the Magistrate Court in and for the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Gem. 
2. Petitioner makes this appeal to the District Court for the Third Judicial District. 
3. Petitioner appeals the Magistrate's Order in this matter dated June 25, 2014 and 
entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw. 
5. The hearings in this matter were recorded. The tape recordings of the hearings are 
in the possession of the Clerk of the Court of Gem County. 
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6. Issues Appellant asserts on appeal will be stated in a Statement oflssues on Appeal 
which will be filed by Defendant pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f)(6), but which will include: 
a. The Will of the Decedent is clear and plain. The intent of the Decedent 
should not be bolstered and explained by parole evidence 
b. A plain reading of the Will establishes that the Decedent did not dispose of 
the residue of his estate. 
c. Other issues as may be determined during the course of this appeal. 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DA1ED this\ J"'day of August, 201~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the { 5:tiay o~~ 4, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be forwarded to the following person(s): 
Nancy Callahan 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, ID 83617 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TfllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the matter of the estate of. 
Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
Thomas B. Lanham, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
Judd Lanham, personal representative 
for the estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2013-886 
MEMORANDUM RE: APPEAL OF 
ATTORNEY FEB AWARD 
This matter is before the court on appeal from an order of the magistrate below awarding 
attorney fees in a probate case. The petitioner below and appellant on appeal, Thomas Lanham, 
is represented by Patrick J. Geile ofFoleyFreeman, Meridian. The personal representative of the 
estate and respondent on appeal, Judd Lanham, is represented by Nancy Callahan, Emmett. The 
matter has been fully briefed, no oral argument has been requested, and the time for requesting 
argument under the case scheduling order has now expired. The case is deemed submitted on the 
briefs without argument. 




For the reasons stated below, the order of the magistrate is vacated, and the matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Facts and Background Proceedings 
Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away on December 5, 2013. Judd Lanham (hereafter 
Judd), a cousin of the decedent, filed a petition for informal probate of will and appointment of 
personal representative, together with what was purported to be the decedent's last will, with the 
magistrate court on December 20, 2013. In due course, a statement of informal probate of will 
and an order designating Judd as the personal representative of the estate were issued. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham (hereafter Thomas), a son of the decedent, filed 
a pro se pleading contending the will was invalid and Judd was unqualified to serve as personal 
representative. On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham (hereafter Keith), a son of the decedent, filed 
a petition through counsel also contending the will was invalid and seeking to remove Judd as 
personal representative. A hearing on the issues raised in both pleadings was set for January 21, 
2014. 
On January 21, 2014, a hearing was held. Thomas appeared pro se and Keith and Judd 
appeared with their respective counsel. Several family members and the witnesses to Gordon's 
will were also present. The magistrate judge noted there were two issues presently before the 
court: (1) the issue of removal of Judd as personal representative, and (2) the issue of the validity 
of the will. The court declined to remove Judd as personal representative at that time. The judge 
set the matter for a bench trial on April 2, 2014. The record indicates that a written notice of trial 
was prepared by the clerk at the time, with copies handed to everyone present at the hearing. A 
notice of service reflecting this service is in the file. 
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Thomas retained counse~ who appeared in the case for the first time on March 24, 2014, 
by filing a petition to temporarily restrain Judd's activity as personal representative, together 
with a new petition to remove Judd, determine the validity of the will, and determine Gordon's 
lawful heirs. These petitions were noticed for hearing April 3, 2014, the day after the bench trial 
was scheduled. 
On March 28, 2014, Judd filed an affidavit averring that he had made available to each of 
the parties in the case a compilation of audio recordings of conversations Gordon and Judd had 
prior to Gordon's death regarding final distribution of Gordon's estate. Included in the audio 
recordings was a recording of the decedent stating how he wanted his property distributed. 
Apparently according to Judd's affidavit, this portion of the tape was transcnbed and placed in 
will format, then signed by the decedent before witnesses, resulting in the transcription he had 
filed along with his petition for informal probate in December 2013. 
On March 31, 2014, the attorney for Keith filed a notice of withdrawal of Keith's 
objection to the will and to Judd's appointment as personal representative. 
On April 2, 2014, Judd and his counsel appeared for the bench trial, along with several 
witnesses. Thomas and his counsel failed to appear. The magistrate judge noted Thomas had set 
a hearing for the following day, and continued the matter to the next day. No other orders were 
entered. 
On April 3, 2014 a hearing was held. Judd and Thomas, with counse~ appeared. The 
parties argued their respective positions on Thomas' s petitions, and the magistrate judge, after 
reviewing the arguments and the record, ruled from the bench that he was denying the petitions 
filed by Thomas. No orders were entered on this ruling. 
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Thomas filed a motion for summary judgment on April 23, 2014, again contending the 
will was invalid and the residue of the estate should pass to Gordon's heirs under the laws of 
intestacy. The motion was not supported by affidavit, exlubit, or any other evidence, other than 
evidence previously entered. The estate filed a response, along with a counter motion for 
summary judgment, both supported by affidavits from Judd, Keith, and a sister of the decedent, 
as well as the previously submitted audio recordings. 
On June I 0, 2014, a hearing was held. The magistrate judge heard argument on the 
summary judgment motions, noted Thomas had put on no evidence in support of his position, 
and announced from the bench that he intended to grant the estate's motion for summary 
judgment and dismiss the motions filed by Thomas. Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration 
on June 20, 2014, apparently from the magistrate's oral rulings, as no written orders had been 
entered. The magistrate entered a written decision and order on summary judgment on June 25, 
2014, granting the summary judgment of the personal representative, denying the motions filed 
by Thomas, and dismissing his petitions. This court later concluded that this order mooted the 
motion for reconsideration and constituted the final appealable order on the matter. The effect of 
these rulings was to continue the probate of the will under the administration of Judd. 
On July 9, the estate filed a motion fur attorney fees, requesting fees and costs pursuant to 
J.C.§§ 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123(2)(a), and I.RC.P. 11 and 54(e), but not including J.C. § 15-
8-208. Thomas filed an opposition on July 31, contending he had not brought claims 
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," and arguing the requested fees were 
excessive. 
On August 13, 2014, Thomas filed a notice of appeal to this court from the final order 
issued June 10, 2014. The appeal was filed more than 42 days after entry of the order appealed 
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from This court dismissed the appeal on February 10, 2015, for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground it had been untimely filed. This court notes than an appeal of this ruling has been filed 
with the Supreme Court. 
The magistrate below addressed the estate's attorney fee motions in a memorandum 
decision on February 19, 2015. An attorney fee detennination, the magistrate judge explained, 
would require resolution of the questions of. (1) which party had ''prevailed," for purposes of the 
relevant statutory and rule provisions, and (2) whether the non-prevailing party "acted 
frivolously and without basis in fact or law." 
With respect to the prevailing party question, the magistrate judge noted Thomas had 
failed to appear for the April 2, 2014, bench trial and could not point to "good cause or excusable 
neglect," had lost on his removal and restraint petitions, and had finally lost on all his claims on 
summary judgment. As a result, the magistrate judge concluded, the estate was clearly the 
prevailing party in the proceedings. 
Turning to the frivolousness question, the magistrate ruled that Thomas's failure to 
appear for the trial on April second, bis duplication of arguments already made and ruled upon, 
and his repeated "failure to present any evidence supporting his claims or in opposition of the 
motion made by the estate," compelled a conclusion that the claims against the estate ''were 
frivolous and without foundation" and attorney fees were warranted. After considering the 
estate's itemization and the relevant Rule 54 factors, the magistrate judge awarded the estate 
$9,000 in fees. 
On March 23, 2015, Thomas appealed this court's order dismissing the appeal to the 
appellate court. On the same day, he appealed the magistrate's award of attorney fees to this 
court. 
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On appeal here, Thomas contends the magistrate judge abused his discretion in awarding 
the estate $9,000 in attorney fees, by relying improperly on a statutory provision, LC.§ 15-8-
208, not cited by the estate in its initial request, and by finding the requisite frivolous conduct. 
Further, Thomas maintains, the magistrate judge erred as a matter of law by issuing a decision on 
attorney fees within forty-two days of this court's dismissal of the prior appeal-a window in 
which, he theorizes, the proceeding should have been automatically stayed. 
The estate responds by arguing the magistrate judge appropriately relied upon several 
applicable statutory provisions in making the award, acted within his discretion in finding the 
claims frivolous, and had the authority to issue an attorney fee decision even while the 
underlying disposition was subject to appeal The estate requests attorney fees on appeal under 
I.RC.P. 54, LC.§ 12-121 et seq., 1.RC.P. 11, I.AR 11.2, and I.C. § 15-8-208. 
Scope and Standard of Review 
The court reviews a magistrate's attorney fee award for abuse of discretion Thomas v. 
Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,639, 132 P.3d 392,396 (2006). An award is said to have been within the 
magistrate's discretion under I.C. § 12-121 if the magistrate was "left with the abiding belief that 
the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). 
Analysis 
A. Applicability of Idaho Code § 15-8-208. The estate correctly points out that our 
appellate courts have "held in a variety of contexts that a correct ruling or order, based upon an 
incorrect theory, will nonetheless be upheld on appeal under the proper theory.,, Fournier v. 
Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600,602 (Ct. App. 1994). Provided, as the Fournier 




below by the party seeking such an award." Id. At a minimum, the Fournier court noted, due 
process requires that any theory selected on appeal as the "correct theory'' upon which an 
attorney fee award may be based must have been "advanced at the trial level by the party seeking 
fees." Id. In this case, the arguments and references in the court below were all made with regard 
to an award of attorney fees for cause, based upon the argument that the proceedings were 
frivolous and without foundation. There was no reference to the basis of fees under the probate 
code, J.C.§ 15-8-208; it was not mentioned in the pleadings, nor in argument. 
B. Bases alleged for imposition of attorney fees. Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides that 
"[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or 
parties," subject to the condition that the provision "shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute 
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees." Rule 54, I.RC.P., limits the 
application ofI.C. § 12-121, directing that under this section of the code fees "may be awarded 
by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Idaho Code § 12-123 addresses 
an overlapping application, providing that "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial in 
a civil action or within twenty-one days after the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous 
conduct." Frivolous conduct, under that provision, is defined as "conduct of a party to a civil 
action or of his counsel of record" that "obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another party to" the action, or "is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and 
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law." J.C. § 12-123(b). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ~ 7 
000060
- -
Interpreting those provisions in the past, our Idaho Supreme Court has explained the 
"entire course" of litigation "must be taken into account" in making an attorney fee 
determination, and "ifthere is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be 
awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 731, 302 P.3d 
349, 356 (2013). Recently, the Supreme Court has expressed concern that "a single, triable issue 
of fact may excuse a party from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the 
conduct of the lawsuit." Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632, 
329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014). 
The Maslen court backed away from a strict application of the rule and recognized that an 
award of attorney fees under J.C.§ 12-121 may still be appropriate if the court, in considering 
the entire course of litigation, is left with the conviction that the management of the case as a 
whole was frivolous or without foundation, notwithstanding the existence of an isolated 
legitimate issue. The Supreme Court in Maslen ruled that in such an instance, the court should 
apportion an attorney fee award, separating out and awarding attorney fees for those portions of 
the case found to be frivolous or without foundation, but not awarding fees fur the portions of the 
case found to rest upon legitimate issues. 
An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is discretionary, but the discretion is not 
unfettered. The trial court is obligated to make specific findings of fact upon the elements of the 
case deemed to be frivolous or without foundation in order to support the award of fees. The 
problem with the instant case lies here; the court below advanced the conclusions that the 
circumstances were frivolous and without foundation, but without reference to specific facts to 
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support the conclusions. This might be accepted if the record was clear and the facts supporting 
the conclusions obvious. That is not the case here. 
Here, the magistrate judge noted the combination of. (1) the failure to appear at the April 
2, 2014, bench trial without explanation, (2) the failure to present any evidence supporting his 
claims, and (3) the failure to present any evidence resisting the estate's claims, all indicated that 
Thomas's claims against the estate were frivolous and without foundation. 
The first item cannot stand. The failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, without more, is 
not sufficient to prove frivolous conduct, or that the proponent's case is without foundation. It is 
not an uncommon occurrence for a lawyer to miss a scheduled hearing through simple oversight 
or mistake. The matter did not get calendared, or the lawyer forgot to look, or the lawyer just 
forgot. None of these are excusable, and frequently the circumstances will put the lawyer in a 
significant predicament with regard to whatever issue was involved in the overlooked hearing. 
But, in the absence of evidence of repeated happenings or of a deliberate course of conduct, the 
circumstance ofan isolated event of missing one hearing is not sufficient, standing alone, to 
support a conclusion that the case was frivolous nor is it evidence that the case that would have 
been advanced was without foundation. 
In the instant case, the magistrate referred several times to the missed hearing, but 
without connecting it to any course of conduct or deliberate indifference or other showing that 
the circumstance was not an isolated instance of simple oversight. The magistrate's conclusion 
that the incident is evidence of frivolous conduct or that the case was without foundation is not 
supported. His connection of the occurrence to the fmdings of an entitlement for attomey fees 
under I.C. § 12-121 is error. Given that he stated several times that he was relying upon this 
circumstance in his final conclusion, the error is prejudicial and necessitates a remand. 
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In ruling on the sufficiency ofThomas's case, the magistrate appears to combine the 
second and third items. The magistrate discusses Thomas's motion for summary judgment and 
his defense of the motion filed by Judd together. In ruling on these issues, he held, uAlthough 
Thomas Lanham, Jr. made several claims and allegations, he failed to support those claims with 
any admissible evidence necessary to sustain his burden of proof." The problem here is there is 
no "burden of proof' in a sunnnary judgment. The summary judgment motion rises or falls upon 
a showing, or lack thereof, based upon "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, 
to get her with the affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. I.R. C.P. 
56(c). 
In a summary judgment proceeding, the term "burden of proof' only has meaning with 
reference to the existence, or the lack thereof, of a dispute over an issue of fact, and to the point 
that if there is any question over the issue, the patty with the burden of proof must come forward 
with a showing that there are no disputes in the facts to be presented at trial. If an affidavit is 
submitted, it must be based on first-hand knowledge and contain admissible evidence. If the 
burden ofproofis relevant to a summary judgment, it is as part oftl1e ruling either that the party 
with the burden ofproofhas demonstrated that there are no facts in dispute to be proved at trial, 
or it is part of the ruling that the defending party has demonstrated that the facts claimed by the 
party with the burden of proof may not be found as claimed, thereby creating a dispute to be 
resolved at trial, and preventing a summary judgment. 
It is not necessary under this construct that the defending party put up "admissible 
evidence" of anything; while a defending pmiy may not rely upon mere denials, he may 
demonstrate that the evidence relied upon by the party with the burden of proof is not admissible. 
The contentions of the party with the burden of proof may not be legally sufficient, or 
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inadmissible as unfounded conclusions, as assuming facts not proved, as un-excepted hearsay, or 
for a variety oflegal deficits preventing their admission at the summary judgment stage and 
making them matters for the trier of fact to resolve at trial. He may show this because of a legal 
insufficiency, because of inherent or judicially cognizable credibility problems, or because of 
foundational issues pertaining to admissibility. Or he may be able to point to specific evidence 
contained in the affidavits and other materials already in the record or as submitted by the 
opponent, and demonstrate that this evidence supplied elsewhere is sufficient to contravene the 
main evidence and raise issue of fact. The point here is that it does not have to be done by 
counter affidavit. Rule 56( e) has been construed to mean that when a counter-affidavit is 
submitted, it must be of evidentiary quality, based on first-hand knowledge and advancing 
admissible facts. 
It is true that a defending party may not create ru1 issue of fact by merely denying an 
avennent of fact offered by the adverse party, but must specificaJJy declare the counter-fact. But 
if the fact advanced is, itself, inadmissible because it is conc1usory, or inherently problematic, or 
contains within it a legal hurdle requiring further foundation, or if the defending party suggests 
the existence of other evidence already in the record that demonstrates a foundational deficit or 
recognized objection that is not ru1swered, that would suffice as a defense to having swnmary 
judgment entered against the party, even in the absence of a separate affidavit or counter-
affidavit. Counsel may rely upon the affidavits and materials supplied by the opposing party. 
The point is that on summary judgement it is not who presented the evidence or the issue, 
it is what is the state of the record after all such is considered; is there or is there not a dispute as 
to any material fact necessitating a trial? 
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In this case, the magistrate merely noted that "Thomas Lanha~ Jr. filed no response to 
the estate's motion, as required by I.R.C.P. (56)(e)." Rule 56(e) says responsive showing may be 
by affidavit or as otherwise provided. This subpart of the rule does not absolutely require an 
affidavit-elsewhere in the rule it says the entire file may be considered in determining the 
existence/non-existence or disputed/non-disputed facts. However, here the magistrate seems to 
read this rule as saying there must be a counteraffidavit, or else. 
Appellant argues that he demonstrated the existence of facts in dispute through other 
means. Neither the magistrate nor the appellant specify what this means. This court notes very 
broadly that the appellant, a son of the decedent, would be cut off almost entirely once the 
purported will is admitted to probate-the bequest in the will to Thomas was for $1.00 only. The 
will was prepared from a transcript of an audio recording-it is not clear whether an attorney 
was involved. The will was witnessed, but the capacity of the witnesses is not clear. If there was 
no wiU, Thomas v.;ould be entitled a share of the estate under the laws of intestacy. Further, as a 
son of the decedent, Thomas would be entitled to preference over the cousin as personal 
representative. None of this appears by affidavit, but all appears either by law with reference to 
the laws of intestacy, or by reference to the allegations in t11e petition for informal probate 
submitted by Judd. Until the summary judgment, there was no adjudication nor were there any 
specific findings by the magistrate on any of these items. 
The statement ofinfonnal probate was not an adjudication. No definitive rulings were 
made at the January 21, 2014 hearing. It would seem that Thomas, as a questioning heir, is 
entitled to an adjudication that the will is the will, and that the cousin is entitled to letters of 
administration over any of the statutorily preferred heirs. From the record, it appears that Judd 
provided some information that would have been crucial to any detennination in the fonn of 
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copies of the audio recordings to Keith and Thomas and their lawyers just before the April 
hearings. Keith decided to withdraw his objection; Thomas did not. 
There is nothing in the record for these motions as to what these audio recordings were 
from the standpoint of their origination, reliability, or purpose. There is nothing to indicate what 
the foundation was in tenns of how they were made, who made them, how they were maintained, 
and as to the accuracy of any of the contents. It appears these recordings were at least part of the 
foundation for the will, for the contention that the decedent was of sound mind and not acting 
under duress, for the decedenfs decision in cutting off the sons, and for his decision to appoint 
the cousin as the personal representative. 
There are some representations as to some of this, but no findings or conclusions from the 
court on any ofit. Someone-it is not clear who-caused a portion of the audio recording to be 
typed up into a format of a will, and obtained the decedent's signature. It is not clear from this 
simple explanation that the decedent knew it was a will or intended it so. The burden of proof 
upon all of this, and particularly_upon the admission of these tapes, would be upon Judd, not 
Thomas, at both the summary judgment stage and at trial. 
All of this may actually have been submitted to the court below, but there are no findings 
by the magistrate on any ofit, either in the ruling on summary judgment or in the ruling on 
attorney fees. Thomas may not have had any specific facts to offer to refute the implications of 
the materials offered by Judd, but he might have thought it sufficient to raise the issue and then 
cross examine the proponents on most of it. One would certainly think the custodian of the aura] 
recordings would be subject to examination on the foundation-for if the foundation for these 
aural recordings was found lacking in any material respect, the entire case might have crumbled. 
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If there is substance to any of these legal deficiencies, Thomas would not be required to 
advance any counter evidence to sustain his defense of the summary judgment filed by Judd. The 
actual burden of proof is on Judd, and if it can be demonstrated that the evidence submitted by 
the proponent is lacking, or leaves any material issue for the trier of fact at trial, summary 
judgment should not be available. Since Judd would have the burden of proof upon the issue of 
the will, if there was a basis to find the evidence Judd was advancing presented an open question 
in any material aspect that might be found insufficient at trial to sustain his burden of proof, that 
would be a sound argument to present in defense of a summary judgment. 
Thomas might be wrong in so relying. The magistrate apparently concluded the 
foundational evidence was sufficient. But all that can be gleaned from the magistrate's written 
findings is that Thomas was wrong, and just being wrong does not mean the position taken was 
frivolous or without foundation. See, e.g., Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 879, 
865 P.2d 965,970 (1993) ("An action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simply 
because it ultimately fails."); Lieurance-Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536, 542, 129 P.3d 1285, 1291 
(Ct. App. 2006) (emphasizing that "failure to present a persuasive custody case did not render" 
pursuit of the case "frivolous and unreasonable.''). Given the open questions that come to mind 
because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the manner in which the will was drafted, 
perhaps raising an issue as to the competence and possibility of duress of the decedent, perhaps 
as to questions as to the legal sufficiency of the will, given further how it was prepared and 
witnessed, the hearsay nature of the central evidence, and the foundational issues over the aural 
recordings, I do not believe it can be concluded that resting on an expectation that the foundation 
for some essential part of some of this might have been found lacking, can be said to be frivolous 
or without foundation, without specific findings to resolve these unanswered questions. 
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This is not to conclude that the magistrate was in error; this is only to conclude the 
magistrate's findings are insufficient to support his conclusion. See, e.g., McGrew, 139 Idaho at 
562 ("Although an award of attorney fees under the statute is discretionary, the award must be 
supported by findings, and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record.''). The court 
below fastens on the failure to appear at the April 2 hearing and the failure to affirmatively 
advance evidence by affidavit. Standing alone or taken together, these conclusions are 
insufficient to demonstrate frivolousness or lack of foundation. There may well be additional 
details in the record and other indicia from which further findings can be drawn. But on the 
record before this court, the bare conclusions cannot be sustained. See Severson v. Hermann, 
116 Idaho 497, 499, 777 P .2d 269, 271 (1989) ("[O]n review, we are left with nothing but a bare 
conclusion lacking the requisite underpinning .... "). Therefore, the matter will be 
remanded for reconsideration by the magistrate consistent with this opinion, and for the entry of 
properly detailed and specific findings of fact, whichever way the magistrate finally concludes, 
to support the conclusions reached. 
C. Ruling on attorney fees with appeal pending. There is no merit to the argument that 
the magistrate lacked authority to rule on the attorney fee issue once the appeal to the district 
court had been filed. The appellate rules clearly provide that the trial court retains jurisdiction to 
act on matters pertaining to costs and attorney fees after the filing of a notice of appeal. I.AR 




D. Attorney fees on appeal. There is no prevailing party yet, and therefore no basis for 
considering attorney fees at this juncture. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, the ruling of the court below awarding attorney fees to the estate and 
against Thomas E. Lanham is vacated. The matter is remanded to the magistrate below to reconsider 
the issue of attorney fees in light of the directions contained herein, and to prepare appropriately 
detailed findings of fact supporting any conclusions reached. No attorney fees on this appeal. 
Dated 21 day ofNovember, 2015. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on 25 November, 2015, s/he served a true and conformed 
copy of the original of the foregoing MEMORANDUM RE: APPEAL OF ATTORNEY FEE 
AW ARD upon the following individuals in the manner described: 
Upon Patrick J. Geile, Matthew G. Bennett, Foley Freman, PLLC, PO Box 10, 
Meridian, ID 83680; 
and upon Nancy L. Callahan by placing a copy in each said counsel's box at the 
Clerk's Office. 
whens/he deposited the same into the US Mail, sufficient postage affixed. 
SHELLY TILTON, Clerk of the Court 
By:~C1Q~D-
Deputy Clerk 
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SUMMARY OF DISC RECEIVED FROM 
KEITH LANHAM ON MARCH 22, 2016 
This disc is dictation by G. T. Lanham. The below entries are not chronological but are in 
the order as contained on the disc. The entrie_s are paraphrased versions of Mr. Lanham's 
dictation. 
February 1, 2011: Beautiful day. In the hospital with dehydration. Will be giving some 
items to Judd. 
NOTE: WILL IS DATED FEBRUARY 19, 2011. 
March 3,2011: 
March 9,2011: 
March 19, 2011: 
May 20, 2011: 
no date: 
Lists vehicles, trailers, equipment, horse, tools, tool boxes. 
Keith does not call back. Leave Keith one dollar. More personal 
property listed for Judd to take care of. 
27 acres (east) of Big Creek: to Jamie Gillahan 
20 acres (west) of Big Creek: to Joe and Thomas (grandsons) 
34 acres and 86 acres (w/ water) to? 
four inches of snow 
Will be including some new information about my will. 
September 27,2011: No reference to property 
NOW BACK TO 2010 
December 12, 2010: para. 8 of will 
December 19, 2010 para. 9 of will 
cJJ" "\. 
January 7,~: para. IO of will 
November 16, 2010: para 1 of will 
November 18, 2010: para 2 and 3 of will 
November 19, 2010: para. 4 of will 
November 29, 2010: para 5 of will 
December 1, 2010: para. 6 of will 
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December 9, 2010: para 7 of will 
NOTE: The transcriber of Mr. Lanham's dictation (Rebecca Clift?) obviously 
listened to the disc in its entirety and then transcribed it chronologically by the date of each entry. 
The transcription was on January 19, 2011, prior to Mr. Lanham completing his dictation. 
Paragraph 11 of the will, naming Judd the executor is not contained in the dictation. 
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Nancy Callahan - 208<1646 p.2 
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Nancy L. Callahan 
Idaho State Bar #4884 
Rolf M. Kehne 
Idaho State Bar #2180 
LAW OFFICES OF NANCY L. CALLAHAN 
101 Canal Street 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Telephone: (208) 365-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 365-1646 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
APR o 2 2014 
SHFJ..,Lv·rlj..TON,CLERK 
Lau r.au.o.aso.mE:-PuTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 








CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
INVENTORY 
_________ ) 
The undersigned, as Personal Representative of the estate of the 
above named decedent, states and represents as follows: 
1. The schedule attached hereto constitutes a full and complete 
inventory of the property owned by the decedent as far as the 
same has come to the possession or knowledge of the 
undersigned; 
2. The values set forth in such schedules are the fair market values 
of the decedent's property as of December 5, 2013, the date of 
the decedent's death, as determined by the undersigned. 
J 
DATED this ,J1v day of April 2014. 
INVENTORY - PAGE 1 





d Nancy Callahan - 208-1646 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2L~/ 
THE UNDERSIGNED, states that on the ~ day of April 2014, the 
undersigned caused delivery in the manner indicated to the following persons 
at the addresses shown below: 
,, 
/court Basket 
William F. Lee 
Attorney for Keith Colby Lanham 
3421 Butte Road 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Thomas Everett Lanham 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
Kathy Gillihan 
10041 DeWitt 
Boise, Idaho 83704 . 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Attorney for Linda Louise Andrews Lanham 
Facsimile: (208) 947-5910 
Judd Max Lanham 
1504 N. McKinney 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
INVENTORY- PAGE 2 
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... Nancy Callahan -
Inventory of Property 
Gordon Thomas Lanham, Deceased 
As of December 5, 2014 
ASSETS 
Real Propertv 
Ranch and Land at 3555 Butte Rd. 
Emmett. ID in Gem County Parcel #RP00418700 
Land at 3557 Butte Rd., Emmett, ID 
Gem County Parcel #RP00418817 2012 Assessed Value 
47+ acres on Big Creek in Valley County; 
2012 Assessed Value (undeveloped forest land) 
(Market value assumed to be considerably higher) 
Bank Accounts 
Home Federal Bank 








Undistributed proceeds of Hazel Lanham estate To Be Determined 
Personal Property 
Household Goods, Fann Tools and Equipment 
Guns (preliminary unappraised valuation) 
Cash and Coins 
Total 
LIABILITIES 
Encumbrances and Debts 
Mortgage held by Linda Louise Andrews Lanham 
Medical Bills (amounts pending insurance claims filed) 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
TOTAL NET VALUE 
* Payable on Death Transfer of Ownership Deed 












IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 43105 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OF: GORDON THOMAS LANHAM, ) 
Deceased. ) ----------------









) Filed: February 25, 2016 
) 
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
) AMENDED OPINION 
) THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION 
) DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2016, 
) IS HEREBY AMENDED 
) 
) ________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Gem 
County. Hon. D. Duff McKee, District Judge; Hon. Tyler D. Smith, Magistrate. 
Intermediate appellate decision dismissing appeal, affirmed. 
Foley Freeman, PLLC; Patrick J. Geile and Matthew G. Bennett, Meridian, for 
respondent-appellant-appellant on appeal. Matthew G. Bennett argued. 
Law Offices of Nancy L. Callahan; Nancy L. Callahan and Rolf M. Kehne, 
Emmett, for personal representative-respondent-respondent on appeal. Rolf M. 
Kehne argued. 
HUSKEY, Judge 
Thomas E. Lanham (Appellant) appeals from the district court's order dismissing the 
appeal filed in this case, arguing that his appeal to the district court was timely. For the reasons 





FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After Gordon Thomas Lanham's (Testator) death, Judd Max Lanham (Respondent) filed 
an application for informal probate and was appointed personal representative. Subsequently, 
Appellant filed a petition for order restraining the Respondent. After a hearing, the magistrate 
denied Appellant's motion. 
Appellant then filed a motion for summary judgment. Respondent filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. At the hearing on June 10, 2014, the magistrate 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a 
motion for reconsideration, but the motion neither included a notice of hearing nor indicated 
whether Appellant desired oral argument; both requirements under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(b). 1 On June 25, 2014, the magistrate filed both an order granting the Respondent's cross-
motion for summary judgment and a judgment. In the judgment, the magistrate did not 
acknowledge the motion for reconsideration. Appellant did not pursue the motion for 
reconsideration after the final judgment was filed. 
On August 13, 2014, Appellant appealed to the district court. Respondent filed a motion 
to dismiss, arguing that Appellant's appeal was untimely filed. The district court held that the 
notice of appeal was filed outside the forty-two-day period and that the motion for 
reconsideration did not toll the time for appeal because it was filed before the magistrate entered 
the judgment. Appellant timely appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether an appeal to the district court was timely filed is a question of law. Goodman 
Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56, 58, 205 P.3d 1192, 1194 (2009). 
Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 
610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 555, 768 P.2d 815, 818 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
Unless a motion may be heard ex parte, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) requires a written motion 
, and a notice of hearing to be filed with the court. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) requires a party to indicate on 





Appellant argues the magistrate's judgment was not a valid final judgment. Appellant 
also argues that his motion for reconsideration should be treated like a motion to alter or amend 
judgment and that his motion tolls the period for appeal. 
A. The Magistrate's Judgment was a Valid Final Judgment 
Appellant argues the magistrate's judgment was not a valid judgment because it, inter 
alia, contains a recital of the pleadings, in contravention of I.R.C.P. 54(a). Appellant cites 
Wicket v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532,363 P.3d 854 (2015), in support of his position. 
In Wicke!, the appellant filed a complaint against the respondent for medical malpractice. 
The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on 
July 25, 2013. The district court entered a purported final judgment on July 30, 2013. The 
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on August 12, 2013, which the district court denied. 
Appellant timely appealed. On October 28, 2013, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the 
district court because the July 2013 order was not a final judgment as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
On October 30, 2013, the Appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration. The district court 
entered a proper final judgment on October 31, 2013. On December 18, 2013, the district court 
determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider the second motion for reconsideration because 
it was filed more than fourteen days after the entry of the July 2013 judgment. The appellant 
again appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted the July 2013 judgment was not 
a valid final judgment but, instead, was an interlocutory order. The second motion for 
reconsideration was timely because it was filed before or within 14 days of the entry of the actual 
final judgment entered in October 2013. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district 
court on December 23, 2015. 
Of note, on February 12, 2015, the Supreme Court entered an order entitled In Re: 
Finality of Judgments Entered Prior to April 15, 2015 (Standing Order). In pertinent part, the 
order stated that "any judgment, decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended 
to be final but which did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) ... shall be 
treated as a final judgment." 
Wicket neither overrules nor contradicts the Standing Order. The doctrine of the law of 
the case provides that upon: 
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an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a 
principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes 
the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, 
both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. 
Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). In Wicke/, the Supreme Court 
determined that the initial judgment was not a final judgment almost two years before it issued 
the Standing Order. Wicke!, 159 Idaho 537, 363 P.3d at 859. Therefore, under the law of the 
case, as of October 2013, when the second motion for reconsideration was filed, the July 2013 
order was not a valid final judgment. Even though the opinion on the second Wicke/ appeal was 
issued after the Standing Order, the Supreme Court was obligated to follow the law of the case 
established in the previous appeal. To allow the parties to relitigate the finality of the initial 
purported final judgment would transgress the purpose of the doctrine of the law of the case. 
Therefore, we hold that Wicke/ is not controlling precedent in this case and this Court will defer 
to the Standing Order as the controlling authority. 
Although the final judgment issued in this c_ase did not comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a), it 
became a valid final judgment by virtue of the Standing Order. 
B. The Magistrate Presumptively Denied Appellant's Motion by Entering the Final 
Judgment 
Appellant argues that his motion can be treated as either a motion for reconsideration 
under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) or a motion to alter or amend judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
Appellant further argues that his motion, under either rule, tolled the period for appeal. 
Respondent argues Appellant's motion was a motion for reconsideration pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) and cannot toll the period of appeal because it was not timely filed. We 
hold that although Appellant's motion was a timely filed motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B), it was presumptively denied when the magistrate entered the final 
judgment. Because the motion for reconsideration was presumptively denied, it did not toll the 
time for appeal. 
1. Appellant's motion was a motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) 
We begin by determining whether Appellant's motion is actually a motion for 
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) or a motion to alter or amend judgment under 
I.R.C.P 59(e). A motion for reconsideration allows a party to move a court to reconsider an 
interlocutory order. I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). An interlocutory order is an order that is temporary in 
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nature or does not completely adjudicate the parties' dispute. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace 
& Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 107, 294 P .32 1111, 1119 (2013). When an order granting 
summary judgment is filed before a final judgment, the order granting summary judgment is an 
interlocutory order. Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,911,332 P.3d 815, 823 (2014). 
Here, Appellant moved the court to reconsider its ruling on Respondent's cross-motion 
for summary judgment, not the final judgment. Because Appellant filed the motion prior to entry 
of the final judgment and was only challenging the order granting summary judgment, an 
interlocutory order, Appellant's motion is a motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), rather than a motion to alter or amend judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
2. Appellant's motion for reconsideration was timely filed 
Having determined that Appellant's motion was a motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B), we now determine whether Appellant's motion was timely filed. A motion 
for reconsideration of any interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any time before 
the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after the entry of the final judgment. 
1.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B). When judgment has been pronounced in open court, requiring a litigant to 
wait to seek reconsideration until the court clerk has file-stamped the written order would be 
hyper-technical and violate the spirit of the rules of civil procedure. See Willis v. Larsen, 110 
Idaho 818, 821, 718 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1986). Therefore, Appellant's motion was timely filed, 
even though it was filed prior to entry of the written order. 
3. Appellant's motion for reconsideration was presumptively denied by entry of 
the final judgment 
A final judgment is "an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject 
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It 
must be a separate document that on its face states the relief granted or denied." T.J.T., Inc. v. 
Mori, 148 Idaho 825,826,230 P.3d 435,436 (2010). The purpose of a rule requiring that every 
judgment be set forth on a separate document is to eliminate confusion about when the clock for 
an appeal begins to run. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619, 
226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010). A final judgment that does not dispose of outstanding issues in a 
case does not fulfill its purpose. Therefore, where a trial court fails to rule on a motion for 
reconsideration filed prior to the entry of a final judgment, we presume the district court denied 




In Wolfe, the appellant was convicted of first degree murder in 1982. In 2004, he filed an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 58, 343 P.3d at 500. The 
motion was denied as untimely; the appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration. Id. 
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, the appellant filed a petition for post-
conviction relief. Id. Thereafter, the district court ordered that the motion for reconsideration 
and the petition for post-conviction relief be decided in one civil case. Id. at 61, 343 P.3d at 503. 
The district court subsequently issued its memorandum decision and order advising the parties 
that the appellant's claims would be dismissed as untimely but did not separately or explicitly 
rule on the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 59,343 P.3d at 501. The district court then entered 
its order dismissing the appellant's civil case. Id. Four years later, the appellant moved the 
district court for a hearing on his seven-year-old motion for reconsideration. Id. The district 
court denied the appellant's motion for a hearing; a timely appeal followed. Id. 
The Supreme Court held the district court did not err when it denied the appellant's 
motion for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 61, 343 P.3d at 503. The Court 
presumed, under the doctrine of the presumption of regularity and validity of judgments, that the 
district court considered the appellant's motion for reconsideration when it issued its 
memorandum decision and order. Id. The Court further noted, "[W]e have held that where a 
district court fails to rule on a motion, we presume the district court denied the motion." Id. 
Because the district court did not rule on the appellant's motion for reconsideration, the Supreme 
Court presumed the district court denied the motion. Id. at 62, 343 P.3d at 504. The Court noted 
that the presumption became a conclusion because the subsequent order dismissed the entire civil 
case. Id. The Court then held, because the order dismissed the entire case and the appellant 
failed to file a notice of appeal within forty-two days, the district court did not err in denying the 
motion for a hearing. Id. 
As in Wolfe, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration that was neither explicitly ruled 
. on nor mentioned in the final judgment. However, as in Wolfe, we presume the court denied the 
motion when it failed to rule on it. The presumption became a conclusion when the final 
judgment was entered. Additionally, presumptively denying outstanding motions by entering 
final judgment ensures that a final judgment actually ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject 
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, while 
simultaneously avoiding confusion about when the time for an appeal begins to run. 
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As noted above, Appellant's motion for reconsideration failed to comply with several 
sections of LR.C.P. 7. The failure to comply with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) was 
further exacerbated by Appellant's failure to pursue his motion for reconsideration at any time 
prior to the filing of the notice of appeal or acknowledge his motion for reconsideration in his 
opening appellate brief to the district court. 2 If Appellant was interested in pursuing the motion 
for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon Appellant to bring the motion to the attention of the 
court. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 62 n.3, 343 P.3d at 504 n.3. Because Appellant waited forty-nine 
days after the entry of judgment to file his appeal, the appeal is untimely. I.R.C.P. 83(e). 
Moreover, fairness and equity do not allow Appellant to destroy the finality of a 
judgment by failing to pursue the motion in this case and then claim that failure tolled the time 
for appeal. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. I.R.C.P. l(a). But to allow a 
motion that did not comply with I.R.C.P. 7, and which Appellant did not pursue, to toll the 
period for appeal does not advance those goals.3 Instead, it allows a party to attempt to 
indefinitely toll the period of appeals and can create confusion about when the time for an appeal 
begins to run. 
Accordingly, we hold that an outstanding motion for reconsideration is presumptively 
denied when a trial court enters a final judgment and thus, does not toll the time for filing an 
appeal. 
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Appellant seeks an award of costs and attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 15-8-208 and 
12-121. In addition to those statutes, Respondent seeks costs and attorney fees under 
I.C. § 12-123, I.R.C.P. 11, and Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. 
2 Even ifwe did not presume the magistrate denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration, 
Appellant abandoned that motion by not pursuing it at any point between the entry of the final 
judgment and the filing of the notice of appeal. Appellant had the burden to pursue the motion 
for reconsideration in the event the district court failed to rule on it. Because he failed to pursue 
the motion, Appellant abandoned the motion. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 62 n.3, 343 P.3d at 504 
n.3; see also Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433, 437, 4 P.3d 545, 549 (2000). 
3 In addition to the civil rules mentioned above, Appellant also failed to state that his 
motion for reconsideration was based on I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) (a motion shall 
state with particularity the ground therefor, including the number of the applicable civil rule). 
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On appeal, Appellant did not act frivolously. Therefore, neither party is entitled to fees 
under LC. §§ 12-121 and 12-123, LR.C.P. 11, or LA.R. 11.2. Under LC. § 15-8-208, an 
appellate court may, in its discretion, award costs or attorney fees to any party. We hold that 
neither party is entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's intermediate appellate decision dismissing 
appeal is affirmed. 




WlLLlAM F. LEE 
Attorney at Law 
629 E. Main Street 




Attorney for Petitioner Keith C. Lanham 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF GEM 











CASE NO. CV 2013-886 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAW AL OF 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
AND FOR DECLARATION OF 
JNTESTACY AND OTIIBR RELIEF 
p.2 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Petitioner Keith Lanham hereby withdraws his 
Petition for Removal of Personal Representative and for Declaration of Intestacy and Other Relief 
filed in this matter on the ground and for the reason that said Petitioner no longer wishes to pursue .., 
said Petition. 
Dated this 30th day of March 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner Keith Lanham 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE AND FOR DECLARATION OF INTESTACY AND OTHER RELIEF-I 
EXHIBIT 12 
000084
William Flee - p.3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 st day of March 2014, served a true and correct copy of 
this Notice to Nancy Callahan, attorney for said Estate and Judd Lanham, by leaving a copy is said 
counsel's basket at the Gem County Clerk's office and to Douglas Fleenor attorney for Thomas 
Lanham by facsimile transmission to said counsel's facsimile of record being: 947-5910. 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAW AL OF PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF PERSONAL 




efri~/llt - • 
_I Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239 
r.:;::::C Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992 
7 CAREY PERKINS LLP 
::= Capitol Park Plaza 
(..!) 300 North 6th Street, Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 519 
c.:r::: Boise, Idaho 83701 
O Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant, by and through his counsel of 
record, Carey Perkins LLP, and hereby answers the Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
First Defense 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 





Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Plaintiffs' Complaint not 
herein expressly and specifically admitted. 
II. 
Admit that Defendant is, and at all relevant times was, an attorney licensed 
to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
Admit that Defendant had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff Thomas 
Lanham. 
Third Defense 
Lack of privity between Plaintiff Keith Lanham and Defendant. 
Fourth Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
Fifth Defense 
Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were proximately caused by the negligence, 
omissions, actions or comparative fault of other third persons or entities for which this 
answering Defendant is not legally responsible and that responsibility should be compared 
by Idaho law. 
Sixth Defense 
Plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages, if any. 
Seventh Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred in whole or in part by the fact that their injuries 
and damages, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by superseding and/or 
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intervening acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or persons or entities other than the 
Defendant, and/or by superseding and/or intervening forces other than those controlled by 
Defendant. 
Eighth Defense 
Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest as to some or all of their claims. 
Ninth Defense 
Plaintiffs' clai,ms are barred by the doctrine of prevention. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiffs take nothing by way of their 
Complaint, that their claims against Defendant be dismissed with prejudice, that Defendant 
be awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to all applicable law 
and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and reasonable. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant demands a trial by jury of twelve ( 12) as to all issues. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2016. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
BY--,-----------1-t------
Riehard L. Stubbs, 0 the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of June, 2016, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as 
follows: 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
7 Richard L. Stubbs 
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ALLEN B. ELLIS 
ELLIS LAW, PLLC 
-
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83 713 
208/345-7832 (Tel) 
208/345-9564 (Fax) 
ISB No. 1626 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
-
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A.M. ____ P.M. ___ _ 
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tit SIANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P. 
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead 
of Keith C. Lanham 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 













Case No. CV-2016-8252 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Come now plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and move the Court for an order of 
partial summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on the following issues as a matter of law: 
(1) Proximate causation: That had the underlying notice of appeal In the Matter of the 
Estate of Gordon T. Lanham (Gem County Case No. CV 2013-0886) been timely filed, plaintiffs 
Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the decedent's 
real property; and 
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(2) Defendant owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham: Notwithstanding the absence of a 
conventional attorney/client relationship between defendant and plaintiff Keith Lanham, under the 
circumstances defendant Fleenor owed plaintiff Keith, as an intestate heir, a duty of care to file a 
timely appeal. 
This motion is based upon the memorandum oflaw filed herewith, the declaration of Allen 
B. Ellis, the affidavit of Samantha L. Lundberg, and the pleadings and records in this action. 
Dated this ~ day of August, 2016. 
Al£5f%7 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this __ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
__ Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(~5-8660) 
Allen B. Ellis 
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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Nature of case and grounds for partial summary judgment: In this action for legal 
malpractice, the will of the decedent Gordon Lanham disinherited his surviving children, the plaintiffs 
Thomas and Keith Lanham. In the underlying probate matter, the magistrate erroneously ruled that 
the will of Gordon Lanham disposed of the entirety of his assets. In reality, the will failed to devise 
the decedent's real property which should have passed to plaintiffs by intestate succession. Plaintiff 
Thomas Lanham retained defendant Fleenor to appeal the magistrate decision. Mr Fleenor 
negligently filed an untimely appeal which was ultimately dismissed and which dismissal was 
affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
By plaintiffs' motion, they seek to dispose of two issues: 
(1) Proximate causation: In the context of proximate causation, plaintiffs seek 
a ruling that had the underlying appeal not been dismissed, the plaintiffs would have prevailed. As 
such they would be accorded the status of intestate heirs to the undevised real property. Based upon 
the unanimous authority cited below, the Court, not the jury, must opine as to the merits of the appeal. 
(2) Duty of care owed to Keith: Plaintiff Keith Lanham did not have an 
attorney/client relationship with defendant Fleenor. That is, it was Thomas Lanham who retained Mr. 
Fleenor to pursue the appeal. However, under the criteria set down in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 
Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), particularly the foreseeability of harm to Keith in the event of an 
untimely appeal, defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to Keith as well as Thomas. Much like a 
named beneficiary in a will who takes nothing because of a drafting error, Keith, an intestate heir, was 
damaged by the untimely appeal and has standing to allege professional negligence. See Lucas v. 
Hamm, infra, p. 16. 
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Standard of review: The Court is familiar with the standard of review respecting motions 
for summary judgment and it will not be recited here, e.g., Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 
Idaho 632,637,339 P.3d 357 (2014). Suffice it to say that issues identified above are issue oflaw, 
and there are no issues of fact to be disposed of in these motion proceedings. 
Exhibits: The referenced exhibits are the exhibits attached to the Lundberg affidavit 
(alphabetical) and Ellis declaration (numbered) previously filed. 
THE FAIL URE TO TIMELY APPEAL THE MAGISTRATE 
DECISION PROXIMATELY RESULTED IN PLAINTIFFS 
LOSS OF THEIR STATUS AS INTESTATE HEIRS. 
Gist of alleged malpractice: The Lanham Will (Exhibit A) which lacked a residuary clause 
failed to devise two pieces of real property.1 Notwithstanding, the magistrate erroneously ruled that 
the Will bequeathed the testator's estate in its entirety. Defendant attorney appealed the magistrate 
decision but missed the appeal deadline by seven days. As a proximate result, plaintiff Thomas 
Lanham was prevented from reversing the magistrate decision by which reversal both plaintiffs would 
have acquired the status of intestate heirs to the decedent's real property. 
According to the leading treatise on legal malpractice, attorney errors in post-judgment and 
appellate matters make up a substantial portion of malpractice suits filed. 
Attorneys frequently have been sued concerning posttrial procedures 
or appeals. . . The nature of alleged errors is as varied as the 
posttrial procedures available to the client. These include failing to 
make posttrial motions; improperly made posttrial motions; advising 
against taking an appeal; failing to advise of an appeal; failing to take 
preliminary steps necessary to appeal, such as moving for a new trial; 
1As used herein, the rfieaning of the term "residuary clause", is consistent with the definition in 
Black's Law Dictionary: "A tJstamentary clause that disposes of any estate property remaining after the 
I 
satisfaction of specific bequests and devises". Id., Seventh Edition, p. 1311. 
l 
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failing to file notice of appeal timely; failing to file required records, 
transcripts, and factual statements necessary to perfect the appeal; and 
negligence in presenting the client's intentions. 
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition (West), Mallen & Smith, Vol. 4, sec. 33:43, pp. 924,925 (emphasis 
added), including seven pages of footnotes with citations. 
In Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482, 83 5 P .2d 1293 ( 1992), the client stated a cause of action 
against his attorney for filing an untimely motion for new trial. 
Dismissed appeal and proximate causation: The magistrate's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (prepared by the executor's attorney) are Exhibit 5 to the Ellis declaration. The 
Court of Appeals recently affirmed the district court's decision, sitting as an appellate court, that 
defendant Fleenor had failed to timely file an appeal from the magistrate decision. See In the Matter 
of the Estate of Gordon Lanham (Docket No. 43105, 2016 Opinion No. 13A, February 24, 2016). 
That is, it is undisputed that defendant Fleenor filed an untimely notice of appeal. See Judgment 
(Exhibit 6) and Notice of Appeal (Exhibit 7). By the failed appeal, plaintiffs lost their claim to being 
intestate beneficiaries to the real property in the Lanham Estate. See Exhibit 11. 
Two major real estate holdings of the decedent are the focus of the herein litigation: (a) a 220 
acre ranch in Gem County, and (b) a 47 acre parcel in Valley County ("Big Creek"). The Will does 
not purport to devise either piece of real estate. 
As to Big Creek, the Will does not devise that property but recites "I want to think about that 
47 acres in Big Creek" (Exhibit A, p. 3). As to the 220 acre ranch, the Will is silent. This silence is 
due to the fact that the decedent attempted to deed that property to his grandson thirty days before he 
died. See Exhibit 1 to Ellis declaration. This so-called deed was never "delivered" in the eyes of the 
law because the decedent retained all possessory rights to the ranch including the right of sale and 
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retention of the sale proceeds., i.e., the ranch remained in decedent's estate. Garrettv. Garrett, 154 
Idaho 788, 791 (2013). 
The executor must have recognized that this deed was ineffective to convey the ranch property 
because the ranch is included on the executor's inventory. See Exhibit 9. 
Because the Will did not devise these two acreages and given the absence of a residuary 
clause, these properties should have passed to the plaintiffs by intestate succession, i.e., they are the 
sole surviving offspring of the widowed decedent. That is, the magistrate committed error in ruling 
that the Will disposed of the entirety of the decedent's estate. See Exhibits 5 and 6 (Findings of 
Fact/Conclusion of Law and Judgment). Defendant's untimely appeal allowed the magistrate's error 
to go unchallenged. 
Idaho law of partial intestacy: In the absence of a specific devise of the property as well as 
the absence of a residuary clause, Idaho case law requires that this real property descend according 
to intestate succession, i.e., there is a partial intestacy arising from the Lanham Will: 
In other words if the will clearly discloses that the testator did not 
dispose of all of his property, particularly in the absence of a residuary 
clause, then the omitted property must descend according to the laws 
of succession. 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339 (1963). 
Defendant Fleenor acknowledged this point oflaw in his unsuccessful motion for summary 
judgment: "When a devise fails and the will lacks a residuary clause, the residue passes through 
intestate succession. In re Corwin 's Estate . . " See Fleenor brief, Exhibit 2, p. 4. The 
executor's brief is Exhibit 3 and Fleenor's reconsideration brief is Exhibit 4. 
Plaintiffs recognize that the Courts "favor testacy rather than intestacy". In re Corwin 's 
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Estate, 86 Idaho at 5. Notwithstanding, a Court may not be allowed to speculate as to testamentary 
intent. 
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the 
court is not permitted to place on the will any construction not 
expressed in it, and which is based upon supposition as to the intention 
of the testator in the disposition of his estate. 
Id., 86 Idaho at 5. 
There is not a hint in the Will as to whom the testator intended as beneficiary as to either Big 
Creek or the ranch property. In fact as to Big Creek, he expressed the desire to "think about" it 
(Exhibit A, p. 3). A fair inference is that the Will does not reference the ranch because it was 
decedent's intention, as borne out later, to dispose of it by an attempted inter-vivos transaction. See 
Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiffs' entitlement as intestate heirs is not affected by the testamentary language limiting 
their bequests to one dollar apiece: A general principle of both American and British jurisprudence 
is that a testator can only alter the mandate of the intestacy laws by disposing of the property by will. 
That is, decedent's disinheritance of plaintiffs does not impair their status as intestate heirs to the real 
property not disposed of by the Will. 
. . . Michigan has held that a testator could not limit or eliminate 
an heir from receiving that portion of an estate governed by the statute 
descent and distribution except by disposing of the property by will. 
Southgate v. Karp, 154Mich. 697, 118N.W. 600; Inre McKay Estate, 
357 Mich. 447, 98 N.W.2d 604. 
In these cases, Michigan followed the general rule in American and 
British jurisprudence. Boisseau v. Aldridges, 5 Leigh 222, 32 Va. 222, 
27 Am Dec. 590; Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S.E. 672, 2 
L.R.A. 848; Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S.W. 639; Pickering v. 
Stamford, (1797), 3 Ves. Jun. 492 (30 Eng. Rep. 1121); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 4 Beav. 318 (49 Eng. Rep. 361). See also Page on Wills 
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(Lifetime ed.), § 939, p. 857; 96 C.J.S. Wills§ 1225, p. 1072; 57 Am. 
Jur § 1170. 
In the Estate of Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535,537 (Mich. 1960). 
Plaintiffs concede that the absence of a residuar:y clause does not, per se, render the Will a 
nullity: Plaintiffs do asset that failure of the Will to devise the real properties and the absence of a 
residuary clause, require that those properties descend according to the laws of intestate succession, 
i.e., to plaintiffs as the surviving issue of the decedent. See Idaho Code§ 15-2-103. 
There is a fatal ambiguity in the Will as to what extent the executor was given "donative" 
powers: At one point in the Will, the testator recites that the executor may distribute the estate 
property as he "sees fit". However, thereafter the testator makes specific bequests of personal 
property to certain persons. As to the Big Creek property, he wants to "think about it". Then, the 
concluding sentence of the Will constrains the executor to "distribute my property and personal 
effects as stated in my Last Will and Testament". Exhibit A, p. 5. See below regarding odd 
circumstances of the Will's creation (pp. 10, 11 ). 
There are several inconsistencies in the above Will provisions. However, it is clear that the 
executor was not given authority to distribute the Big Creek property. And because of his subsequent 
attempted conveyance of the ranch property, bequeathing that property was likely not on testator's 
radar screen at the time the Will was signed. 
In order for a power of appointment to be coherent and enforceable, there must be a clear 
definition of what property is subject to the power. Here, given the mishmash of testamentary intent, 
i.e., expressed uncertainty (Big Creek), actual devises to named persons, devises as the executor "sees 
fit", an ineffective inter-vivos transfer, and post-Will "devises" (Exhibit 9), it cannot be determined 
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from the Will what property is actually subject to the so-called power of appointment. As noted in 
the California case cited by defendant, the power of appointment, to be effective, must designate 
specific assets of the decedent. Estate of Conroy, 67 Cal.App.3d 734, 738, 135 Cal Rptr 807 (App. 
1977). 
In the event the power of appointment existed, it clearly did not pertain to property that (a) the 
testator had not decided about (Big Creek), or (b) property that was not identified in the Will (the 
ranch property). 
The odd circumstances surrounding the Will's origins: The background of the Will's 
authorship lends credence to the assertion that it suffers from at least partial intestacy. This 
background also accounts for the various ambiguities noted above. As evinced by the informal syntax 
of the Will, it was dictated by the testator, transcribed, and signed with the apparent testamentary 
formalities. After execution, the testator made further devises by dictation which were never 
incorporated into the Will. See Exhibit 9 to Ellis declaration. This raises the reasonable inference 
that the testator did not perceive Exhibit A (the Will) to be his last will and testament. 
In Judge McKee's written decision on an attorney fee issue, he made the following 
observations about the Will and the adjudicative process with respect thereto (paraphrased from Judge 
McKee's Memorandum Decision, Exhibit 8): 
(1) The will was prepared from a transcript of an audio recording; it is not clear 
whether an attorney was involved; 
(2) There is nothing in the record as to the origination, reliability or purpose and 
accuracy of the audio recordings; 
(3) It is not clear who typed the audio into the format of a will and obtained the 
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decedent's signature and whether the decedent knew it was a will; 
(4) The burden of proof on the foregoing would be on the executor, Judd; 
(5) One would think that custodian of the audio disc would be subject to examination 
on foundational issues; 
(6) The will was witnessed but the capacity of the witnesses is not clear; 
(7) As son of the decedent, plaintiff Thomas would be entitled to preference over 
the cousin as personal representative; 
Exhibit 8, pp. 12 - 15. 
These unanswered questions posed by Judge McKee underscore the fragility of the 
magistrate's decision, rendering its affirmance problematic had there been a timely filed notice of 
appeal, i.e., there was a sound argument for full intestacy given the slapdash origins and preparation 
of the Will. 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ARE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS THAT 
AS TO TIME-BARRED APPEALS THE COURT, NOT THE JURY, 
DETERMINES WHETHER THE UNDERLYING APPEAL 
WOULD HA VE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. 
A key issue in this case is plaintiffs' assertion that a timely appeal would have been successful. 
In the language of tort law, resolution of this issue determines whether there is "proximate causation". 
For example, an untimely appeal may constitute negligence, but if the appeal lacked merit there is no 
completed tort, i.e., no proximate causation. The question presented is whether the merits of the 
appeal in this case are to be addressed by the jury with the assistance of experts or by the Court as an 
issue of law. 
As in many legal malpractice cases, the Court here is presented with a case-within-a-case. 
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In the recurring error of a missed statute of limitation, the plaintiff is required to "litigate an action 
that was never tried" which "is the accepted and traditional means of resolving issues in the 
underlying proceeding .. " Legal Malpractice, Vol. 4, sec. 37:15, pp. 1510, 1511. 
However in the instance of a time-barred appeal, the distinction is that, unlike a barred trial 
due to the expiration of the limitations period, an appeal presents legal issues, not factual issues, 
which legal issues cannot be addressed by the traditional device of a case-within-a-case for jury 
consideration. Thus the choice becomes whether ( 1) the Court determines what would have been the 
appeal result, or (2) whether such resolution is reached by the jury with the assistance of expert 
witnesses. 
The overwhelming majority view is that, because an appeal involves issues oflaw, the Court, 
not the jury, is tasked with determining the outcome of the appeal. As authors of the leading treatise 
on legal malpractice note: 
The resolution of a petition or appeal must and can be made by the 
trial judge as an issue of law, based on review of the transcript and 
record of the underlying action, the argument of counsel, and subject 
to the same rules of review as should have been applied to the motion 
or appeal. This does not usurp the entitlement to a jury because the 
issue is one of law. 
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition, Vol 4, sec. 33.43, p. 942. 
The above quote is footnoted with multiple case authority from twenty-eight jurisdictions, 
including California, Oregon, and Washington. As the Michigan Supreme Court held: 
In summary, we hold that the question whether a court or a jury should 
determine whether the underlying appeal would have been successful 
is reserved to the court because whether an appeal would have been 
successful intrinsically involves issues of law within the exclusive 
province of the judiciary. 
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Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 513 N.W.2d 773, 786 (Mich. 1994). 
And the Washington Supreme Court: 
In cases involving an attorney's alleged failure to perfect an appeal, 
however, the burden of proving causation takes on a different light. 
The cause in fact inquiry becomes whether the frustrated client would 
have been successful if the attorney had timely filed the appeal. 
Specifically, the client must show that an appellate court would have 
( 1) granted review, and (2) rendered a judgment more favorable to the 
client. Not surprisingly, numerous other courts confronted with 
making this causation determination have not delegated it to the jury. 
Rather, they have consistently recognized that these latter two 
determinations are within the exclusive province of the court, not the 
jury to decide [cases cited]. 
Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600,603 (Wash. 1985) 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, DEFENDANT 
FLEENOR OWED A DUTY OF CARE, NOT ONLY TO HIS CLIENT 
THOMAS LANAHAM, BUT TO THOMAS' FELLOW INTESTATE 
BENEFICIARY, KEITH LANHAM, A NON-CLIENT. 
Erosion of privity as an absolute condition to tort liability: From the early twentieth century 
through the present time, the national judiciary has expanded the field of potential tort victims. From 
manufacturers (McPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) to public weighers 
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), liability has been expanded, compensating those 
persons injured by, but not party to, the original commercial transaction. A similar development in 
the professional liability context did not occur until the mid-twentieth century, i.e., Biakanja v. Irving, 
320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1358 (Cal. 1958) (notarial malpractice); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 
(Cal. 1961) (legal malpractice). The majority rule now is that, under the proper circumstances, an 
attorney may owe a duty of care to a non-client: 
As noted by the leading treatise on legal malpractice: 
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The modem trend in the United States is to recognize the existence of 
a duty beyond the confines of those in privity to the attorney-client 
contract. Whatever the legal theory, however, there must be a duty of 
care owed by the attorney to the plaintiff. The issue of duty usually 
presents a question of law for the court. . . . A duty exists under 
two principal theories. The first approach is a multi-criteria balancing 
test, which originated in California. Another approach is the concept 
of a third-party beneficiary contract. 
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition (West), Mallen & Smith, Vol I, sec. 7.8, p. 781. 
Idaho has adopted the multi-criteria balancing test. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), citing both Biakanja and Lucas v. Hamm. The test for liability to a non-
client focuses on, among other factors, foreseeability of harm to the non-client, proximate causation, 
and the certainty that a legal injury was inflicted. In Harrigfeld, the plaintiff, omitted from the will 
as a beneficiary, alleged that the drafting attorney's negligence resulted in this omission. The Court 
rejected this assertion, ruling that the plaintiff failed to meet the Biakanja/Lucas criteria: "The 
attorney has no duty to insure that persons who would normally be the objects of the testator's 
affection are included as beneficiaries in the testamentary instruments." Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 
138. 
Conduct to which the Harrigfeld criteria are to be applied: Plaintiff Thomas Lanham 
("Thomas") retained defendant Fleenor to contest the attempted probate of the testator's will as 
pertaining to the entirety of the testator's estate. In the course of this representation, defendant 
Fleenor was tasked with the assignment of filing a timely notice of appeal to challenge the 
magistrate's conclusion that the Will disposed of the entire Lanham estate. The successful outcome 
of this appeal would be the descendance of the ranch and Big Creek to Thomas and Keith Lanham 
by intestacy. That the challenge was made by his client Thomas, and not Keith, did not obscure the 
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obvious fact that a finding of intestacy would inure to both their respective benefits in equal amounts. 
Application of the Harrigfeld criteria to defendant's untimely appeal (Id. 140 Idaho at 138): 
Criterion 
Forseeability of defendant's negligence 
harming Keith 
Degree of certainty that Keith suffered 
financial injury. 
Connection between missing appeal 
deadline and Keith's financial loss. 
Policy of preventing future harm 
Moral blame for missed appeal deadline 
Extent of burden to profession by 
imposing liability for Keith's loss. 
Availability of insurance for the risk 
As applied 
Keith had exposure equal to Thomas, i.e., 
untimely appeal would create financial loss 
for Keith 
Absolute certainty 
Undisputed proximate causation 
Increased sensitivity to non-clients 
Marginal ( criterion unclear) 
Burden of making a timely appeal not 
enhanced by liability to Keith 
Insurance available 
The major criteria noted in Harrigfeld, i.e., foreseeability, proximate causation, and certainty 
of loss, clearly point to the conclusion that defendant Fleenor owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham. 
The lesser criteria of (a) burden on the profession, (b) policy of preventing future harm, and (c) 
insurance availability also favor acknowledging a duty to Keith, the non-client. The only 
imponderable is the question of"moral blame". Notably, in Lucas v. Hamm, the Court deleted this 
criterion without explanation. Id, 56 Cal. 2nd at 588, 589, but the Harrigfeld decision equated 
negligence to "moral blame", i.e. "sufficient moral blame attached to the negligent preparation or 
execution of testamentary instruments to impose liability". Id 140 Idaho at 138. 
The Lucas parallel: In Lucas, the testator directed his attorney to prepare a will which 
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included gifts to several beneficiaries. Through a drafting error, the gifts were disallowed as 
constituting an illegal restraint on alienation. Opined Chief Justice Gibson in Lucas: " . . [O]ne 
of the main purposes which the transaction between defendant and testator intended to accomplish 
was to provide for the transfer of property to plaintiffs; the damage to the plaintiffs [non-clients] in 
the event of invalidity of the bequest was clearly foreseeable". Id, 56 Cal 2nd at 589 (bracketed 
material explanatory). 
Likewise here: the damage to Keith Lanham in the event of an untimely appeal was clearly 
foreseeable, i.e., arising out of his entitlement under the law of intestacy (just as the Lucas plaintiffs 
had entitlement by the testator's bequest). At the time defendant Fleenor faced the challenge of filing 
a timely appeal, it was foreseeable that failure to do so would deprive Keith, as well as his client 
Thomas, of their rightful status as intestate heirs. Unlike the plaintiff in Harrigfeld, plaintiff Keith 
Lanham is not imposing upon attorney Fleenor the duty of speculating as to appropriate testamentary 
beneficiaries. 
No conflict of interest: Had Mr. Fleenor actually represented both Thomas and Keith in 
opposing full testacy, such representation would not constitute a conflict of interest. That is, during 
the course of such litigation, the interests of the brothers Lanham were co-extensive, i.e., either they 
would be held to be intestate heirs (sharing equally) or, alternatively, disinherited offspring. Mr. 
Fleenor would have had no power to manipulate a result which favored one client over the other. 
Likewise, had the litigation been fully prosecuted as was attempted with Thomas the sole 
client, a favorable appeal result would effect Thomas and Keith equally, i.e., intestate heirs sharing 
equally, notwithstanding Keith's status as a non-client. 




Proximate causation: From one standpoint, this action is a relatively straight-forward case of 
professional negligence, i.e., failure to file a timely notice of appeal. However, imbedded in the 
negligence analysis is the question whether a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate 
decision. The law is clear that, for two reasons, a timely appeal would have reversed the magistrate 
and the real property would have passed to the plaintiffs by intestate succession: (1) the Will did not 
devise the real property; and (2) there was no residuary clause i.e., "a testamentary clause that 
disposes of any estate property remaining after the satisfaction of specific bequests and devises". See 
footnote 1. 
By virtually unanimous authority, the Court, not the jury, is to make the determination as to 
the appellate outcome, had there been a timely appeal. Idaho common law makes it clear that, in the 
absence of a residuary clause, undevised property must pass according to the law of intestate 
succession. In short, the magistrate's ruling that the Will devised the entirety of the decedent's estate 
is in error and would have been vacated on appeal. 
Duty owed to plaintiff Keith Lanham: Under the criteria enunciated in Harrigfeld, defendant 
Fleenor owed Keith a duty of care. Like Mr. Fleenor' s client Thomas, Keith Lanham was a potential 
intestate heir, and defendant Fleenor owed him the same duty of care as was owed to Thomas. That 
is, it was reasonably foreseeable that a missed appeal deadline would impact Thomas and Keith in 
identical fashion. 
DATED This __3_L day of August, 2016. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Samantha L. Lundberg 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
300 N. 6th Street, Ste. 200. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
.. X RaHd delhr.efj'"' A{; 
__ Overnight delivery 
--4-- Facsimile (345-8660) 
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
               Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,




COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendant Douglas Fleenor, by and through
his attorney of record, Carey Perkins, LLP, and moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for entry of summary judgment in favor of said
Defendant on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Holmes, Deputy Clerk
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This Motion is supported by the documents and pleadings on file with the
Court, the Affidavit of Counsel in support of Motion to Dismiss dated may 6, 2016; and
upon Defendant’s Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this   7th   day of September, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP
By     /s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
CAREY PERKINS LLP
By     /s/ Samantha L. Lundberg
Samantha L. Lundberg, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this   7th  day of September, 2016, I
electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-




12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140
Boise, Idaho 83713
Telephone (208) 345-7832
[  ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[  ] Hand-Delivered
[  ] Overnight Mail
[  ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564
[X]       ICourt/E-Filing
            /s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs
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Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
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Telephone:  (208) 345-8600
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
               Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
               Defendant.
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN




This is a legal malpractice action brought by Thomas Lanham and the
bankruptcy trustee, standing in the shoes of Keith Lanham, against attorney Douglas
Fleenor. Douglas Fleenor represented Thomas Lanham in an action challenging  his father
Gordon Lanham’s will.  Plaintiffs allege Douglas Fleenor committed malpractice when he
did not file a timely appeal in the prior lawsuit challenging the validity of the will. 
Electronically Filed
9/7/2016 4:21:53 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Holmes, Deputy Clerk
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This case comes before the Court on Douglas Fleenor’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.  This Memorandum will show that the Magistrate Court’s finding the Gordon
Lanham’s will was valid under Idaho law was based on substantial and competent
evidence in the record. As a result, the Appellate Court would not have disturbed the
decision on appeal.  The Appellate Court also would have affirmed because the Magistrate
Court correctly found Gordon Lanham’s will to be valid.  Additionally, Keith Lanham’s
claims are barred because Douglas Fleenor did not have an attorney-client relationship
with Keith Lanham and did not owe him a duty of care. Keith Lanham also waived his claim
when he stated that he believed his father’s wishes in his will should be honored.  Keith
Lanham also is bound by his judicial admission.  Accordingly, Douglas Fleenor requests
the Court grant his motion for summary judgment. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are material to the Motion for Summary Judgment and are
undisputed. 
1. Thomas Lanham retained Attorney Douglas Fleenor to bring an action
to invalidate the will of the Lanhams’ father, Gordon Lanham. Complaint, Par. I.
2. The will sought to disinherit Thomas and Keith Lanham. Complaint,
Par. I.
3. An attorney-client relationship existed between Thomas Lanham and
Douglas Fleenor with respect to the action to invalidate the will. Complaint, Par. II.
4.        Keith Lanham was not a client of Douglas Fleenor, Complaint, Par. III,
and was represented by his own attorney. See In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon
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Thomas Lanham, Gem County District Court CV2013-886, Keith Lanham’s Petition to
Remove Personal Representative dated January 13, 2014, filed by Attorney William F.
Lee. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit B. 
5.           Keith Lanham also provided an affidavit in which he stated, “I believe
and accept that my father made the specific gifts to my brother, Thomas Everett, and me
as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.”
Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 23, 2014, In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon
Thomas Lanham, supra. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May
6, 2016, Exhibit C.
6. Gordon Lanham’s estate was distributed according to the will, rather
than intestate succession. Complaint, Par. VIII.
7. The will that is the subject of the Lanhams’ Complaint is the Last Will
and Testament of Gordon Lanham (“Lanham Will”). Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
8. The Lanham Will was signed by Gordon Lanham on February 19, 
2011. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
9. Two witnesses to Gordon Lanham’s signing or acknowledging of the
Lanham Will, signed the Lanham Will stating that Gordon Lanham signed or acknowledged
the will in their presence, and that he appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress,
fraud, or undue influence. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May
6, 2016, Exhibit A.
10. An Idaho Notary Public notarized Gordon Lanham’s signature of the
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Lanham Will, stating that Gordon Lanham personally appeared before her,  acknowledged
to her that he signed the Lanham Will.  The Notary Public also declared under penalty of
perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud or
undue influence.  Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016,
Exhibit A.
11. In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham acknowledges specific property
he owns and his relationship with his potential heirs. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
12. In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham recognized Thomas and Keith
Lanham as his sons, and left them each one dollar. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
13. In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham stated that Thomas Lanham 
“has already ben given all he needs to have.” Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
14. In the Lanham Will, Gordon Lanham stated that he was not giving 
Keith Lanham more money than one dollar because he did not want Keith Lanham “to be
able to sell and profit off of his alcoholism...” Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
15. The Lanham Will named Judd Lanham as the executor of the 
Lanham Will and gave Judd Lanham power of attorney over Gordon Lanham’s property
and personal effects. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6,
2016, Exhibit A.
16. The Lanham Will discussed specific furniture and antiques owned by
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Lanham family members, and stated that the family members would be left with that
property and would be able to disperse of it however they saw fit. Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
17. The Lanham Will specifically gave a wooden bed to Keith Lanham 
and another to Thomas Lanham. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss
dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A.
18. The Lanham Will discussed in detail the guns Gordon Lanham 
owned, and stated that they could be sold off to pay part of the mortgage. Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A. 
19. The Magistrate Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on June 25, 2014. Declaration of
Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
20. The Magistrate Court found: “The Court finds no reason to doubt the
validity of the will. From the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that
decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time
of (sic) he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of his potential heirs, and
his relationships with them and sound reasons for treating each as he did. There is no
evidence suggesting that anyone exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.
In fact, in spite of decent’s failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a strong
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed his will.” Declaration of Allen Ellis
dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
21. The Magistrate Court also found: “Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham
000115
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 6
advanced several claims, but he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota
of credible, admissible evidence. Based upon the language of the will itself, the affidavits,
the audio recordings and the entire record, the court finds in favor of the Personal
Representative on every factual dispute.” Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016,
Exhibit 5.
22. The Magistrate Court then held: “The will of decedent Gordon 
Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and binding. Decedent’s intent is sufficiently clear from the
language of the will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, if necessary, judicial
enforcement. As to the Claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, decedent’s intent is very clearly
that claimant take by the will only one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful
reason to frustrate decedent’s intent. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be
determined by the Court and the Personal Representative is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and the Court therefore GRANTS the Personal Representative’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment.” Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 5.
23. Douglas Fleenor filed a Notice of Appeal on August 13, 2014.
Complaint, Par. VII.
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, and the admissions on file together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Here, Plaintiffs have moved for partial
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summary judgment.  Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there
is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from granting
summary judgment.  Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136
Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001).
IV. 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE MAGISTRATE COURT’S FINDINGS
OF FACT 
The Lanhams’ malpractice claim against Douglas Fleenor alleges that he did
not timely file an appeal, and if he had timely filed an appeal, the Appellate Court would
have found that the Magistrate Judge improperly granted the Personal Representative’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A court’s findings on cross motions for summary judgment will not be
disturbed on appeal so long as the record is sufficient to support the findings. Riverside
Development Co.,  v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); Cougar
Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979) (in reviewing
the sufficiency of the record to sustain a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Court limits the review to whether there is substantial, competent, although conflicting
evidence, in the record to support the findings). 
The Magistrate Court based its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
the language of the Lanham Will itself, the affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire
record. The Court held there was no reason to doubt the validity of the Lanham Will, stating
“from the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it is clear that decedent Gordon
Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time of (sic) he
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executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of his potential heirs, and his
relationships with them and sound reasons for treating each as he did. There is no
evidence suggesting that anyone exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent.
In fact, in spite of decedent’s failing health and physical maladies, it appears he was a
strong willed and independent thinker at the time he executed his will.” The Court further
stated that Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but he failed to
support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, admissible evidence. Based
on these findings, the Magistrate Court granted the Personal Representative’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Magistrate Court’s findings concerning the Lanham Will based on
substantial and competent evidence in the record. As a result, even if the appeal of the
Magistrate Court’s decision was timely filed, the Appellate Court’s review would have been
limited to determining whether the Magistrate Court’s findings were supported by evidence
in the record. The Lanhams have failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate the
Magistrate Court’s decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence.
Further, while Thomas Lanham previously failed to support his claims with “one iota of
credible, admissible evidence,” even if there had been conflicting evidence, the Appellate
Court would still refrain from disturbing the Magistrate Court’s ruling so long as there was
evidence in the record to support its findings. 
V.
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S CONCLUSION THAT THE LANHAM WILL WAS VALID
WAS NOT IN ERROR 
The Lanhams’ malpractice claim alleges they sustained damages as a result
of Gordon Lanham’s estate being distributed pursuant to the Lanham Will. The elements
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of a legal malpractice claim are : (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the
failure to perform that duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client.
Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996); Soignier v. Fletcher, 151
Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (2011) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706,
652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982)). However, as the Magistrate Court correctly found, the Lanham
Will was valid under Idaho law. Even assuming for the sake of argument Douglas Fleenor
failure to perform a duty, the alleged breach of that duty did not cause harm to the
Lanhams because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court’s correct
decision.  
i. Gordon Lanham Executed a Valid Will
In 1971 the Idaho Legislature extensively revised Idaho’s statutes relating to
descent and distribution on death. Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 747
P.2d 18 (1987). For the most part, the prior statutes were repealed in total and replaced
by provisions of the Uniform Probate Code ( “UPC”). Id. The Idaho Legislature specifically
stated the two purposes of the adoption of the UPC were to “simplify and clarify the law
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and
incapacitated persons,” and “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in
distribution of property.” Idaho Code §§15-1-102(b)(1) and (2). The provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code are to be “liberally construed and applied...” In Re Estate of
Kunzler, 108 Idaho 374, 377, 699 P.2d 374, 1391 (1995).
 The Legislature defined a will as “a testamentary instrument and includes
codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints an executor or revokes or
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revises another will.” Idaho Code §15-1-201(56). The test of the testamentary character
of an instrument “is not the testator’s realization that it is a will, but his intention to create
a revocable disposition of his property, to accrue and take effect only upon his death, and
passing no present interest.” In re Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 707, 551 P.2d 1339,
1343 (1976) (quoting Estate of Hengy, 53 Idaho, 515, 519, 26 P.2d 178, 179 (1933))
(greeting card did not qualify as holographic will because testator did not write card with
testamentary intent). 
Any “emancipated minor or any person eighteen (18) or more years of age
who is of sound mind may make a will.”  Idaho Code §15-2-501.  The Comment to the
Official Text states:
Part 5 of Article II (Chapter 2) deals with capacity and
formalities for execution and revocation of wills.  If the will is to
be restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of
wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple.  The basic
intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever
possible.  To this end, the age for making wills is lowered to
eighteen, formalities for a written and attested will are kept to
a minimum, holographic wills, written and signed by the
testator are authorized, choice of law as to validity of execution
is broadened, and revocation by operation of law is limited to
divorce or annulment.  However, the statute also provides a
more formal method of execution with acknowledgment before
a public officer.
Comment to Official Text,  General Comment to Idaho Code §§15-2-501 to 15-2-513
(emphasis added).  The execution of wills is governed by Idaho Code §15-2-502:
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within section
15-2-513 of this part, and wills within section 15-2-506 of this
part, or except as provided in sections 51-109, 55-712A, or 55-
712B, Idaho Code, every will shall be in writing signed by the
testator or in the testator’s name by some other person in the
testator’s presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by
at least two (2) persons each of whom witnessed either the
000120
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 11
signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature or
the will.  
The Comment to the Official Text states:
The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been
reduced to a minimum.  Execution under this section
normally would be accomplished by signature of the
testator and of two witnesses; each of the persons signing
as witnesses must “witness” any of the following:  the signing
of the will by the testator, an acknowledgment by the testator
that the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator
that the document is his will.  Signing by the testator may be by
mark under general rules relating to what constitutes a
signature; or the will may be signed on behalf of the testator by
another person signing the testator’s name at this direction and
in his presence.  There is no requirement that the testator
publish the document as his will, or that he request the
witnesses to sign, or that the witnesses sign in the presence of
the testator or of each other.  The testator may sign the will
outside the presence of the witnesses if he later acknowledges
to the witnesses that the signature is his or that the document
is his will, and they sign as witnesses.  There is no requirement
that the testator’s signature be at the end of the will;  thus, if he
writes his name in the body of the will and intends it to be his
signature, this would satisfy the statute.  The intent is to
validate wills which meet the minimal formalities of the
statute.  A will which does not meet these requirements may
be valid under Section 2-503 as a holograph.
Comment to Official Text,  Idaho Code §15-2-502(emphasis added);  see In re Estate of
McGurrin, 113 Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994 (Ct.App. 1987)(discussing legislative history of
Idaho Code §15-2-502).  
Idaho Code §15-2-603 addresses rules of construction and intention:
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the
legal effect of his dispositions.  The rules of construction
expressed in the succeeding sections of this Part apply unless
a contrary intention is indicated by the will.
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Construing §15-2-603, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, “The language of the will is to be
given its ordinary and well understood meaning.”  Allen  v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 32, 665
P.2d 1041, 1042 (1983)(affirming magistrate’s construction of will).  “If the testator’s intent
can be determined from the face of his will, that intent, unless it is in contravention of some
established rule of law or public policy, must be given effect.”  Id. at 34, 665 P.2d at 1044.
In construing the provisions of a will to ascertain the meaning of a testator, the cardinal rule
of construction is to ascertain the testator’s intent, and “this intent is to be ascertained from
a full view of the everything within the four corners of the instrument.”  Wilkins v. Wilkins,
137 Idaho 315, 320, 48 P.3d 644, 649 (2002)(affirming magistrate’s construction of will).
The Lanham Will satisfies all requirements under Idaho law. The Lanham Will
is a testamentary instrument.  The Lanham Will is entitled “Last Will and Testament.”  In
the Lanham Will Gordon Lanham referred to giving “executor” Judd Max Lanham “a Power
of Attorney for full control now and even after I am dead.”  Gordon Lanham stated, “I want
him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will
and Testament.”  These statements show Gordon Lanham’s intention to create a revocable
distribution of his property, to accrue and take effect only on his death, and to pass no
present interest.  
Compare the Lanham will to the greeting card in In re Estate of Webber,
supra.  In the greeting card, Arthur Webber addressed the card to Jessie Nail, and wrote
on the back of the card, “Aug. 1, 1969 I bid this world goodbye I leave this land to you,” and
signed his name. Extrinsic evidence was admitted at trial that was conflicting as to Mr.
Webber’s intent.  Mr. Webber’s widow and an attorney both testified that while conferring
with the attorney on other legal matters, Mr. Webber asked about a will and intestate
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succession and after the attorney explained the law of intestate succession to Mr. Webber,
Mr. Webber replied to the effect that he did not think that he needed a will.  Testimony was
adduced that on several occasions Mr. Webber stated that he did not have a will and that
he intended that the farm be given to his wife upon his death, apparently under the laws
of intestate succession.  The trial court resolved the conflicting evidence in favor of Mrs.
Webber.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that in light of the evidence presented, the finding
by the trial court that Arthur Webber did not execute the greeting card alleged to be his will
with testamentary intent must be affirmed. Id. at 707, 551 P.2d at 1343.
In contrast,  the Lanham Will is entitled Last Will and Testament.  Gordon
Lanham discusses at length the fact that he intends to create a distribution of his estate
upon his death.  The Lanham Will discusses Gordon Lanham’s property in detail.  Gordon
Lanham ends the Lanham Will by stating that he wants Judd Lanham, his executor, to
have power of attorney for full control to distribute the property after his death.  Unlike the
greeting card,  Gordon Lanham makes his testamentary intent clear. See In re Estate of
Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). 
The Lanham Will satisfies the requirements of Idaho Code §15-2-502 that
it be a writing signed by the testator and that it be signed by at least two other persons
each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the
signature of the will.  The Lanham Will is in writing. Each witness stated that Gordon
Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud or undue influence.
Gordon Lanham’s signature of the Lanham Will is notarized by an Idaho notary public.  The
notary states that Gordon Lanham acknowledged to her that he executed the Lanham Will.
The notary further stated under penalty of perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of
000123
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 14
sound mind and under no undue influence.
These elements are sufficient to satisfy the Idaho Probate Code’s minimal
requirements for a will.  The Lanham Will satisfies the “minimal formalities of the statute.”
Under these circumstances, the Lanham Will must be validated “whenever possible.”
Gordon Lanham’s intention as expressed in the Lanham Will “controls the legal effect of
his dispositions.”  Gordon Lanham’s intent, unless it is in contravention of some
established rule of law or public policy, must be given effect.  
There is no Idaho law or public policy prohibiting a person from choosing not
to distribute property to his adult children.  “Courts favor testacy rather than intestacy.”  In
re Estate of Corwin, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339, 343 (1963)(reversing district court’s
judgment and ordering that distribution occur as provided for in will). Gordon Lanham was
not required to, but listed reasons for not distributing property to Thomas and Keith
Lanham.  In the case of Thomas Lanham,  Gordon Lanham stated in the Lanham Will that
he felt Thomas Lanham “has already been given all he needs to have and that I am going
to leave $1 more dollar against whatever is legal to him and then he is going to be on his
own.”  Gordon Lanham stated in the Lanham Will that as to Keith Lanham and his spouse,
“what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my estate I don’t want him to be able to
sell and profit off of his alcoholism or drugs ever since his car wreck he has been on pain
pills and ever since his son rode in the rodeos and got himself into a domestic violence
case and went to prison, now his father is the same way.”  This was a sound choice by
Gordon Lanham that he was legally entitled to make.  Gordon Lanham rationally chose not
to leave the vast majority of his estate to Thomas or Keith Lanham.  Thomas and Keith
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Lanham are not pretermitted children.  See, Idaho Code §15-2-302.  The Court could not
overturn what Gordon Lanham decided to do in his valid Last Will and Testament.  
A. There is no requirement a will contain “dispositive provisions”
The Lanhams allege in their Complaint that the Lanham Will was defective
“in several respects,” including “failing to set forth dispositive provisions.”  It is assumed
that in making this allegation, the Lanhams intend to allege that the Lanham Will did not
contain provisions disposing of Gordon Lanham’s property.  However, the Lanham Will did
in fact dispose of Gordon Lanham’s property.  Gordon Lanham gave his executor power
of attorney and stated that the executor should distribute Gordon Lanham’s property and
personal effects as stated in the Lanham Will.  The Idaho Probate Code permits a testator
to do this.  Idaho Code §15-2-610 discusses the exercise of a power of appointment by the
testator.  The Comment to the Official Text of §15-2-610 states in relevant part:
Under this section and Section 2-603 the intent to exercise the
power is effective if it is “indicated by the will.”  This wording
permits a Court to find the manifest intent if the language of
the will interpreted in light of all the surrounding circumstances
shows that the donee intended an exercise, except, of course,
if the donor has conditioned exercise on an express reference
to the original creating instrument.  In other words, the
modern liberal rule on interpretation of the donee’s will
would be available.  
(Emphasis added).  See Conoway v. Fulmer, 54 So.624, 625 (Ala.  1911)(“The will is but
the expression of the desire of and direction by the testator as to what shall be done with
the property left by him, and if he does not desire to make any disposition save such as the
law provides, but does desire to name the one who shall administer upon his effects, he
has the right to do so.”), cited on other grounds, In re Heazle’s Estate, 72 Idaho 307, 240
P.2d 821(1952) (reversing lower court with directions to receive additional evidence as to
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testator’s competence).  Here, Gordon Lanham expressly stated in his will that he intended
his executor to make distributions in accordance with his statements in the Lanham Will.
Gordon Lanham made it plain that he did not want the vast majority of distributions going
to Thomas and Keith Lanham.  The Court was required by the modern liberal rule to
interpret the will in a way that honored Gordon Lanham’s intent.
Additionally, Gordon Lanham made statements in the Lanham Will directing
how property should be disposed.  The Lanham Will described furniture that was to go to
Linda Louise Andrews Lanham.  Thomas and Keith Lanham were each given a bed.  
B. There is no requirement a will contain a residuary clause 
The Lanhams allege that the Lanham Will is invalid because it does not
contain a residuary clause.  Idaho law does not require a will to have a residuary clause.
The Idaho Court of Appeals considered a holographic will in In re Estate of Bradley, 107
Idaho 860, 693 P.2d 1062 (Ct.App. 1984)(deletion of residuary clause did not invalidate
will).  The testatrix prepared a holographic will.  She subsequently made changes to the
will be deleting certain provisions, including a residuary clause.  The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the deletion of the residuary clause did not demonstrate an intent by the
testatrix to cancel specific devises which she had made and which she did not delete.  The
Court of Appeals noted that Idaho Code §15-2-603 requires that “[t]he intention of a
testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions.”  The Court
therefore was required to determine the validity of the will “’as we find it…giving due effect
to all cancellations and additions.’”  Id., 107 Idaho at 862, 693 P.2d at 1064 (quoting, In the
Matter of the Estate of Fisher, 47 Idaho 668, 672, 279 P.2d 291, 292 (1929)).  In fact,
because she deleted certain provisions and left others as she drafted them, her intent was
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clear that by deleting the residuary clause, she did not intend to cancel the will in its
entirety. 
If the deletion of the residuary clause did not invalidate the holographic will
in In re Estate of Bradley, then the absence of a residuary clause in the first place does
not invalidate the Lanham Will.  
C. There is no restriction on bestowing donative powers on the
personal representative 
As discussed above,  Idaho Code §15-2-610 allows a testator to designate
the personal representative to have the power to dispose of property under the will.  Until
termination of his appointment a personal representative has the same power over the title
to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust, however for the
benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate.  Idaho Code §15-3-711;  see
also Estate of Conroy, 136 Cal.Rptr. 807, 809 (Cal.Ct.App. 1977)(A “power of
appointment” is defined generally as a power or authority conferred by one person by deed
or will upon another to appoint the person or persons who are to receive and enjoy an
estate or an income therefrom after the testator’s death).  
Here, Gordon Lanham had the power as testator to empower the personal
representative to distribute his estate.  The Lanham Will in fact discusses generally how
Gordon Lanham wanted property distributed, and the fact that he did not want the bulk of
the property distributed to Thomas and Keith Lanham.  The fact that Gordon Lanham
chose to do this does not invalidate the Lanham Will.
ii. Summary
Although the Lanhams claim that the Lanham Will is defective,  in reality the
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underlying Court properly decided that the Lanham Will is a “legal, valid and binding” will.
In doing so,  the Court was favoring testacy over intestacy, validating the will whenever
possible.  The Lanham Will satisfied “the minimal formalities” of the Idaho Probate Code.
Under the circumstances, the Court was constrained to interpret the Lanham Will so as to
ascertain and fulfill Gordon Lanham’s intent. Gordon Lanham’s intent was to not give the
bulk of his estate to Thomas and Keith Lanham.
VI. 
DOUGLAS FLEENOR IS NOT LIABLE TO KEITH LANHAM BECAUSE MR.
FLEENOR DID NOT OWE HIM A DUTY AND BECAUSE KEITH LANHAM WAIVED
HIS CLAIM
The Trustee contends that although Keith Lanham did not have an attorney-
client relationship with Douglas Fleenor, Douglas Fleenor still owed him a duty.  This is
contrary to Idaho law.  As a general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only
to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-
client relationship.  Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256(2014)(attorney providing
opinion letter to stockholder which specifically stated that the stockholder could rely on the
opinions in the letter had voluntarily assumed duty to stockholder and was subject to
potential liability for legal malpractice).  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized only
narrow exceptions to the general rule. In Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d
884 (2004)(intended beneficiary of will could sue attorney who drafted will for malpractice),
the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether an attorney drafting a will should potentially
be held liable to a beneficiary of the will.  In deciding whether to recognize a duty,  the
Court engaged in a “balance-of-the-harms” test:
That test involves the consideration of policy and the weighing
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of factors, which include:  the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff;  the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the
injury;  the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered;  the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct;  the policy of preventing
future harm;  the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach;  and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.  Considering those factors, the Court held that an attorney
preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified
therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the testator to have them properly
executed, so as to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the testamentary
instruments. Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. The Court found that the harm to the intended
beneficiaries was clearly foreseeable.  In this setting, the Court found that the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm is direct.  The Court found that there was
sufficient moral blame attached to the negligent preparation or execution of testamentary
instruments to impose liability. Id. at 138, 90 P.3d at 888.   The Court held that imposing
such a duty might prevent future harm by creating an incentive to prepare such instruments
carefully because otherwise there would be no liability for the negligent drafting of such
instruments.  Finally, the Court found that extending the duty to this degree would not
unduly increase the burden upon attorneys to use care when drafting testamentary
instruments, and insurance is readily available to cover such risk.  
The Harringfeld Court noted that its extension of the attorney’s duty was “very
limited.”  Id. It did not extend to beneficiaries not named or identified in the testamentary
instruments.  The extension of an attorney’s duty with respect to preparation of
testamentary documents “will not subject attorneys to lawsuits by persons who simply did
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not receive what they believed was their fair share of the testator’s estate, or who
simply did not receive in the testamentary instruments what they understood the testator
and stated or indicated they would receive.” Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889 (emphasis added).
In Taylor v. Riley, supra, an attorney representing a corporation wrote an
opinion letter to a stockholder.  The opinion letter expressly stated that the stockholder
could rely upon the opinions stated in the letter.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that under
the circumstances that the attorney voluntarily undertook to issue the opinion letter and
stated that the stockholder could rely on it,  the attorney had a duty of care to the
stockholder, and was potentially liable for legal malpractice. Id. at 339, 336 P.3d at 272.
Turning to the case at hand,  the Idaho Supreme Court has already made it
plain that it would not apply the “balance-of-the-harms” test to recognize a duty under these
circumstances.  Keith Lanham seeks to impose liability upon Douglas Fleenor because
Keith Lanham “simply did not receive what [he] believed was [his] fair share of the
testator’s estate.” Harrigfeld v. Hancock, supra (emphasis added).  In addition, if an
attorney representing a beneficiary in an estate dispute owed duties to other persons who
were potential beneficiaries,  it could create risk of conflicting duties.   It would be improper
to impose a duty on an attorney representing one heir contesting a will as to another heir
where the two heirs have a potential conflict of interest.   See, Pelham v. Grieseheimer,
440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982)(holding that to conclude attorney representing a spouse in a
divorce also owed a duty to the children would create conflict of interest situations).  
Here, Thomas and Keith Lanham had a conflict of interest.   Keith Lanham
was represented by separate counsel in the lawsuit.  It would be improper to impose a duty
on an attorney to a beneficiary in an estate dispute where that beneficiary was represented
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by another attorney.  Further,  Keith Fleenor took a position in the underlying lawsuit that
was a direct contravention to Thomas Lanham’s position.  See Affidavit of Keith Lanham.
Keith Lanham’s assertion in the affidavit is a waiver of his present claim.  Fullerton v.
Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 136 P.3d 291 (2006)(affirming trial court’s finding of waiver).
This is not the case in Taylor v. Riley where another party’s attorney made
representations to a person and told that person he could rely on those representations.
There is no evidence that Douglas Fleenor ever represented Keith Lanham.  There is no
evidence that Douglas Fleenor provided any communication to Keith Lanham.  There is
no basis for finding Douglas Fleenor voluntarily assumed a duty.
Accordingly, Douglas Fleenor’s motion for summary judgment against Keith
Lanham should be granted because Keith Lanham did not have an attorney-client
relationship with Douglas Fleenor and it would be improper to impose a duty upon Douglas
Fleenor under these circumstances.  The claim also should be dismissed because Keith
Lanham waived his claim.
VII. 
KEITH LANHAM IS BOUND BY HIS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party
about a concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter of law and not an
opinion.  Grain Growers Membership & Investment Trust v. Liquidator for the
Universal Life Insurance Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242, 250 (2007).  Keith
Lanham testified in his affidavit dated March 22, 2014, filed in the lawsuit contesting the
Lanham Will:
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3. I believe and accept that my father made specific gifts to my brother,
Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons
and his wishes should be honored.
4.  The remainder of my father's personal property consists primarily of old
farm and ranching equipment and vehicles, household items and sentimental
memorabilia.  These items of personal property and the lots at Big Creek
should be distributed according to his will and his recorded wishes made
after he executed his will.  Judd Lanham is the appropriate person to
manage and distribute my father's estate as he knows what my father
wanted to do.
5.  A few years ago my father quitclaimed my brother Thomas Everett
approximately 100+ acres.  This was not intended as a gift.  My brother
promised to help support my father so he could pay his bills, including the
mortgage to Linda Andrews Lanham.  My brother abandoned my father after
the quitclaim deed was recorded.
6.  I reconciled with my father prior to his death.  I do know that my father
was completely estranged from my brother, Thomas Everett, at the time of
his death on December 5, 2013.  
Affidavit of Keith Lanham (see Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, Exhibit C).  This sworn testimony by Keith Lanham contains the following
statements about concrete facts within Keith Lanham's peculiar knowledge:
• Keith Lanham believes and accepts that Gordon Lanham made the
specific gifts to Thomas and Keith Lanham as set forth in the Will for his own
personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.
• Gordon Lanham's personal property and lots at Big Creek should be
distributed according to Gordon Lanham's will and his recorded wishes made
after he executed his will.
• Judd Lanham is the appropriate person to manage and distribute
Gordon Lanham's estate as Judd Lanham knows what Gordon Lanham
wanted him to do.
• Thomas Lanham promised to support Gordon Lanham in exchange
for a quitclaim to 100+ acres, and then Thomas Lanham abandoned Gordon
Lanham after the quitclaim deed was recorded.
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• Gordon Lanham was completely estranged from Thomas Lanham at
the time of his death.
Keith Lanham is bound by these judicial admissions.  Keith Lanham provided
his affidavit testimony expecting the Court to rely on his testimony.  The Magistrate Court
admitted the Affidavit of Keith Lanham, and relied on his affidavit testimony in rendering
its decision that the Lanham Will was valid.  Idaho law does not permit Keith Lanham to
revoke his testimony.  A litigant is not allowed to revoke his testimony that the Court in fact
relies upon in rendering its decision.  Keith Lanham's testimony is part of the substantial
evidence on which the Magistrate Court relied on issuing its decision.  Keith Lanham's
testimony is completely binding on his claim. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Even assuming Douglas Fleenor breached a duty, the alleged breach did not
cause harm because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court's
correct decision. The Magistrate Court's findings were supported by the substantial
evidence in the record. An Appellate Court would not have reversed the Magistrate Court's
conclusions of law, since they were correct, in that the Lanham Will was valid. Further,
Keith Lanham did not have an attorney client relationship with Douglas Fleenor and it
would be improper to impose a duty on Douglas Fleenor as to Keith Lanham under the
present circumstances. Additionally, Keith Lanham waived his claim. Therefore, for the
foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests the Court grant his motion for summary
judgment.
000133
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 24
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Case No. CV-2016-8252 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Come now plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and submit this answering brief to 
defendant's motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. 
Preliminary note: Plaintiffs incorporate their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed August 31, 2016, as though set forth in full herein. This earlier 
Memorandum addresses issues of (I) proximate causation, (2) whether the proximate cause issue 
is within the province the court, rather than a jury; and (3) the duty of care owed Keith, a non-client. 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT - I 
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KEITH LANHAM'S WITHDRAW AL OF HIS PETITION FOR A DECLARATION 
OF INTESTACY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE Aw AIYER OF ms CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
Defendant erroneously argues that plaintiff Keith has "waived" his right to sue defendant 
for malpractice: Defendant argues as follows: 
Further, Keith Fleenor (sic) took a position in the underlying lawsuit 
that was a direct contravention to Thomas Lanham's position. See 
affidavit of Keith Lanham. It is incredulous that Keith Lanham now 
contends that Mr. Fleenor owed him a duty where Keith Lanham 
made a judicial admission in the will contest taking a directly adverse 
position to Mr. Fleenor's client. . . Keith Lanham's assertion in 
the affidavit is a waiver of his present claim. 
Defendant's Brief, p. 17. 
Although not entirely clear, defendant apparently is contending that Keith's withdrawal of 
his petition for intestacy bars this claim for legal malpractice. The precise dynamics of this "waiver" 
are not identified by defendant, nor is there helpful case authority, i.e., the only citation is to a case 
dealing with waiver of the right to declare a purchase invoice void. Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 
820 (2006). 
At the time of the so-called waiver, it must be shown that the waiving party "intentionally 
relinquished a known right or advantage". Id.. 142 Idaho at 824: As reflected in the 2014 affidavit 
of Keith Lanham, at the time of the withdrawal of his petition, he believed that his father's real 
property had either been disposed ofby the Will (Big Creek) and that the remainder (the ranch) had 
been deeded to grandson Joseph. See declaration of Keith Lanham filed herein as corroborated by 
his 2014 affidavit (Exhibit 3 to Exhibit C to Lundberg affidavit). As testified in his declaration 
herein, he withdrew his petition for declaration ofintestacy because he did not want to incur attorney 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANT'S 
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fees in attempting to recover personal property of relatively little value. That is, in Keith's eyes, at 
the time he withdrew his petition, the intestacy claim did not include a claim to the real property. 
Defendant erroneously equates Keith's waiver of his claim against the estate as a waiver of 
his claim against defendant Fleenor. The one has nothing to do with the other. 
Even ignoring this error, the petition for withdrawal was made upon the mistaken belief that 
(1) the Will had devised the Big Creek property, (2) that his father had conveyed the ranch prior to 
his death, and (3) that all that remained in the Estate was relatively valueless personal property. 
Accordingly, even if characterized as a waiver, his mistaken perception of things prevented the so-
called waiver from being effective because it was not a "relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage". Id. 
Given the elements of waiver, i.e., relinquishment of a known right, genuine issues of 
material fact are presented which preclude summary adjudication. Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P.; Brand S 
Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 429 (1981). 
KEITH LANHAM'S SO-CALLED "ADMISSIONS" ARE ERRONEOUS OR 
IRRELEVANT TO THESE PROCEEDINGS AND INCLUDE CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW UNDERTAKEN BY A LAYMAN. 
Defendant argues in his brief (pp. 21 - 23) that plaintiff Keith Lanham has made certain 
"admissions" to which he is "bound". However, defendant fails to explain the relevancy of these 
admissions to his motion for summary judgment. As set forth below the so-called admissions offact 
in Keith's 2014 affidavit (Exhibit 3 to Exhibit C) are either erroneous, irrelevant, or both. Two 
"admissions" are points oflaw conceruing which Keith, a layman, lacks the competence to articulate: 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT • 3 
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Alleged admission Erroneous Irrelevant 
(1) Decedent made specific bequests to 
the plaintiffs which should be honored. 
(2) Big Creek property should be devised 
according to the Will. 
(3) Quitclaim of 100 acres to Thomas was 
a gift. Then Thomas abandoned decedent 
( 4) Decedent was estranged from Thomas; 
Keith reconciled with decedent. 
(5) Judd Lanham is appropriate person to 









As can be readily seen, four of the five so-called admissions have no relevance to (1) 
proximate causation, (2) whether defendant Fleenor owed Keith Lanham a duty of care, or (3) 
whether Keith waived his claim of malpractice. Defendant's brief fails to point us in the direction 
of relevancy. The purported admission dealing with the Big Creek property is simply erroneous and 
constitutes a legal conclusion which is beyond Keith's competence. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior briefing: As noted above, plaintiffs' summary judgment brief, incorporated herein by 
reference, deals with issues of proximate cause, proximate cause adjudication, and the duty of care 
which defendant Fleenor owed Keith Lanham and is responsive to defendant Fleenor's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Waiver: At the time plaintiff Keith withdrew his petition for intestacy, he believed that the 
real property of the decedent had either been devised by the Will or had been conveyed away during 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANT'S 
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the decedent's life. That is, there cannot be a waiver in the absence of an intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. Stated more baldly, withdrawing a petition for intestacy has nothing to do with 
the herein malpractice claim. 
Purported admissions: Defendant's brief fails to identify the relevance of these admissions. 
As is reflected in the above chart, the admissions are, in the main, irrelevant. The single admission 
that is not irrelevant, i.e., that Big Creek was devised by the Will, is flat out erroneous and a 
conclusion of law opined by the layman Keith Lanham. 
Dated this 3'd day of October, 2016. 
1···77_7!::_ 
\/~ 
Allen B. Eilis/ · c · 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Richard L. Stubbs 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
               Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
               Defendant.
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I.
INTRODUCTION
The first issue raised in the Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is whether Douglas Fleenor’s alleged failure to timely file an appeal proximately caused the
Lanhams to lose their status as intestate heirs. However, in making this argument the
Lanhams apply the wrong standard of review. The correct analysis of an appeal is whether
the Magistrate Court based its findings on sufficient facts in the record.  See  Camp v. East
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Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002).  There is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding that the Lanham Will was valid under Idaho law. Further, the
Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld juries deciding the issue of proximate cause
in legal malpractice cases.  See Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350
(1991)(affirming jury’s determination that attorney’s conduct was not a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s damages);  Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101
(1990)(affirming jury determination of proximate cause in attorney malpractice lawsuit).
Taking the determination of violation of standard of care of proximate cause away from
juries would violate Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution (“The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate….”).  
Additionally, there is a genuine question as to whether Douglas Fleenor’s
failure to timely file an appeal was a breach of his duty of care based upon Thomas
Lanham’s hesitation to pursue the appeal. (Affidavit of Douglas Fleenor in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated September 30, 2016). After the
Magistrate Judge denied Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham’s motion for summary
judgment in the prior proceeding, Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham there was
a limited time frame to appeal. Id. Due to concerns over cost, Thomas Lanham instructed
Douglas Fleenor to wait while he decided whether he wanted to pursue an appeal and to
only proceed if and when Thomas Lanham gave him approval. Id. After the deadline had
passed, Thomas Lanham informed Douglas Fleenor he wanted to proceed with the appeal.
Id. Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham that the appeal deadline had passed but
there may be a chance it would still be accepted due to their motion for reconsideration,
and filed the appeal on August 13, 2014. 
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The second issue the Lanhams raised is whether Keith Lanham, who was
not a client of Douglas Fleenor, has a right of action against Douglas Fleenor. It is
undisputed that Keith Lanham did not have a contractual attorney-client relationship with
Douglas Fleenor. It is additionally undisputed that Keith Lanham took an adversarial
position to Thomas Lanham in the prior proceedings. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C). Douglas Fleenor represented and owed
a duty of care to Thomas Lanham. Douglas Fleenor cannot be held to have also had a duty
to a litigant adverse to his client.
Based on the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests the Court deny
the Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
II.
VALIDITY OF THE LANHAM WILL
i. The Magistrate Judge’s Ruling Would Not Have Been Overturned on
Appeal
If we are evaluating the efficacy of an appeal, findings of fact based on
substantial evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of conflicting
evidence. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008). So long as the
record is sufficient to support the Court’s findings, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
Riverside Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982). In
this case, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Lanham Will was valid. This decision
was based on affidavits and audio recordings of the Lanham Will, ultimately finding
“decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the time
he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the extent and nature of his
assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his potential heirs, and his relationships with
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them and sound reasons for treating each as he did.” (Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June
13, 2016, Exhibit 5). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence and would not have been overturned on appeal. The Lanham’s
reference to Judge McKee’s findings and observations concerning the Lanham Will are not
persuasive in the current matter. Judge McKee’s statements regarding the Lanham Will
were dicta, made while deciding whether to award attorney’s fees and should not be
utilized by this Court in determining whether the Lanham Will was valid, or whether the
Magistrate Judge’s determination that the Lanham Will was valid was supported by
substantial evidence.
ii. Gordon Lanham Executed a Valid Will
Idaho requires the following “minimal formalities” for a will:
 • The testator must be an “emancipated minor or any
person eighteen (18) or more years of age who is of
sound mind.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-501. A testator
is of ‘sound mind’ if he knows, “in general, without
prompting, the nature and extent of the property of
which he is about to dispose, and nature of the act
which he is about to perform, and the names and
identity of persons who are to be the objects of his
bounty, and his relation toward them.” Wooden v.
Martin (In re Conway), 152 Idaho 933, 943-44, 277 P.3d
380, 390-91 (2012)(citing In re Heazle’s Estate, 74
Idaho 72, 76, 257 P.2d 556, 558 (1953)); 
• The will must be a testamentary instrument, which
means that it demonstrates the testator’s intention to
create a revocable disposition of his property, to accrue
and take effect only upon his death, and passing no
present interest. Idaho Code Section 15-1-201(56); In
re Estate of Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 707, 551 P.2d
1339, 1343 (1976);
 • The will must be “signed by the testator or in the
testator’s name by some other person in the testator’s
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presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at
least two (2) persons each of whom witnessed either
the signing or the testator’s acknowledgment of the
signature of the will.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-502. 
The Lanham Will meets these requirements. Gordon Lanham was above the
age of eighteen and of sound mind when he executed the Lanham Will. He acknowledged
his property, his heirs, and his relation to them. He appointed Judd Lanham as his
Executor, and granted him Power of Attorney, to have full control to distribute his property
after his death. The Lanham Will is in writing, signed by the testator, in the presence of two
witnesses, each of whom witnessed both the signing and the testator’s acknowledgment
of the signature of the will. Each witness stated Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound
mind and under no duress, fraud or undue influence. A notary further stated under penalty
of perjury that Gordon Lanham appeared to be of sound mind and under no undue
influence. The Lanham Will complies with the minimal formalities set forth under Idaho law.
iii. Thomas and Keith Lanham Seek to Circumvent Gordon Lanham’s
Testamentary Intent by Declaring Part of the Property Should Pass
Intestate 
If the Court determines that the Lanham Will is valid, but also finds there are
ambiguities concerning the proper distribution of property, before requiring property to pass
intestate, it is the goal of the Court to determine the testator’s intent from within the four
corners of the will. Wilkins v. Wilkins (In Re Estate of Wilkins), 137 Idaho 315, 319, 48 P.2d
644, 648 (2002). Here, there is no question as to what Gordon Lanham intended. Gordon
Lanham intended that specific items of property be distributed as stated and then gave
Judd Lanham discretion to distribute the remaining property. Nonetheless, the Lanhams
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continue to argue that the Lanham Will is defective and so the property should pass
intestate, particularly regarding two pieces of real property.
Relying on In re Corwin’s Estate, the Lanhams contend “in the absence of
a specific devise of the property as well as the absence of a residuary clause, Idaho case
law requires that this real property descend according to intestate succession.”
(Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment pg. 7.) This argument fails to
consider the fact Gordon Lanham granted Judd Lanham power of appointment in lieu of
creating a residuary clause. In In re Corwin’s Estate, the testator left one half of her estate
to her granddaughter, but provided that in the event the granddaughter predeceased her,
her brother was to receive an undivided interest in the estate. In re Corwin’s Estate, 86
Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). The granddaughter was still living at the time the testator
died. Accordingly, the court found the testator had failed to dispose of the other half of the
estate. Id. at 5. The court held the undevised half of her property must pass through
intestate succession because there was no residuary clause. Id. at 6. Because the will in
In re Corwin did not include a power of appointment, it is clearly distinguishable from the
case at hand. 
 While arguing there are no dispositive provisions regarding the Big Creek
and Ranch properties, the Lanhams assert that “the failure of the Will to devise the real
properties and the absence of a residuary clause, require that those properties descend
according to the laws of intestate succession.” (Memorandum in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment, pg. 9). This argument does not recognize that a residuary clause
cannot co-exist with a power of appointment. A power of appointment cannot be created
if there is “a general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all of
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the testator’s property.” Idaho Code Section 15-2-610. The reason being that a power of
appointment authorizes “a power or authority given to a person to dispose of property, or
an interest therein, which is vested in a person other than the donee of the power.” Estate
of Conroy, 67 Cal. App. 3d 734, 738, 136 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1977). 
The Lanhams contend that if a power of appointment existed in the Lanham
Will, it doesn’t pertain to property that Gordon Lanham had not decided about, or property
not identified in the will. In asserting this argument, the Lanhams cite to Estate of Conroy,
stating that a power of appointment must “designate specific assets of the decedent” to be
effective. (Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, pg. 10). However there
is no discussion of such a requirement in that case. Gordon Lanham chose to grant Judd
Lanham Power of Attorney over all personal and real property stating “I want him to be
able to distribute my property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will
try and put all the wording about the personal effects.” (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit A) (emphasis added).
 Additionally, the Lanhams argue that the Lanham Will’s disinheritance of
Thomas and Keith Lanham does not impact their status as intestate heirs. This ignores the
presumption that if a provision in a will can be construed in more than one way, intestacy
should be avoided, “especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of his or her entire estate, or where intestacy will result in persons sharing in the
estate whom the testator expressly cut off in the will.” Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal. App. 2d
189, 202, 8 Cal. Rptr. 160,167 (1960) (the court found “where an intention to disinherit an
heir is expressed clearly and manifestly in a will, so as to leave no reason for doubt, a
construction of the will which would leave the testator intestate as to any portion of the
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property will not be adopted to defeat the intention and thus allow the heir to have some
share in the estate.”); In Re Corwin’s Estate, supra, 86 Idaho at 5, 383 P.2d at 343 (“Courts
favor testacy over intestacy”). The Lanhams were each left $1 dollar and a bed built by
their grandfather. It would entirely frustrate the intent of Gordon Lanham to allow the
Lanhams to profit through the laws of intestacy.  
Finally, the Lanhams allege that because there were additional devises by
dictation, Gordon Lanham did not intend the Lanham Will to be his last will and testament.
(Declaration of Allen Ellis dated June 13, 2016, Exhibit 9). To create a valid will it must only
comply with the minimal formalities set forth in the Idaho Probate Code. Once a will is
created, the testator may revoke or amend the will, but only through formal processes.
Idaho Code Section 15-2-507.  Those formalities were not followed in this case. As a
result, any additional dictation is not legitimate and does not impact the validity of the
Lanham Will. The Lanhams are attempting to circumvent the intent of the Lanham Will to
recover a majority of the estate that the Gordon Lanham sought to disinherit them from.
Such an attempt does not comport with Idaho law.
III.
DOUGLAS FLEENOR DID NOT BREACH HIS DUTY OF CARE
The Lanhams’ allege that Douglas Fleenor breached his duty of care by
failing to file the appeal within the 42-day time period. However, this argument does not
take into account Douglas Fleenor’s numerous attempts to discuss the appeal deadline
with Thomas Lanham, and Thomas Lanham’s reluctance to file the appeal. On June 10,
2014, Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham discussed the limited time to file an appeal
after the Magistrate Judge’s decision in favor of the personal representative and against
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Thomas Lanham. (Affidavit of Douglas Fleenor in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated September 30, 2016). Thomas Lanham instructed Douglas
Fleenor that he wanted to wait due to concerns over the cost of an appeal. Id. Due to
Thomas Lanham’s concerns, Douglas Fleenor and Thomas Lanham discussed filing a
motion for reconsideration as a cheaper alternative to pursuing the appeal, and on June
20, 2014, Douglas Fleenor filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court. Id. 
On July 9, 2014, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration and Douglas
Fleenor called Thomas Lanham and again discussed the deadline for filing an appeal. Id.
Thomas Lanham instructed Douglas Fleenor to not file an appeal unless and until he
decided he wanted to proceed. Douglas Fleenor made several attempts to contact Thomas
Lanham over the next few weeks to ask about the appeal and Thomas Lanham failed to
respond. On August 13, 2014, Thomas Lanham told Douglas Fleenor to file the appeal.
Douglas Fleenor informed Thomas Lanham that the appeal deadline had passed but there
may be a chance due to their previous motion to reconsider. Id. Douglas Fleenor then filed
the appeal on the same day. 
Douglas Fleenor has testified that under the circumstances, his filing of the
notice of appeal complied with the applicable standard of care.  This evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Fleenor’s filing of the appeal more than
forty two days after the Court’s decision violated the standard of care.
IV.
DUTIES OWED TO KEITH LANHAM
It is undisputed that Keith Lanham did not have a contractual attorney-client
relationship with Douglas Fleenor. The Lanhams incorrectly apply the
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balance-of-the-harms test set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock and Lucas v. Hamm, to argue
that Keith, as a beneficiary of the Lanham Will, was owed a duty by Douglas Fleenor.
Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004); Lucas v. Hamm, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). This argument ignores the precedent concluding
the multi-factor balancing test does not apply in adversary situations. See Bowman v. John
Doe Two, 704 P.2d 140 (Wash. 1985)(attorney representing son did not owe duty to
mother);  Rhode v. Adams, 957 P.2d 1124 (Mont. 1998)(attorney representing mother in
custody dispute did not owe duty to father);  Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal.Rptr. 237
(Cal.Ct.App. 1975)(attorney did not owe duty to former adverse litigant, declining to extend
holding of Lucas).  
Additionally, both Harrigfeld and Lucas are strongly distinguishable from the
case at bar because in those cases, the attorney drafted the will that led to the dispute.
Here, Douglas Fleenor did not draft the will. Douglas Fleenor represented Thomas Lanham
in a challenge to the Lanham Will.  Thus, unlike the situations in Harrigfeld and Lucas,
Douglas Fleenor’s role arose out of litigation.  Keith Lanham was an adversary to Thomas
Lanham in the will contest.  Keith Lanham was represented by his own attorney, and later,
Keith Lanham executed an affidavit in which he testified that Thomas Lanham should
receive nothing under the Lanham Will. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C). Douglas Fleenor’s duties were owed to Thomas
Lanham.  He cannot also be held to owe duties to a litigant who was adverse to his client.
Keith Lanham ignores the statement of the Harrigfeld Court that the general rule is that
attorneys do not owe duties to non-clients.  Keith Lanham further ignores the Supreme
Court’s statement in Harrigfeld that its holding “will not subject attorneys to lawsuits by
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person who simply did not receive what they believed was their fair share of the testator’s
estate, or who simply did not receive in the testamentary instruments what they understood
the testator had stated or indicated they would receive.”  Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138, 90
P.3d at 88.
The Lanhams maintain that there was no conflict of interest between Thomas
and Keith Lanham. Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in paragraph (b) a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by the personal
interests of the lawyer, including family and
domestic relationships.
Here, Thomas and Keith Lanham were both seeking to recover property from
the Estate of Gordon Lanham.  There was an inherit potential conflict of interest between
them. In fact, the inherit potential conflict of interest became a real conflict when Keith
Lanham testified in an affidavit that Thomas Lanham should not recover. (Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2016, Exhibit C).
The Court cannot determine that there was no conflict between Thomas and
Keith Lanham simply as to the issue of the timeliness of the appeal.  If Douglas Fleenor
had a conflict that prevented him from representing both Thomas and Keith Lanham at the
trial court level, that conflict permeates the entire representation.  The adversity between
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Thomas and Keith prevents the Court from imposing a duty owed by Douglas Fleenor to
Keith Lanham, a non-client.
V.
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests that the Court deny the
Lanhams’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
DATED this   3rd   day of October, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP
By      /s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of __ _ ) 
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252 
DEFENDANT DOUGLAS 
FLEENOR'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DOUGLAS FLEENOR, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Defendant in the above-captioned action, and the following 
statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
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2. I am, and at all relevant times have been, an attorney admitted to 
practice, and in good standing, in the State of Idaho. I have actual knowledge of, and I am 
familiar with, the standard of care applicable to an attorney practicing in the State of Idaho 
at the times that I provided legal services to Thomas Lanham. I developed my actual 
knowledge of, and familiarity with, the standard of care through practicing in the State of 
Idaho and discussing the practice of law with attorneys and judges in the State of Idaho. 
The opinions stated herein are stated with reasonable professional certainty. 
3. On March 5, 2014, Thomas Lanham retained me to represent him with 
respect to Gordon Lanham's will. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is my file copy of the 
retention agreement entered into by Thomas Lanham in retaining me to represent him. 
This file copy has been maintained by me in the ordinary course of my doing business. 
4. On June 10, 2014, the Judge ruled from the bench and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the personal representative and against Mr. Lanham. After 
the Judge's decision I discussed the possibility of an appeal with Mr. Lanham and informed 
him that time was limited if he wanted to pursue an appeal. Mr. Lanham expressed some 
concern over the possible cost of appeal and told me to wait. 
5. On June 17, 2014, due to his concerns about the cost of an appeal, 
I talked with Mr. Lanham about filing a motion for reconsideration as a cheaper alternative 
to pursuing an appeal. Mr. Lanham agreed to proceed with a motion for reconsideration. 
On June 20, 2014, I filed a motion for reconsideration with the court. 
6. On July 9, 2014, I informed Mr. Lanham by telephone that the 
Magistrate Judge had denied the motion for reconsideration. I told Mr. Lanham we only had 
until the first week of August to appeal. Mr. Lanham instructed me to hold off for now. Mr. 
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Lanham asked me to estimate how much it would cost to undertake an appeal, and I told 
him that it would cost approximately $5,000 dollars. Mr. Lanham then told me that he did 
not want me to file an appeal at that time. 
7. I called Mr. Lanham several times over the next weeks asking about 
the appeal, but he did not get back to me. 
8. On August 13, 2014, Mr. Lanham told me to file an appeal. I told him 
that the time had run out and that it was too late to file a timely appeal, but stated there 
may be a chance due to the motion for reconsideration. After our conversation I filed the 
appeal. 
9. It is my opinion that I met the standard of care for an attorney 
practicing in the State of Idaho in not filing an appeal within 42 days of issuance of the 
Magistrate Court's opinion and order granting the personal representative's motion for 
summary judgment and denying Thomas Lanham's motion for summary judgment, 
because Thomas Lanham expressly directed me not to file an appeal unless and until he 
told me to file an appeal. It is my opinion that at all relevant times the standard of care for 
an attorney practicing in Idaho requires the attorney to follow the instruction of his client 
with respect to whether or not to file an appeal, and it is my opinion that I met the standard 
of care in following Mr. Lanham's instruction to not file an appeal. It is my opinion that at 
all relevant times the standard of care for an attorney practicing in Idaho requires the 
attorney to inform the client of the consequences of a late appeal, and it is my opinion that 
I met the standard of care in informing Mr. Lanham that failing to file an appeal within 42 
days of the Court's opinion could foreclose an appeal. It is my opinion that there was a 
valid argument that the filing of the motion for reconsideration extended the time for taking 
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of an appeal, and that it was within the standard of care for me to inform Mr. Lanham that 
the filing of the motion for reconsideration might extend the time for an appeal. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. , __ 
2016. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this:':{) day of ~k~ 
Notary Public for d ho ,~ 1 
Residing at ~ wuvt-t- --· 
Commission expires 7- l 3'- 2 6 
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which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as 
follows: 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
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[X] ICourt/E-Filing 
DEFENDANT DOUGLAS FLEENOR'S AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFFS' 




ATTORNEY FEE AGREEMENT 
Thomas E. Lanham 
This will confirm our agreement that you will retain Douglas E. Fleenor in representing your interests in 
the Gordon Thomas Lanl1am estate. You have provided your express authorization to institute 
administrative or legal proceedings as may be deemed necessary. 
As compensation for ]egal services you promise to pay the following: 
I. Attorney fees for tbe services of Douglas E. Fleenor at the rate of $200.00 per hour. 
2. All necessary costs associated with this representation, including but not limited to filing 
fees, discovery costs, deposition costs, witness foes, faxes, photo copies, and the like. 
Under our attorney/client relationship, you as the client will be the final decision-maker with regard to 
substantive decisions regarding the course of this action. Douglas E. Fleenor shall have the right to 
manage and control the matter. 
No matter how likely I believe it is that you will obtain a successful outcome, I cannot guarantee a 
positive r esult. 
Either of us may end this Agreement. I reserve the right to withdraw if you fail to honor this 
Agreement, or for any just reason permitted or required under Idaho rules or codes. If l withdraw, I will 
send you written notice. 
You may end this Agreement at any time by sending written notic.e. If you end the Agreement, you will 
still owe for expenses incurred and work performed up to the time of notice, and for any expenses or 
work incurred to withdraw and close your file. 
I look forward to working with you in this matter. 
Thomas E. Lanham Dated 
Electronically Filed
10/10/2016 11:31:04 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
oc
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ISB No. 1626 
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DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2016-8252 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Come now the plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, and submit the herein reply brief 
in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF 
THE WILL: RATHER. THEY ASSERT THAT THE TESTATOR'S 
REAL PROPERTY WAS NOT DEVISED BY THE WILL 
AND MUST PASS BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION. 
The will did not convey a power of appointment to the executor Judd Lanham with 
respect to the testator's real property: 
(I) Real property not subject to any "power": At the time of his death, the testator owned 
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acreage in Valley County (Big Creek) and a ranch in Gem County. The ranch was not mentioned 
in the will, and the testator expressly "want[ed] to think about that 47 acres in Big Creek". Also, 
there is no reference to a "power of appointment" in the will. Absent disposition by the will, these 
properties pass to the plaintiffs by intestate succession given the absence of a residuary clause. See 
plaintiffs opening brief. 
(2) Indispensable to an enforceable power of appointment is an identification of the property 
that is subject to the power: The Lanham will fails to identify the property that is subject to the 
alleged power. The will (Exhibit A to Lundberg affidavit) recites that executor Judd is to distribute 
the property "as he sees fit" pursuant to "power of attorney". However, the "property" is not 
identified. Thereafter, contradicting this language, the testator seeks to devise certain articles of 
personal property to named beneficiaries, rather than allowing his executor to do it, i.e., "Kathy can 
disburse", some books "belong to Lizzy"; "as far as my guns are concerned, I am gonna have to try 
and decide how that goes"; table and chairs "belong to Lizzy"; "sand painting that belongs to Lizzy". 
As to the Big Creek real property, "I want to think about that". 
As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: "power of appointment. A power conferred on a 
do nee by will or deed to select and nominate one or more recipients of the donor's estate or income" 
(Id., Seventh Edition, p. 1190). Indispensable to the creation of a coherent power of appointment 
is identification of the property to which the power is subject. The will in question fails in this 
regard. The need for property identification is particularly crucial because the Lanham testator 
specifically devised items of personal property in derogation of so-called power of appointment. 
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In arguing for the existence of a "power of appointment". defendant erroneously conflates 
such power with the "power of attorney" referenced in the will: The will recites that executor Judd 
is the recipient of the testator's "power of attorney over all my personal and real property". There 
is no reference to a "power of appointment". 
Defendant's brief asserts: "He [the testator] appointed Judd Lanham as his executor, and 
granted him power of attorney, to have full control to distribute his property after his death" (p. 5, 
emphasis added). Under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act such distribution by the executor is 
a legal impossibility. According to the Act, "a power of attorney terminates when . . the 
principal dies"(§ 15-12-110). Hence, the executor had no authority, post death, to convey any 
property, real or personal. 
Defendant may argue that the testator confused "power of attorney" for "power of 
appointment"and, therefore, the will should be read as conferring a power of appointment. The 
express language of the will causes this argument to fail. The will recites that the executor's power 
of attorney is effective immediately, a feature inconsistent with a testamentary power of 
appointment. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "power of appointment" is "[a] power 
conferred on a donee by will or deed . . ." Id., p. 1190, (Seventh Ed.). 
By the terms of the will (Exhibit A): (a) "I am giving his (sic) Power of Attorney for full 
control now" (p. 1 ); and (b) "I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after 
I am dead." (pp. 4, 5). 
The mere absence of a residuary clause does not transform will provisions into a power of 
appointment: Defendant argues that the existence of a residuary clause is incompatible with the 
existence of a power of appointment. Again, as noted above, the will gave the executor a power of 
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attorney, not a power of appointment. In any event, defendant seems to be asking this Court to 
conclude that the absence of a residuary clause transforms will provisions into powers of 
appointment. 
Idaho Code § 15-2-610, cited by defendant does provide that a residuary clause does not 
constimte an exercise of a power of appointment unless specific reference is made that the residuary 
clause includes the property subject to the power. Absent a residuary clause in the Lanham will, the 
statute is not relevant. 
DEFENDANT ERRONEOUSLY ARGUES THAT APPLICATION OF 
OF THE HARRIGFELD CRITERIA DOES NOT COMPEL THE 
CONCLUSION THAT HE OWED KEITH THE S~\.fE DUTY 
OF CARE WHICH HE OWED TO PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiffs incorporate herein pages 14 through 17 of their opening brief which is an 
exposition of why the criteria in Ha.rrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134 (2004) force the conclusion 
that defendant attorney owed Keith Lanham a duty of care. Defendant's answering brief fails to 
establish that sueh conclusion is incorrect. 
At the time defendant filed the notice of a1212eal. there was no adversary relationship between 
defendant and Keith: Tom Lanham hired defendant to appeal the magistrate decision holding that 
the will in question devised the entirety of the Lanham Estate assets. The case authority cited by 
defendant deal with claims made by a litigant against his adversary's attorney respecting alleged 
negligence occurring in that litigation. 
In the underlying litigation, Keith and the defendant attorney were not adversaries. The failed 
appeal was against Judd Lanham, the executor of the Lanham Estate who was claiming that the will 
disposed of the decedent's real property. As reflected in Keith's declaration, he withdrew from the 
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probate litigation in order to avoid additional attorney fees. He was under the illusion that (1) the 
will devised the Big Creek property and (2) that the ranch had been conveyed, inter-vivos, by the 
decedent to his grandson. 
Defendant attomev erroneously seeks to distinguish Harriffield and Lucas by the fact that the 
defendant attorney in those cases drafted the v.ill: There is nothing in the Harrigfeld/Lucas criteria 
which limits attorney conduct which can give rise to non-client liability. In Lucas, three named 
beneficiaries (non-clients) failed to get their inheritance because the bequest was an illegal restraint 
on alienation. Lucas held that these non-clients were owed a duty of care by the drafter, i.e., it was 
foreseeable that a drafting error would cost them financial loss. Id. 56 Cal.2d at 588, 589. It was 
equally foreseeable to defendant Fleenor that Keith Lanham, the remaining intestate heir, would 
suffer the same financial loss as his brother in the event of a late appeal. Whether drnfting a will or 
perfecting an appeal, Lucas and the case at bench have a commonality: the risk to the non-clients in 
the event of negligence as well as their identity were known to the attorney from the outset, unlike 
Harrigfeld 
There was no conflict of interest between Keith and Thomas: As potential intestate 
beneficiaries, the respective entitlement of Keith and Thomas was fifty/fifty. Whether they won or 
lost the appeal (had it been timely filed), the impact on them would be identical, i.e., owners as 
tenants in common to the real property or non-owners. 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION IS A LEGAL ISSUE 
FOR THE COURT TO RESOLVE. 
Because the existence of proximate cause turns on the merits of the time-barred appeal, the 
overwhelming majority of cases conclude that this issue, i.e., the merits of the appeal, is a legal issue 
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for the Court. See analysis in plaintiffs' opening brief, pages 11 - 13. 
The authorities cited by defendant are not on point. One involves the alleged negligence of 
an attorney in allowing evidence to be destroyed (Murray v. Farmers Ins., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 
IO I (1990)). In the other case, the client sued the attorney for his failure to file a financing statement 
(Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 (1990). 
Defendant argues that removing from jury consideration "the determination of violation of 
standard of care of proximate cause" (sic) is in violation of the Idaho Constitution. First, Court 
determination of proximate causation does not remove from the jury whether there has been a 
"violation of the standard of care". Secondly, as defense counsel well knows, legal issues are 
routinely removed from jury consideration, the Idaho Constitution notwithstanding. 
DEFENDANT HAS IMPROPERLY INCLUDED IN HIS RULE 56 
"ANSWERING BRIEF" AN ARGUMENT NOT ADDRESSED 
IN EITHER HIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION OR IN 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment addresses two issues: (I) proximate causation, i.e., 
whether the magistrate's ruling which held the real property to be devised by the will was subject 
to reversal on appeal; and (2) whether defendant attorney owed a duty of care to plaintiff Keith 
Lanham ("Keith"). Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment addresses these two issues and 
a third issue, i.e., whether plaintiff Keith is "bound" by "judicial admissions". 
Now, for the first time, in his Rule 56( c) "answering brief' defendant asserts that he was not 
negligent, conceding that this issue is fact-driven and not amenable to summary disposition. 
Defendant's point is not clear. The issue of fact presented by defendant's alleged negligence does 
not impair plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the legal issues of proximate 
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causation and defendant attorney's duty of care to Keith. 
Dated this 10th day of October, 2016. 
/s/ Allen B. Ellis 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 10th day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
__ Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
_x_ Facsimile (345-8660) 
/s/ Allen B. Ellis 
Allen B. Ellis 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
DEFENDANT DOUGLAS FLEENOR’S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
Richard L. Stubbs, ISB No. 3239
Samantha L. Lundberg, ISB No. 9992
CAREY PERKINS LLP
Capitol Park Plaza
300 North 6th Street, Suite 200
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho  83701
Telephone:  (208) 345-8600
Facsimile:  (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
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REYNARD,
               Plaintiffs,
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DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,








Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief discusses Keith Lanham’s claim only. Plaintiffs
raise two arguments in their Answering Brief:  1)  Keith Lanham's withdrawal of his petition
for a declaration of intestacy does not constitute a waiver of his claim against Mr. Fleenor
for legal malpractice because he mistakenly believed that Gordon Lanham's real property
had already been disposed of; and 2)  Keith Lanham's judicial admissions were erroneous
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or irrelevant.  Note that Plaintiffs did not respond to Mr. Fleenor’s assertion that it would be
improper to impose a duty on Mr. Fleenor as to Keith Lanham where Keith Lanham was
represented by separate counsel in the underlying suit.  See, Pelham v. Grieseheimer,
440 N. E. 2d 96 (Ill. 1982) (holding that to conclude attorney representing a spouse in a
divorce also owed a duty to children would create conflict of interest situations). The fact
that Keith Lanham was represented by a separate attorney creates an inherent conflict that
precludes Douglas Fleenor from being liable to Keith Lanham.
II.
KEITH LANHAM'S AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY WAIVED HIS CLAIM
Plaintiffs portray Douglas Fleenor as arguing that Keith Lanham's withdrawal
of his petition for a declaration of intestacy constituted a waiver of his claim.  This is not Mr.
Fleenor's argument.  Instead,  Mr. Fleenor argues that Keith Lanham's filing of his affidavit
constituted a waiver of his present claim.  See, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21 ("Keith Lanham's assertion in the affidavit is a waiver
of his present claim.")  The waiver occurred in Keith Lanham's testimony:
I believe and accept that my father made the specific gifts to
my brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in his Will for
his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.
Affidavit of Keith Lanham dated May 23, 2014.
Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony could not be more clear.  Keith Lanham
testified that he believed and accepted that his father made specific gifts to both Thomas
Lanham and to him as set forth in his Will for his own personal reasons and that Gordon
Lanham's wishes should be honored.  The fact that Keith Lanham may have believed that
Gordon Lanham's real property had already been disposed does not make this a less than
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knowing waiver, particularly when this is considered in its proper context.  Keith Lanham
filed a petition for a declaration of intestacy.   Then, before he withdrew his petition,   Keith
Lanham provided an affidavit in which he testified that he believed and accepted that
Gordon Lanham made the specific gifts to Thomas and Keith "as set forth in his Will for his
own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored."  In this testimony,  Keith
Lanham concedes that Gordon Lanham's Will is valid.   Keith Lanham also concedes that
Gordon Lanham effectively disinherited Thomas and Keith for Gordon's "own personal
reasons and that his wishes should be honored."  
Keith Lanham knew he had a right to challenge Gordon Lanham's will.  He
waived that right when he filed his affidavit.  When Keith Lanham filed his affidavit, he knew
that he could have continued to contest the will as his brother Thomas was doing.  Instead,
Keith Lanham chose to renounce his right to contest the will.  He is not allowed to
"unwaive" that right now.
III.
KEITH LANHAM IS BOUND BY HIS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Plaintiffs assert that Keith Lanham's judicial admissions are limited to the
following:  1)  Gordon Lanham made specific bequests to Thomas and Keith Lanham that
should be honored;  2)  the Big Creek property should be devised according to the Will;
3)  the quitclaim of 100 acres to Thomas Lanham was a gift, and then Thomas abandoned
Gordon Lanham;  4)  Gordon Lanham was estranged from Thomas Lanham, and Keith
Lanham reconciled with Gordon Lanham;  and 5)  Judd Lanham was the appropriate
person to be personal representative.  Plaintiffs do not dispute Douglas Fleenor's statement
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of the law concerning judicial admissions.  Plaintiffs also do not dispute that Keith Lanham
was represented by an attorney other than Mr. Fleenor in the underlying action.
The judicial admissions made by Keith Lanham are not limited to the five
described by Plaintiffs.  Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony constituted a "deliberate, clear,
unequivocal" statement about concrete facts within his knowledge.  Grain Growers
Membership & Investment Trust v. Liquidator for the Universal Life Insurance Co.,
144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242, 250 (2007).   Keith Lanham admitted in court that
Gordon Lanham's specific gifts to Thomas and Keith in his Will were made for his own
personal reasons.  Keith admitted in court that Gordon Lanham's will was valid and that he
did not challenge it.  Keith admitted in court that Gordon Lanham's wishes should be
honored.  He then withdrew his petition.
The Magistrate Court relied on this testimony by Keith Lanham in rendering
its decision.  Keith Lanham is not permitted now to revoke his testimony.  The assertions
in Keith Lanham's affidavit are completely binding on his claim, and bar it.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Keith Lanham's affidavit testimony constitutes a waiver of his claim.  In
addition, in filing his affidavit,  Keith Lanham made judicial admissions that were relied upon
by the Court, and by which he is now bound.  Keith Lanham was represented by an
attorney other than Douglas Fleenor in the underlying lawsuit.  Accordingly,  Douglas
Fleenor respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion for Summary Judgment.
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DATED this 10th day of October, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP
By/s/Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th  day of October, 2016, I electronically
filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt/E-Filing system
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Boise, Idaho 83713
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[  ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
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[  ] Overnight Mail
[  ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564
[X]       ICourt/E-Filing
              /s/Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs
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Case No. CV-OC-2016-8252 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for legal malpractice.  The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Lanham 
was admitted to probate in Gem County.  His cousin, Judd Lanham, was appointed personal 
representative. Plaintiffs Thomas and Keith Lanham1 are Gordon Lanham’s children.  He left 
them each one dollar in his will.  Plaintiff Thomas Lanham unsuccessfully contested the will as 
to its validity and as to its inclusion of certain property in the probate estate.  The contest of the 
will was originally joined by plaintiff Keith Lanham.  Keith Lanham withdrew his objection 
prior to the hearing before the probate judge.  Plaintiff Thomas Lanham was represented in the 
probate proceedings by defendant Douglas Fleenor.  Plaintiff Keith Lanham was represented by 
separate counsel.  An appeal from the magistrate’s decision was held to be untimely, and this 
lawsuit followed. 
                                                          
1 Janine Reynard, bankruptcy trustee for Keith Lanham, has been substituted as a party in his place by 
Order entered August 31, 2016.  For the sake of simplicity and consistency, this opinion will continue to refer to 
Keith Lanham as a party, recognizing that the real party in interest is the bankruptcy trustee. 
Kathy Pataro 11.22.16
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Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, stating that (1) had the underlying notice 
of appeal for In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon T. Lanham been timely filed, Plaintiffs 
Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the 
decedent’s real property; and (2) Defendant owed a duty of care to Keith Lanham.  Defendant 
moved for summary judgment for dismissal of the case because (1) a timely appeal would have 
been unsuccessful; and (2) in any event defendant owed no duty to plaintiff Keith Lanham. 
II. DISCUSSION 
i. The Duty Owed to Keith Lanham 
The Court reiterates its ruling made from the bench:  Defendant Douglas Fleenor owed 
no duty to Plaintiff Keith Lanham.  Keith Lanham was represented by separate counsel, and it is 
undisputed that Defendant did not undertake to represent him.  This case does not fall within the 
exception to the general rule set forth in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 
(2004).  Nor did Defendant voluntarily undertake any duty to act on Plaintiff Keith Lanham’s 
behalf as did the defendant in Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256(2014).  The mere 
fact that Keith Lanham might incidentally benefit from a successful appeal is insufficient to 
impose such a duty and consequential liability. 
ii. The Outcome of a Timely Appeal 
Both parties suggest that they would be successful had the appeal been timely filed.  
When viewing this question from the standpoint of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, 
there is a preliminary question of whether the outcome of a hypothetical appeal is a question of 
law for the court or a question of fact for a jury.  Plaintiff cites a treatise on legal malpractice: 
“The resolution of a petition or appeal must and can be made by the trial judge as 
an issue of law, based on review of the transcript and record of the underlying 
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action, the argument of counsel, and subject to the same rules of review as should 
have been applied to the motion or appeal. This does not usurp the entitlement to 
a jury because the issue is one of law.” 
Legal Malpractice, 2012 Edition, Vol. 4, sec. 33.43, p. 942.  
The treatise cites multiple cases from several jurisdictions.  For example, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that for “cases involving an attorney’s alleged failure to perfect an appeal,” 
courts have consistently recognized that the determination of the success of the appeal is within 
the exclusive province of the court and not the jury. Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 603 
(Wash. 1985).  
At oral argument, Defendant’s counsel suggested the outcome of the appeal was a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury.  No similar argument was made in the briefing 
submitted by the defense and no authority for this proposition was cited at oral argument.  The 
Court is persuaded that the treatise is correct.  Whether or not a properly perfected timely appeal 
would have been successful is a question for the court.  The Court is further persuaded that the 
issue is to be decided “based on review of the transcript and record of the underlying action, the 
argument of counsel, and subject to the same rules of review as should have been applied to the 
motion or appeal.” 
The difficulty here is that, while many of the facts are not in dispute, including those 
recited above, the Court does not have before it a complete record of the proceedings before the 
magistrate court in the underlying case, nor any clear understanding of the judgment entered by 
the probate court in the underlying case.  The record does not tell us what “affidavits, the audio 
recordings and the entire record” is the basis for the probate court to “find in favor of the 
Personal Representative on every factual dispute.”  Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence of 
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exactly which appellate record would be presented in the hypothetical appeal along with the 
argument for exactly the relief that would be available in a properly perfected appeal.  While it is 
correct that the opinion of the Honorable Duff McKee raises concerns regarding the procedure 
and decision of the magistrate judge, that is a far cry from a decision on the merits based upon a 
complete record. 
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue suffers the same frailty.  Absent 
a complete record and argument that would be before an appellate court in the hypothetical 
appeal, this Court is not prepared to say the magistrate ruling was correct.  There are a number of 
interesting issues, including the question of what is required to create a power of appointment, 
whether the will in this case does so, what evidence is admissible to make that determination and 
what issues were before the trial court.   Ultimately, Plaintiff Thomas Lanham bears the burden 
of proof and persuasion in this case.  However, where Defendant is moving for summary 
judgment, it is incumbent upon Defendant to present the Court with a complete record upon 
which a decision can be made. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is denied.  
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Janine P. Reynard, as party plaintiff in 
the stead of Keith C. Lanham, is granted and Plaintiff Reynard’s complaint will be dismissed.  
The remainder of Defendant’s summary judgment motion is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
       ___________________________ 
       RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
       District Judge  
 
  
Signed: 11/22/2016 11:48 AM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P. ) Case No. CV-2016-8252 
REYNARD, as party plaintiff in the stead ) 
of Keith C. Lanham, ) STIPULATION ON THE ISSUE 
) TO BE RESOLVED IN SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs ) JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS 
v. ) 
) 




Come now the parties, through their respective attorneys of record, and stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
WHEREAS, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the 
legality of the magistrate court's Findings of Fact and Judgment in the underlying probate 
proceedings, to wit, In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham (Gem County Case No. 
CV-2013-886). 
WHEREAS the herein Court has ruled the aforesaid motions for summary judgment cannot 
be resolved until a record of the underlying proceedings is made a part of this record. 
STIPULATION ON THE ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED 
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS - 1 
Electronically Filed
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WHEREAS the parties are in the process of assembling the aforesaid record in order to 
comply with the Court's ruling. 
WHEREAS the Court has directed the parties to prepare a stipulation which identifies the 
issue to be resolved in the pending summary judgment proceedings. 
WHEREAS the parties have fully briefed the issue presented, and the matter can be 
submitted for decision at such time as the underlying record has been filed with the Court, subject 
to the Court's discretion to require oral argument. 
Therefore, based upon the above premises, the parties, through their respective attorneys 
of record, stipulate and agree to submit the following issues to the Court for resolution without 
further briefing: Plaintiffs issue: had the underlying notice of appeal for In the Matter of the Estate 
of Gordon T. Lanham been timely filed, Plaintiffs Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have 
been adjudicated the intestate heirs to the decedent's real property. Defendant's issue: a timely 
appeal would have been unsuccessful. 
Dated this 10th  day of February, 2017. 
/s/ Allen B. Ellis  
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Dated this 13th  day of February, 2017. 
/s/ Samantha L. Lundberg  
Samantha L. Lundberg 
Attorney for Defendant 
STIPULATION ON THE ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED 
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS - 2 
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CAREY PERKINS LLP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THOMAS E. LANHAM and JANINE P.
REYNARD,
               Plaintiffs,
vs.
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR,
               Defendant.
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON NEWLY 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE
COMES NOW Defendant Douglas Fleenor, by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby submits this Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Support
of his Motion for Summary Judgment based on newly obtained evidence, stating the
following in support thereof:
1. On August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Electronically Filed
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Judgment, and on September 7, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on November 22, 2016,
indicating that the Court could not resolve all the issues presented due to an inadequate
record.
3. Following the Court’s Decision, the parties assembled additional
records to provide the Court with sufficient facts to make a ruling. These records were
provided to the Court on or about March 2, 2017.
4. In obtaining a complete record, Defendant discovered evidence the
Court and the parties did not incorporate into their briefing prior to the November 22, 2016
decision. 
5. The request to submit supplemental briefing will not prejudice Plaintiffs
and is timely as the Court has not yet issued a ruling resolving all the issues on the
cross-motions for summary judgment
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this   18th   day of April, 2017.
CAREY PERKINS LLP
By        /s/ Richard L. Stubbs
Richard L. Stubbs, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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 Plaintiffs Thomas and Keith Lanham brought a legal malpractice action 
against Defendant Douglas Fleenor alleging that Defendant Fleenor committed 
malpractice when he did not file a timely appeal in the prior lawsuit challenging the validity 
of the will of their father, Gordon Lanham.  On August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, and on September 7, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. On November 22, 2016, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
indicating the Court could not resolve all the issues presented due to an inadequate 
record. Following the Court’s decision, the parties assembled the additional Gem County 
records to provide the Court with sufficient facts to make a ruling.  While obtaining a 
complete record of the Gem County documents for the Court, Defendant Fleenor 
uncovered additional information that further demonstrates the Magistrate Court’s finding 
that Gordon Lanham’s Will was valid under Idaho law was based on substantial and 
competent evidence. Accordingly, Defendant Fleenor requests the Court grant his Motion 
for Summary Judgment.  
II. 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE MAGISTRATE COURT’S FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Douglas Fleenor did not timely file an 
appeal, and that had he filed an appeal, the Appellate Court would have found the 
Magistrate Judge improperly granted the estate’s motion for summary judgment.  
 A court’s findings on cross motions for summary judgment will not be 
disturbed on appeal so long as the record is sufficient to support the findings. Riverside 
Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); Cougar 
Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979) (in reviewing 
the sufficiency of the record to sustain a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Court limits the review to whether there is substantial, competent, although 
conflicting evidence, in the record to support the findings).  
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 In the prior proceedings, on April 23, 2014, Douglas Fleenor, on behalf of 
Thomas Lanham, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in Support, 
alleging that the property of the decedent, Gordon Lanham, should have passed intestate 
to the decedent’s heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent 
failed to dispose of all of decedent’s property. Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of 
Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit A. On May 23, 2014, Attorney Nancy Callahan, on behalf of the estate, filed a 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, alleging the will was 
valid. Id., Exhibit B. 
 As evidence considered in the cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
Court reviewed the transcription of Gordon Lanham’s Will, the audio recording of Gordon 
Lanham’s Will, as well as the affidavits of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham, and 
Keith Lanham, which discuss the decedent’s intent to completely disinherit Thomas 
Everett Lanham. The affidavits explicitly state that Thomas Everett Lanham was not to 
profit from the estate and that Judd Lanham should distribute the remaining property not 
specifically addressed in Gordon Lanham’s Will. 
 Catherine Lanham Gillihan, the older sibling of Gordon Lanham, testified in 
an affidavit:  
When Gordon Thomas was unable to be a lineman and had 
limited work, his son, Thomas Everett agree to pay his father 
for part of the property. Gordon Thomas quit claimed Thomas 
E. some 100 + acres. The agreement was contingent on 
Thomas E. selling his ranch. The sale failed and numerous 
problems ‘snowballed.’ Because there was no written 
contract, Gordon Thomas received no money and Thomas E. 
listed that property for sale. Because of this transaction and 
because Thomas E. failed to pay child support or arrange for 
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any further education for Joe or Robbie, and because Gordon 
Thomas with assist from myself contributed to the education 
of Joe and Robbie, Gordon Thomas felt Thomas E. needed 
no further distribution from the estate. 
 
Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. Ms. Gillihan went on to testify:  
When Gordon Thomas was asked about his will, he told me 
that when he dictated his estate wishes he had been at odds 
with his family and that he was now making new distributions. 
He stated that if it was incomplete, Judd knew his wishes and 
that he completed trusted him to take care of Keith, Joe, and 
Robbie. Gordon Thomas told me he didn’t put any one else in 
charge because of the family conflict it would cause. He told 
me he wanted Joe to be on the land and in his house to care 
for him. He had a life tenancy for the property, and that the 
ranch would be Joe’s when he died. He wanted Judd to pay 
off Linda and take care of Keith, Joe, and Robbie, using his 
discretion, with his remaining property. He left an audio tape 
of his intentions and directions to Judd. 
 
Id. Ms. Gillihan additionally attested to Gordon Lanham’s mental state and stated that “he 
was coherent and clear as to his intentions and desires.” Id. 
 Judd Max Lanham, cousin of Gordon Lanham and the named personal 
representative, testified in an affidavit that Gordon Lanham:  
[S]aw his elder son, Thomas Everett, as a liar and a thief, 
having quitclaimed about 115 acres to Thomas Everett on his 
promise that he would help support Tom. Once the quitclaim 
deed was recorded, Thomas Everett abandoned Tom. He felt 
betrayed and saddened by Thomas Everett’s words and 
actions. To say that this situation broke his heart is not an 
exaggeration. Tom was ashamed of Thomas Everett’s 
behavior toward the many women in his life and his neglect of 
his children, particularly Joe and Robby. 
 
Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D. Judd Lanham also testified “Tom 
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died on December 5, 2013. He left a Last Will and Testament naming me personal 
representative. I did not want to be personal representative but Tom insisted because he 
predicted problems from his son Thomas Everett Lanham, whom he was estranged from 
until the day he died.” Id.  
 Additionally, Keith Lanham testified in an affidavit “I believe and accept that 
my father made the specific gifts to my brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth in 
his Will for his own personal reasons and his wishes should be honored.” Affidavit of 
Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit E. 
 At the hearing on June 10, 2014, the Court heard arguments on the cross-
motions for summary Judgment. Prior to arguments, the Magistrate Judge informed the 
parties he had taken considerable time to review the record on the motions for summary 
judgment, and stated that he thought the residuary clause in Gordon Lanham’s Will was 
“explicit and clear that he wanted Judd to dispose of anything that was left that wasn’t 
disposed of.” Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit F. Judge Smith then 
stated he wanted to hear oral arguments for any additional information.  
 After hearing arguments from both parties, and reviewing the briefing prior 
to the hearing, Judge Smith held:  
I’m going to grant summary judgment on behalf of the 
personal representative and I’m going to deny, Mr. Fleenor, 
your motion for summary judgment. I find based on the will 
(inaudible) admissible to show the donor’s intent. What the 
deceased wanted is disposed of (inaudible) and through 
parole evidence, you can determine his intent. The two boys 
were specifically disinherited. I’m not going to override his 
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wishes. You know, I find that even in the light most favorable 
to the adverse party, that there’s not genuine issue of material 
fact implying we need a trial at this point. The rule’s clear the 
donor’s intent was established by the concurrent recordings. 
Ms. Callahan, you’ll prepare the order of summary 
judgment…on behalf of the personal representative and they 
have higher courts to take a look at what this court decides 
but it’s real clear to me what Mr. Gordon Thomas Lanham 
wanted and it’s real clear that not only in my mind does he 
dispose of the property, but also his wishes are contained in 
the recordings of what his intent was, that that would be 
admissible and that’s the order of the Court. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). On June 25, 2014, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, holding “claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, 
but he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, admissible 
evidence. Based on the language of the will itself, the affidavits, the audio recordings, and 
the entire record, the Court finds in favor of the Personal Representative on every factual 
dispute.”  Affidavit of Richard L. Stubbs in Support of Defendant’s Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G. 
 The Magistrate Court relied on substantial and competent evidence in the 
record in rendering its decision that Gordon Lanham’s Will was valid pursuant to Idaho 
law. Accordingly, even if the appeal had been timely filed, the Appellate Court’s review 
would have been limited to whether the Magistrate Court’s findings were supported by 
sufficient evidence in the record. See Riverside Development Co., v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 
515, 522, 650 P.2d 657, 664 (1982); see also Cougar Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 
380, 383, 597 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1979). In making its decision, the Magistrate Court relied 
on the language from Gordon Lanham’s Will itself, bolstered by the audio recording of 
Gordon Lanham, and the Affidavits of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Max Lanham, 
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and Keith Lanham. This is sufficient evidence to make the determination as to whether 
Gordon Lanham executed a valid will before his death, and as such, the Magistrate’s 
decision would not have been disturbed on appeal.  
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Magistrate Court’s decision was based on substantial evidence in the 
record. Accordingly, the decision would not have been reversed on appeal. Even 
assuming Douglas Fleenor breached a duty, the alleged breach did not cause any harm 
because the Appellate Court would have sustained the Magistrate Court’s decision. For 
the foregoing reasons, Douglas Fleenor requests to Court grant his motion for summary 
judgment. 
 DATED this 4th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
      CAREY PERKINS LLP 
 
 
By:__/s/Samantha L. Lundberg______ 
      Samantha L. Lundberg, of the Firm 
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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
  I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2017, I electronically filed 
the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system which 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as follows: 
 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho  83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
Attorneys for Plaintiff   
[  ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[  ] Hand-Delivered 
[  ] Overnight Mail 







 /s/ Samantha L. Lundberg  




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-16-08252 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. 
LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG, having been first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1 . I am a member of the law firm of Carey Perkins LLP, attorneys of 
record for the Defendant Douglas Fleenor in the above-captioned action, and the 
following statements are made of my own personal knowledge and are true and correct. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-1 
000190
2. The following records produced herewith as Exhibit "A" through 
"G", from the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham, Gem County Case No. 
CV2013-886 were provided to the Court on or about March 2, 2017, and are being 
reproduced for the ease of the Court in reviewing the Supplemental Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Attached as Exhibit "A" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
Thomas Lanham's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
April 23, 2014. 
4. Attached as Exhibit "B" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the Personal Representative's Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 23, 2014. 
5. Attached as Exhibit "C" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Exhibit 1 to the Memorandum in Support of 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 22, 2014. 
6. Attached as Exhibit "D" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the Affidavit of Judd Max Lanham, Exhibit 2 to the Memorandum in Support of Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 23, 2014. 
7. Attached as Exhibit "E" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the Affidavit of Keith Lanham, Exhibit 3 to the Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, dated May 22, 2014. 
8. Attached as Exhibit "F" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the transcript of the Hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment, dated June 10, 2014. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-2 
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9. Attached as Exhibit "G" to this Affidavit is a true and correct copy of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Motion and Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated June 25, 2014. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 




STATE OF IOAHO 
u lie for Idaho 
Residing at ~' {O 
Commission expires {0 f ,Zo / ZO 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION.FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of May, 2017, I electronically filed 
the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system which 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as follows: 
Allen B. Ell is 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
[X] ICourt/E-Filing 
aellis@aellislaw.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMANTHA L. LUNDBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
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Douglas E. Fleenor ISBN 7989 
Attorney & Counselor at Law 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83 702 
208-4 72-8846 
208-947-S910 fax 
Attorney for Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF nm THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
GORDON THOMAS LANHAM; 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV 2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Thomas E. Lanham, by and through his attorney, Douglas 
E. Fleenor, and submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Petitioner seeks summary judgment declaring that property of the decedent passed 
intestate to the decedent's heirs for the reason that the Last Will and Testament of the decedent 
fails to dispose of all of decedent's property. 
FACTS 
The personal representative filed a purported Last Will and Testament of the above 
named decedent dated January 19, 2011. 
Decedent's Last Will and Testament fails to make any dispositive provisions or give 
direction regarding the residue of his estate. 
In paragraph four on page two, the Will states, "I want [Judd] to be able to distribute my 
property and my personal effects in any way that he sees fit and I will try to put an the wording 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 1 
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about the personal effects." Then again in the last paragraph, the WiJl reiterates, "I want [Judd} 
to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my Last Will and 
Testament." 
Page 3 of the Will contains the only possible devise, stating " .. .I gotta $3,000 sheep head 
that Judd can hang up in his cabin if he wants to.,, 
Toe remainder of the Will discusses the ownership of certain property located at his 
residence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate with the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
on fil~ show th.at there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Failure of a party to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and upon which that 
_party bears the b~den of proof entitles the moving party to swrunaryjudgmeot as a matter of law. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has thoroughly addressed the standards governing motions for summary 
judgment. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is generally required to 
liberally -construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. drawing 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Construction Management Systems. 
Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680,682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001). However, Rule 
56(3) requires the non-moving party to go beyond pleadings through affidavit, depositions, etc .• to 
demonstrate that there are genuine issue of material facts, Doe v. Durischi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d 
1238 (1986). If the non-moving party mils to do so, then the moving party is entitled to summary 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT - 2 
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judgment as a matter of law. Id at 46, 716 P.2d at 124); see also Sparks v. St. Lukes Reg. Medical 
Ctr. Ltd, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho has adopted of the Uniform Probate Code, which allows decedents to pass their 
property upon death through a validly executed Will. 
A will should be interpreted, if possible, in such manner as to prevent intestacy when it 
evinces an intention to dispose of the entire estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 6, 383 P.2d 
339,341 (]963). 
However, a devisee must be identified so that the courts can be certain that the testator's 
inten1s and purposes are being carried out. Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105, 108, 416 P.2d 
164, 167 (1966), quoting 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, pg. 18, § 363. 
In order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to place 
on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based on supposition as to the 
intention of the testator in the disposition of his estate. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 
P.2d 339,341 (1963); In re Hoytema's Estate, 180 Cal. 430, 181 P. 645; In re Be/don's Estate, 11 
Cal.2d 108, 77 P.2d 1052; 95 C.J.S. Wills§ 615c. 
Idaho statutes authorize a person to devise or bequeath his property, but it does not permit 
him to delegate to another the power to make such disposition for him. Hedin v. Westdala 
Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241,250, 81 P.2d 741, 745 (1938). Such testamentary efforts have 
been likened unto powers of attorney to make wills, which the law does not permit Id 
Each of the above cases held that a devise fails when a devisee is not designated with 
sufficient legal certainty. Examples of failed devises included a gift to any charitable 
organization chosen by a spouse (Hedin), devising the residue to any worthy charity selected by 
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the executor (Yribar), and a failure to dispose of half the estate (Corwin), Without a defined 
devisee. the court cannot ascertain or enforce a decedent's intent. 
Idaho Statutes also state that any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed 
of by his will passes to his heirs. I.C. § 15-2-10 I. In addition. if any devise fails for any reason, it 
becomes part of the residue. I.C. § 15-2-606. 
When a devise fails and the will lacks a. residuary clause, the residue passes through 
intestate succession. In re Corwin's Estate, 86 ldaho 1, 5,383 P.2d 339,341 (1963), 
In this case, even if the Will is valid, the decedent clearly failed to name devisees for his 
property. Therefore, as a matter of taw, decedent's entire estate, with the possible exception of 
one specific devise, passes to bis heirs by intestate succession pursuant to Chapter 2, Title 15 of 
the Idaho Code. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to swnmary judgment on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, summary jud~ent should be granted in favor. of Petitioner, 
finding the property of decedent passes to his heirs by intestate succession. 
DATED this~ day of April, 2014. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This memorandum is respectfully submitted to the Court in 
support of the Personal Representative's CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO THOMAS EVERETT 
LANHAM'S MOTI ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Gordon Thomas Lanham executed a Last Will and Testament on 
January 19, 2011 naming his cousin, Judd Lanham executor giving him 
Power of Attorney over all of his personal and real property. The Last 
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Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham specifically provided for 
his sons Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham to each receive a dollar and 
a bed made by their grandfather. The children of Keith Lanham were 
also specifically disinherited. The Last Will and Testament was 
transcribed from a recording made by the testator over a period of time. 
On or about November 19, 2013 the testator executed a Transfer 
on Death Deed naming Petitioner's son, Joe Lanham, beneficiary, 
subject to payment of a mortgage to his former girlfriend and his 
brother Rex Lanham Jr.'s ex-wife, Linda Louise Andrews Lanham(aka) 
Linda Louise Andrews, . Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 
2013. The original Will was filed with the Court on December 20, 2013 
and Judd Lanham was informally appointed personal representative. 
On January 8, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed pro se 
an "Application to Attest Personal Representative" in the probate case 
with a claim that the will was not valid and that the personal 
representative was not qualified . On January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, 
by and through his attorney William F. Lee filed a Petition to Remove 
Personal Representative with claims contesting the validity of the will 
and removal of the personal representative. The matters were set for 
hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On or about January 15, 2014, the personal representative 
attempted to satisfy the mortgage to Linda Louise Andrews Lanham in 
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the amount of $54,625.00 from funds left to the personal representative 
in a POD account. He was verbally instructed by the decedent prior to 
his death that Joe Lanham would take the ranch free and clear of any 
encumbrances. Linda Andrews Lanham refused to accept payment of 
the mortgage. 
On January 21, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham, pro se, and Keith 
Lanham with his attorney, William F. Lee, were present in Court in the 
probate case. Judd Lanham was present with counsel. Also present 
were the two witnesses to the decedent's Will, Rebecca Clift, notary, 
Cathy Gillihan, sister of the decedent, and other family members. This 
Court advised the parties that two matters were before the Court; the 
issue of removal of the personal representative and the validity of the 
Will. The Court advised the parties that it was not inclined to remove 
the personal representative and that the matters concerning the 
construction of the will were continued for a half day trial on April 2, 
2014. 
On March 5, 2014 the Personal Representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a Quiet Title action in Gem County Case No. 2014-185 due to Linda 
Andrews' refusal to accept satisfaction of the mortgage. 
On March 24, 2014 Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case 
on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham in the probate case and in the 
quiet title action on behalf of Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. In the 
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probate case he filed another Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a Petition of 
Order Restraining Personal Representative on behalf of Thomas Everett 
Lanham. 
On March 28, 2014 the personal representative, . Judd Lanham, 
filed his affidavit concerning the audio recording of the decedent which 
was the basis for the Will in contest and because the recording included 
additional instruction to the personal representative for distribution of 
his personal property. 
On March 28, 2014, William F. Lee, on behalf of Keith Lanham, 
withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal Representative and Keith's 
claim contesting the validity of the will. 
On April 2, 2014, Thomas Everett Lanham or his attorney failed to 
appear for the Court trial to construe or determine the validity of the 
Will, a trial that was pending since January 21, 2014. 
On April 3, 2014, Thomas E. Lanham appeared with his counsel, 
Douglas Fleenor, for hearing on their Petition for Order Removing 
Personal Representative, Construing Will and Determining Heirs and a 
Petition of Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court having · 
reviewed the record and arguments of counsel denied the Petition for 
Order Removing Personal Representative and further denied the Petition 
for Order Restraining Personal Representative. The Court awarded the 
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estate attorney's fees. 
On April 9, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim in the quiet title action alleging the deed transferring the 
ranch to Joe Lanham was void and the ranch should be Included in the 
estate of Gordon Thomas Lanham. Linda Louis Andrews further claimed 
that the decedent failed to make any principle payments on the 
December 17, 2002 mortgage entitling her to $137,369.46. Paragraph 
6 of the Counterclaim alleges that: 
"On August 19, 2004, Gordon Thomas Lanham coerced Linda Lanham 
into signing a "Mortgage Payment", by threatening to expose and 
distribute personal, private and revealing photographs of Linda Lanham. 
The purported amount of the interest payment was $23,400.00." 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 further allege: 
"That on December 11, 2006, Gordon Thomas Lanham fraudulently 
caused Linda Lanham to enter Into an accord and satisfaction agreement 
by promising her payment of cash in the amount to $50,000. The 
accord and satisfaction consisted of Linda Lanham signing a Satisfaction 
of Mortgage for the December 17, 2002 Mortgage, in exchange for 
Gordon Thomas Lanham paying Linda Lanham $50,000 in cash and 
executing a new Promissory Note and Mortgage in the amount of 
$50,000 bearing Interest at the rate of 3% annum. Upon obtaining 
Linda Lanham's signatures, Gordon Thomas Lanham lelt the premises 
without paying Linda Lanham any of the promised amounts." 
On April 21, 2014 the personal representative and Joe Lanham 
filed a reply to Linda Andrew's counterclaim alleging any claims of fraud 
made by Linda Andrews Is barred by the statute of limitations and the 
only amount due to Linda Andrews is $54,625.00. 
On about April 21, 2014, an estate check in the amount of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS- PAGE 5 
57 
000204
$54,625.00 was sent to Mr. Fleenor and Linda Louise Andrews Lanham. 
On April 23, 2014, Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Gem County Case No.2014-187 on behalf of Linda Louise 
Andrews Lanham on the issue that the Deed to Joe Lanham is void and 
claims that the ranch should be included in the decedent's estate. On 
that same day Attorney Fleenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
this probate case on behalf of Thomas Everett Lanham on the issue that 
the Will fails to make any dispositive provisions or give direction 
regarding the residue of his father's estate and should pass intestate to 
decedent's heirs. 
ARGUMENT 
The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Thomas Lanham clearly 
and unambiguously and for independent reason, specifically 
bequeathed that his sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby 
Lanham, each receive one dollar and a bed that there grandfather 
made for them each as children be returned to them, with the intent 
that his sons take nothing from his estate. The will also specifically 
states that the children of Keith Colby Lanham would receive nothing 
from his estate. 
On the first page of the will Gordon Thomas Lanham states that: 
"This is a new day. It's the 29th of November. Thanksgiving is over and 
I just wanted to add to this program that my son, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all that he needs to have 
and that I am going to leave $1 (sic) more dollar against whatever is 
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legal to him and then he Is going to be on his own." 
On Page 2 paragraph 1 the Will states: 
"It's a new day and it's snowing. It's 1st December 2010. It's the first 
snow out back. I am not really looking forward to it, .... but anyway, I 
want to go on about my son, Keith Colby Lanham and his wife, ·Amy 
Lanham, that I am going to try to write it down or leave it in this 
recording that. .. what I leave them is going to be $1 because in my 
estate I don't want him to be able to sell and profit off his alcoholism or 
drugs .... 
Track 7 and 8 of the audio recording previously submitted allows 
one to hear this decision he made to disinherit his sons in the decedent's 
own words. 
Track 8 of the audio recording made by the decedent (the entry 
dated March 19, 2011) on the CD previously submitted to the Court, 
clearly and unambiguously instructed that the lots at Big Creek property 
were to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek 
Property to Jamie Gillihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for 
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham 
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he is only 
eighteen and Joe is 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed etc. 
However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going to do 
with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on i~, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for his 
27" acres ... " 
The Court should take judicial notice of the quiet title action 
concerning the decedent's real property, Gem County.Case No. CV2014-
187. In that case the Issue is payment of the "$50,000 mortgage that 
Lizzie has on it", her counterclaim states that she is entitled to 
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$137,369.49, her claim the deed intended to gift the ranch to Joe 
Lanham is void, and claiming that the ranch should be included In this 
estate case, presumably as part of the ·residual estate. Then in this 
case, Thomas Everett is challenging the validity of the will to claim an 
intestate portion of the residual estate. 
Trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a 
"threshold question" to be answered before addressing the merits of 
motions for summary judgment. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992), Ryan v 
Beisner, 123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27 (Ct.App. 1992), Gem State 
Ins. Co. v Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.2d.172(2007), 
Montgomery v Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 at 6 (Idaho 2009). 
When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material 
which would be admissible at trial. Petricevich v Salmon River 
Canal,Co;, 92 Idaho 865-,869, 452 P.2d 362,366 (1969) I.R.C.P. 
56(e). 
In addressing the evidentiary issues raised concerning the 
statements attributed to Gordon Thomas Lanham on the CD recording 
concerning the distribution of his estate, and the Affidavits of 
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Judd Lanham and Keith Lanham inform the 
court of the decedent's reasons and intent to completely disinherit 
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Thomas Everett Lanham after quitclaiming 115 acres to Thomas 
Everett on his promise to help financially support his father as set forth 
in the affidavits submitted herewlth are admissible hearsay and will be 
admitted as evidence at trial as exception to hearsay rule I.R.E. 
803(3) which provides: 
Rule 803 : Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial 
(3) The Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical 
Condition . A statement of the declarant's then existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design mental feeling, pan, 
and bodily heath), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it 
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms 
of declarant's will. ( emphasis added) 
The Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan (Exhibit 1) and the 
Affidavit of Keith Lanham (Exhibit 3), support the decedent's wishes 
that neither Keith Lanham nor Thomas Everett were to profit from the 
estate and that Judd Lanham should distribute his remaining personal 
property. 
The Affidavit of Judd Lanham, personal representative, clarifies 
the terms of the will concerning the statement in the will that "I want 
Judd to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects in 
any way that he sees fit and I will try to put all the wording" in that 
Gordon Thomas Lanham believed at the time of his death that the only 
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remaining property after his specific bequests would be personal 
property items to be distributed in-kind, if possible. 
The intended beneficiaries of this estate are the sons of Thomas 
Everett Lanham, namely Joseph "Joe" Lanham and Robert "Robby" 
Lanham. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing argument and the evidence submitted 
herewith, the Court should dismiss Thomas Everett Lanham's claim, 
find that Gordon Thomas Lanham fully disposed of hi~ estate in his will 
and his audio recordings and the personal property remaining in the 
decedent's estate should be distributed by the personal representative 
at his discretion for the reasons set forth herein and as intended by 
Gordon Thomas Lanham. Further, that the Court should order that 
Thomas Everett Lanham reimburse the estate the attorney's fees 
incurred herein. 
Dated this~ay of May 2014. 
~~ 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
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CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE 
LANHAM GILLIHAN 
Your Affiant, CATHERINE LANHAM GILLIHAN, having personal 
knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. · I am a retired nurse and vocational education instructor. I am the 
oldest sibling to Gordon Thomas Lanham and Judd Lanham is my first 
cousin. Our fathers operated a power line construction company 
involving the entire family in the work. 
2. Linda Louise Andrews came Into the family by marriage to Rex E 
Lanham, Jr. in October, 1965 and in the mid 80's she divorced receiving 
AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE LANHAM GILIHAN- PAGE 1 
!:}\')\ \),t \ 63 
000211
a marital settlement plus a future distribution. She will be receiving 
another settlement from our mother's trust. Linda continued to live ·on 
and off with our mother, Hazel Lanham. She borrowed a lot of money 
from her that has never been repaid. She had full knowledge of our 
family finances induding Gordon Thomas's and knew that his finances 
were limited and that he was receiving assistance from his mother after 
he returned to the Butte. During his illness, Gordon Thomas's sons, 
nephews, grandsons, and friends were assisting him to maintain his 
equipment and repairs to his Butte property. 
3. Following Linda's divorce, she married Sam Davis and Gordon Thomas 
had married Joanne Blackwell; both were married to other people during 
much of their relationship, and did not file any joint tax returns, or have 
any financial accounts together. Gordon Thomas never introduced her to 
anyone as his wife. Linda Louise Andrews Lanham has always been 
known by this family and friends as Rex Jr. 's ex-wife. 
4. After her other ventures for her "dream" bed and breakfast were 
bankrupt, Linda built a room on the side of Gordon Thomas's house, 
knowing that the house was In structural disrepair and that it would not 
pass any commercial codes, including the water. 
5. At the same time, Linda was trying to build a similar venture on the 
family's Mexican property, knowing full well that the Mexican 
government would not accept It. The government took that property 
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and Linda returned to the border broke. Gordon Thomas borrowed 
money to go and get her and he stated "that she was yet in another 
affair" and he ended his relationship with Linda. Gordon Thomas then 
married his life-long friend, Norma de Cordova. Linda secured the 
mortgage on the property. 
6. Gordon Thomas delayed paying Linda because he had no cash flow. 
He also felt he deserved consideration for payment of the mortgage 
because he paid many of Linda's outstanding bills: her divorce from Sam 
Davis, her eye surgery, care for her terminally ill mother, and numerous 
other expenditures. 
7. When Gordon Thomas was unable to be a lineman and had limited 
work, his son, Thomas Everett agreed to pay his father for part of the 
property. Gordon Thomas quit claimed Thomas E. some 100 + acres. 
The agreement was contingent on Thomas E. selling his ranch. The .. sale 
failed and numerous problems "snowballed". Because there was no 
written contract Gordon Thomas received no money and Thomas E. 
listed that property for sale. Because of this transaction and because 
Thomas E. failed to pay child support or arrange for any further 
education for Joe or Robbie, and because Gordon Thomas with assist 
from myself contributed to the education of Joe and Robbie, Gordon 
Thomas felt Thomas E. needed no further distribution from the estate. 
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8. Gordon Thomas was hospitalized numerous times in the last 14 
months of his life. Linda wrote cards, telephoned, and came to the 
hospital on numerous occasions. She acted llke an old friend, not a 
woman who was coerced or threated by Gordon Thomas In the past. 
She stated to him that because she still owed him, she would care for 
him in his home; an offer Gordon Thomas declined. At no time that I 
am aware of did Linda ask about payment of the mortgage or that she 
was owed more money. It Is only after Gordon Thomas's death is she 
now claiming she Is owed more money. 
9. I understand that Linda Is now making accusations that Gordon 
Thomas threatened or coerced her Into signing certain documents or he 
would distribute "personal, private, revealing photographs of Linda 
Louise Andrews. I have assisted Judd Lanham in going through Gordon 
Thomas's personal effects and all of his pictures and papers. No 
compromising materials were found. There were posed pictures like 
"glamour shots" that Linda had taken by a professional studio and 
distributed them herself. These photos have been returned to Linda. 
10. When Gordon Thomas was asked about his will, he told me that 
when he dictated his estate wishes he had been at odds with his family 
and that he was now making new distributions. He stated that if it was 
incomplete, Judd knew his wishes and that he completely trusted him to 
take care of Keith, Joe and Robbie. Gordon Thomas told me he didn't 
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put any one else in charge because of the family conflict It would cause. 
He told me he wanted Joe to be on the land and in his house to care for 
him. He had a life tenancy for the property, and that the ranch would be 
Joe's when he died. He wanted Judd to pay off Linda and take care of 
Keith, Joe, and Robbie, using his discretion, with his remaining property. 
He left an audio tape of his intentions and directions to Judd. 
1i. When Gordon Thomas was undergoing surgery or treatments, he 
was coherent and clear as to his intentions and desires. He could clearly 
recall any fact or figure we needed about getting work done around the 
place or for his finances. He was clearly able to make any and all 
decisions necessary for his future. 
The above Is true to the best of my knowledge, Catherine Gillihan 
Dated this ~day of May 2014. 
~~[u._ 
Catherine Lanham Gillihan, Affiant. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~y of May 2014. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Gem ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDD LANHAM 
Your Affiant, JUDD LANHAM, personal representative, having 
personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Gordon Thomas Lanham and I were first cousins. Our fathers 
were brothers. We grew up together. He was the closest I would ever 
have to a little brother. We played together as children, ran a little wild 
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together as adolescents, worked In power llne construction with our dads 
for several years, and spent time with our young families together 
camping and otherwise socializing. I was with Tom through his marriages 
and divorces to Colleen, JoAnn and Norma, and his relationship with 
Defendant Linda Louise Andrews. At the time of his death he was confined to 
a wheelchair and housebound. I spoke to him each day (sometimes twice a 
day) until the day before he died. 
2. Tom married his first wife, Colleen, while he was still in high school. 
They had two sons, Thomas Everett Lanham and Keith Colby Lanham. 
Keith has three sons and Thomas Everett has four children including, Joseph 
(Joe) Lanham and Robert (Robby) Lanham. Joe and Robby are half-brothers. 
Tom was estranged from his children. He was disappointed in the behavior 
of Keith's sons, who rarely came to visit t heir grandfather and only, in Tom's 
words, "when they wanted something from him." Prior to his death he was 
rebulldlng his relationship with Keith. 
3. He saw his elder son, Thomas Everett, as a liar and a thief, having 
quitclaimed about 115 acres to Thomas Everett on his promise that he would 
help support Tom. Once the quitclaim deed was recorded, ·Thomas Everett 
abandoned Tom. He felt betrayed and saddened by Thomas Everett's words 
and actions. To say that this situation broke his heart is not an 
exaggeration. Tom was ashamed of Thomas Everett's behavior toward the 
many women In his life and his. neglect of his children, particularly Joe and 
Robby. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDD LANHAM - PAGE 2 
69 
000218
4. During the last years of Tom's life, his support network was pretty much 
reduced to Joe and wife Jessica, Keith and his wife Amy, Robbie, his sister 
Cathi, a few close friends and me. Tom was especially appreciative of the 
support of his grandsons Joe and Robby. Tom saw genuine promise in them. 
He gave great credit to his sister Cathy for the way they had turned out; she 
had taken a firm hand In helping them with upbringing and schooling. Over 
the course of our discussions, Tom made it clear to me that he wanted Joe to 
have his ranch, free and clear of the mortgage to Linda, and he wanted to 
help Robby. After his experience with Thomas Everett, he wanted to be sure 
that he could live at the ranch for the rest of his life knowing that Joe and his 
wife would care for him and upon his death the ranch would be transferred, 
free and clear to his grandson, Joseph Lanham. A deed entitled Transfer on 
Death Deed was recorded to memorlallze his intent, shortly before he passed 
away. 
5. Tom had a live-in relationship with Linda Louise Andrews Lanham (whose 
last name Is Lanham because she was once married to Tom's older brother 
Rex Jr.). At one point In their relatlonshlp in mld·1990, Tom agreed to let 
Linda add_onto the ranch house In the hopes of turning the place into a dude 
ranch or bed and breakfast. Linda used some of her money for the project. 
To secure her Investment, Tom gave Linda a mortgage on his ranch. The 
bed and breakfast Idea failed, which began Tom's long and tumultuous "on-
again, off-again" relationship with Linda. As set forth In the documents filed 
in the quiet title action, Tom and Linda entered into a series of recorded 
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satisfactions and mortgages and at the time of his death Linda held a 
mortgage of $50,000.00 with 3% Interest, payable on de~th. 
6. Tom died on December 5, 2013. He left a Last Will and Testament 
naming me personal representative. I did not want to be personal 
representative but Tom Insisted because he predicted problems from his son 
Thomas Everett Lanham, whom he was estranged from until the day he died. 
7. Once I was appointed personal representative and because the mortgage 
was payable upon Tom's death and accruing 3% Interest, and knowing It was 
Tom's desire that Joe own his ranch free and clear of further Involvement 
with Linda, I attempted to satisfy Linda's mortgage. I Issued a check for 
payment in the amount of $54,625.00 for the principle and approximate 
Interest that had accrued from January 2011 to January 15, 2014. Linda 
refused to accept this check. 
9. As a result of Linda refusing to accept payment I initiated a quiet title 
action with, and on behalf of Joe Lanham and the estate In Gem County Case 
No. CV2014-185. In that action, Linda Andrew Lanham Is claiming that 
deed to transfer the ranch to his grandson Joe Lanham Is void and the ranch 
should be included this estate action. She further counterclaims in the quiet 
title action that due to threats or coercion Tom made in 2004 and 2006, she 
is owed $137,369.49, instead of $54,625.00. 
10. Once Issue of payment of Linda's mortgage Is settled, Tom still has 
outstanding debts and medical bills of approximately $28,354.00. The rest 
of his property, not Including the ranch, consists of household goods, farm 
tools, guns, family memorabilia, an unknown distribution from the Hazel 
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Lanham trust, and 2 undeveloped forest lots at Big Creek In Valley County 
with a tax assessed value of $1620.00, although the market value may be 
much higher. 
11. According to track #9 (the entry dated March 19, 2011) of the CD 
previously submitted to the Court, Tom wanted the Big Creek property 
to be distributed as follows: 
"My plans are to leave that 27 acres on the east side of that Big Creek 
Property to Jamie GIiiihan, my sister's only son, and I want to plan for 
leaving the 20 acres on the west side to my grandson Joseph Lanham 
and my other grandson Thomas Robert John Lanham and he Is only 
eighteen and Joe ls 21 so I don't know how that will work on a deed 
etc. However that works, but anyway, I'm working on what I am going 
to do with this house and 34 acres because of the $50,000 mortgage 
that Uzzle has on It, I'm thinking that Jamie can pay her mortgage for 
his 27 acres ... " 
12. I believe that this is a specific instruction. Tom wanted me to sell 
the 27 acres on the east side of the creek to Jamie Gillihan for $50,000 
and to gift the remaining 20 acres to his grandsons Joe and Rob 
Lanham, who has now reached the age of majority. Tom's sister, 
Cathy Gillihan, owns property at Big Creek and she has personal 
knowledge of the lay-out of the properties. This distribution is 
possible, unless the properties need to be listed for sale to pay for 
medical bill or further litigation in this case and the quiet title action. 
13. Much of the personal property listed In the will and by Tom on the 
CD was sold prior to his death. 
14. Tom wanted me to distribute the remaining personal property in 
kind to his various family members, and in consideratlon of their actions or 
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Inactions related to challenging his wlll and estate. I am prepared to make 
such distributions, unless this property needs to be sold to pay for Tom's 
medical bills or further lltlgatlon In this case and the quiet title action. 
15. Tom specifically did not want his sons Keith and Thomas Everett Lanham 
to profit from his estate and as set forth in his Last Will and Testament and 
on Tracks 7 and 8 of the CD, In Tom's own word, It Is obvious that this was a 
very painful and difficult decision for him to make. 
16. Keith Lanham was able to reconcile with his father before his death and 
he accepts and honors his father's wishes as set forth in his father's will. 
17. Thomas Everett did not have further contact with his father after 
acquiring 100+ acres by quitclaim deed and they were estranged at the t ime 
of Gordon Thomas Lanham's death . 
-2"A 
Dated this~ day of May 2014. 
!!Ji-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May 2014. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Gem ) 
CASE NO. CV2013-0886 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LANHAM 
Your Affiant, KEITH LANHAM, son of Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
having personal knowledge of the facts herein and being first duly sworn 
upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My father, Gordon Thomas Lanham, passed away on December 5, 
2013. At .the time of his death he was wheelchair bound and needed full 
time assistance so he could continue to live on his ranch. My wife and I 
live one property away and we were both working full-time. Joe was 
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,......,. 
working In North Dakota and he was able to help· my father financially. 
His wife, Jessica, helped care for him during the last years of his life. He 
was building a small house on his property so Joe and his family could 
be closer to care for him. It was my father's Intent to live on his ranch 
with Joe and his family living with him or on his property. 
2. He Intended to give the ranch to Joe and he recorded a deed to 
transfer the ranch to Joe after he died. 
3. I .believe and accept that my father made the specific gifts to my 
brother, Thomas Everett, and me as set forth In his Will for his own 
personal reasons and his wishes should be honored. 
4. The remainder of my father's personal property consists primarily of 
old farm and ranching equipment and vehicles, household Items and 
sentimental memorabilia. These Items of personal property and the lots 
at Big Creek should be distributed according to his will and his recorded 
wishes made after he executed his will. Judd Lanham is the appropriate 
person to manage and distribute my father's estate as he knows what 
my father wanted him to do. 
5. A few years ago my father quitclaimed my brother Thomas Everett 
approximately l00+acres. This was not intended as a gift. My brother 
promised to help support my father so that he could pay his blll's, 
including the mortgage to Linda Andrews Lanham. My brother 
abandoned my father after the quitclaim deed was recorded. 
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7. I reconciled with my father prior to his death. I do know that my 
father was completely estranged from my brother, Thomas Everett, at 
the time of his death on December 5, 2013. 
Dated this~day of May 2014. 
fl~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b fore me this ~ day of May 2014. 
Notary 
Resldi ~-~~~----.--:--T--
My Commission Expires: ~;::z._/_1t~-~--
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Z COURT: Be seated. I heva Gordon IAnhilm. I have 
3 pelldlng eroas moti1ms; for surnmary Judgment and motion tn 
,4 dl!imlli5 en behalf of the petSonal represenl:lltSve. lr1 this 
6 particular case, I've spent considerable time thi!i morning 
G going thrcugh the record on th• motions for $11mmarv 
T Judgment. 
, Was there any additional tnronnatlan by way of 
9 evidence that either side Willi 9oin9 ID pn1unt7 I know 
O there wit • hearing in the dlsbirt anllt but I'm not SIJ!l! 
11 that It had anything l:hilt would be diS'PoSitive <In my 
1 d11clsion In this mJttar, 
3 MS. ~UAHAN: Judge, I guess t can tell you what 
14 I'm aware of dlilt h11ppened In thtt dllltt'ict couJt ltlilt M5. 
. ·5 Llnc!a Lanham Andrav,,.; had (in1111cllble) il9~illlit the stay. We 
•• did a quklt title 11i;tion. The defe.n<fant ~iloo to plead 
17 any dQfQllSQS in her counterclaim. She'd made some 91:mensl 
II allagaUons, She didn't meet the spednc elements of 
1U fTaud that she was attempting to plead. ·1111!! statute of 
:ao Hrnit.itiora; ilro:.e In 2006. 
'1 Concemil'lg her r.ilsing the Issue of a transfer on 
22 death deed, the judge, - Judge Scultlwon:ti left that Jssue 
~3 ru bf! dat81'TV)lned by the court as far as Interpreting or 
:4 refurmadon of the deed that was signed and recorded by 
25 Gordort Lanham purporting tn obtain a lire emte and 
4 
·1 tran,~ng the property to Joseph Lanham and I bellevt! 
2 that lfli1t'11 what happme:d In dlstrt:t oourt. 
a courcn Well, and I'll Just kind of teU you guys 
, ·4 just based on my review, t think that-- I don'Hhlnlc 
5 therl!!'s - the real l!'.sue 1 think Is -- In my mind hnvh'lg 
& reviewed 11: Is does tile residual clause 11ctu111fy dispose of 
7 the main propen.y. eecausa I think the one pl1H;Q Df 
8 property, b1111ed cm what's presentad to U,e CDurt, likely 
·g h;,B Ix> be dispni;ed of by the re'Sldual dausa bec,1ui;~ lt 
·,a 101.11<,; like ii lifil citot. Ind n I don't see -- I'm jus;t 
11 tellin9 ypu that', how I see It illi I ~d it. You guys can 
2 argue, 
13 And thars kind of what lt comes down IX). I've 
".4 reviewed the resldu~l dause. 1 lt!lnk It's explldl: and 
~ clear that he wanted Judd tn dl~pose of anyth1119 that wp 
i's lert that wasn't disposed ot but r wanted to ht!•r argument 
7 ror addttIon1t lnmrmetton and, Mr, l'l11enor, t'JI let ya11 
a· 9o or.it. 
19 MR. FLEENOR.: Thank you, Your Honor, Our 
,0 argument's pretty much set l'Drth 1n our brief ~nd I gueu 
.:1 just to recap that Is, ye,eh, evl!n If ttils will Is v11ll!t alld 
22 we\'e nor even got i» that point yet but even if it w.u- and 
.3 sv8n If ·· when you're reading tfl~ will, th• tei;tilwr Hid, 
..4 "I dcJJ't want my sonr. to have anything. I want tnem l'o 
25 have one dollar each,'' or whiltever he put In the wlll --
5 
1 COURT; {Iniludlble.) 
2 MR. FLEENOR: El(a~y. Outside oftfo1t. there's no 
3 a1apc,11uva provi&ions -- not even residue but thara's no 
4 Oilipoi.itive provisions or r~idue. 
6 C0UR.T: ,r thou9ht you quoted It In your brter where 
S he basically !!IVS, ''l wa11t Judd to be able to dtsb1bute my 
1 property and persOflal effects in any way tllat he !il!l!S fit." 
B So frankly, illl ti1C wording, you he1re peri;onal effects and 
9 then lat:et says, ~And t went him to be able to dlsl:rt.butl! 




and t:esl:'JJITll!nt. • 
Mlt. f=U:ENOR: Yes, that's exactly right but there 
is no -- there Is no other language thee decides that and 
14 1t111t language by ltaelf, Idaho wurts have already 
1!1 del:'errnlnea tl'l111t'a no~good enough. You can't 1:$11 somecme 
111 111lse or YllU c;an't shllt ttiat Intent IX> scm11ona else, 
17 A testator cannot say, "I want my wira to be able 
18 t» oick the charities she gives It to,· er "I want my 
1~ whOeve.r to pick th!! org11niatiaru1 whara my property goe!:.11 
;z9 llio.e ilfl! the other -- those ere tfil!!! ~ th;,t l 've cited 
21 in here ind so it's dear tiuil! that'!! not tlie t:esbltor's 
22 Intent anymore. Thars now )udd'5 mtent er !tie perSOnal 
23 represenostlve's Intent, And Idaho law does not ellolll the 
2-t b!!ibil:or lb givei wh11t Idaho courts have eallt!ld II powe(" of 
2S attorney on death Is you can't s11y, ·1 w111t him to be able 
6 
1 'lo diatnbute my estate as he sees nt. • lhers not~ 
2 dl$poaldve provisioll under Idaho law. 
3 Thant"s bQ&n no leg;,! argument tl1at th.e pen;onal. 
4 repmi:qnl:;ltive hi!$ put forth to co11tnst that b,c.aµse there 
5 is none. lt's a dear -- I me.an the l!l~Ul!5 in thlli a,e 
& very dear i& the Court can't SZ1y, "Yeah, tt's ok.iy for a 
1 personal representative to meke the!te detenninations by 
I himself." And once that'a g1me: amiY, once -- onc.e he 
9 doesn't rnake any Intent know,,, then It passes back tnrough 
10 the residue or the emte, back in bl&'l:.loo provlslol'ls which 
11 go to his heirs. Arid even In the i;:.;,ie where he says, "I 
12 o"IY want my two sons to get nolfling or a dollar," It g-
13 b11ck In those l:!No sons beau.ise those are his helr1.. 
14 lhe only argument that !h&y've brought up that I 
16 tan see In ttielr cross moaon Js mat you sh011ld look ~t 
tG the testatx>(s intent through tttcse otherthing5 lmlt are 
17 outside the wilt. 'Tliere's ,ttlcse recprdinR5, I know that 
18 those have be11n mentioned a c:ciuple of limes in court that 
19 there's •• the buii. for the will was these oral recordl(lga 
20 that the blsblt:or made and there'!) omer recctdlng,; besld86 
21 what's In the WIii. 
22 Ana again, lilat'9 dear In th;.t Cc,,rwin e5tate as 
Z3 well where It !51Jyr. thl! o,urt onnot FpecuJ,1te iii to what 
24 the testator lnMndl!d to ttllldtirc in his will e><c:ept a.s the 
25 Intent es e>CS,re.55ed In the ta&ta[l)r'~ words, What he 
7 
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1 oct\Jelly uffl In the WIil, that'G how the Court dirtannlnes 1 milm1.idin11 oftt,e l.ew, 
2 whit ttie 1:est11to~'s intent w~. 2 Und11r his will, he dlSlnherfl:8 them but tl,en under 
3 COUR.T: Felr tnough. 3 the sblrutorv provisions 'When there's; nothing tnac go 
4 MR. Fl,,EENOR: Okay7 4 pasAS umterttie w1111 It goe.i lflrough statutory con,tructs 
s COURT: Ms. call11h.1m, a and tnat's to tno!e two.same sons 11nd that's very 111lniJar 
8 MS. CAllAHAN; Jlld!Je, I think tnat th~ court at 6 to the Corwin Gillie ilOain is wherlf 1n the Corwin l!llse, ha 
7 the last n~n9 where Hr. Fl~nor, mtltiom; to determine 1 gives hAlr ll2 J believe It w1111 & granllrJaugl'lter lit the time 
8 the validity ol'ttie will when he mltse<t the court tnel tu 8 ar,11 doe,sn't dispose ot th~ other halt. And wl11,m he does 
9 datermine that and Uie Co11rt ordered attomey'li r- which 9 not dii;pose of the other half, the wholo thing goes to the 
10 h.iven't been judged cm yd tnat r don't beUwe that 10 granddaught,u even though he argued J suppmse that he onlv 
11 Mr. 'l"no1T111• Ev~(Qtt ~nJ\am evt!h has itiinding. tfe was 11 Int.ended h•lf of it to go to the granddaugh~. 
11 specifically dl&fnllerlted ny his father, Any res111ua1 12 That's the same type of case her<\. When the WIii 
13 would go n, Joe tind Robby. Keith Lanham, his ottler .i;on, 13 doesn't :;,ay where the property goes, lt goes vra ~ ,I 
14 accepts and understands the reasons tar hi& tattler's wlsnes 14 statute and tNtate statutes ZIN! lttrvugh hls hell'!I 11nd ·-
15 in dl~lnllenting him ind Tom. 15 COllRT; Sa wh11t proparty do you think isn't 
16 Tom l"el:eived 115 acres Which he su~uent:!y sold 16 disposed of .spijdfiCA!lty7 
17 fllr ovltl' $240,000. Now he's making a clalm hfll'e. I don't 17 MR, FLEE;NOlt! The only -- tho only property I see 
UI know If it's; out oF splr.e or Interest but he11 really 18 that Is dispd!:ed of iii the sheep's heqd, The sheep•, ti-e-1d 
19 g!)ttcn his shah3, 19 of $3,00D, som~here In then!, Judd c;in h11ng in hill c.abln. : 
JO l t'.hink th.it what tfle court h;a«. tu detemlne Ii the zo Th11t"s the "lo~ thing that ha 'lives an11 property to 
21 testatior's intent and that'll What the Court needs to do 111 21 aoy.t>oov, I 
n ti:, look 11t the ot1ler evldeni:t! tt111t ifi illfmisslble In tht!f n He names II bunc:ti of property and he says, "Ye1111, j 2, case. And t believe th•t ttla affidavits that Wt!'va 23 f.ls\da or Joe or sDtnt!body has property here or I own these 24 i;ubmltted iind t.he record In this c;ue ,hows thllt hll wa& %4 9U11!1, n but he doe!n't !lly 'lyho to OIVe t:h011e guns to or l:ttl! 
25 1!1Cplid~y dear. He essenttaiy di~polied gf all Of his 25 contenbi of my safe. He do~n·t 6aV who to give ttie 
f! 10 
1 property. ~e did Intend that Joe get the ranch. lt savs 1 r:;ontenbi of the safe. Ha does say )Udd om hang Ifie 
3 In his wlll one pemin will qet the ranch. He's dona a a 2hecp's head In his Cllbln If hie wanb tn. Toill's the 
3 deed tllzt a~mpb=d to transfer tilnt r•1nin9 11 life i dosl!St property or dos5t dispostt:lve fll'l)Ylsion that's In 
'.4 est,~. 4 thare. And thlt'i; what l reterat1°'d· iii lhe ~late of 
!i He specffl1.ally In l g1,1~$S you could c.all It a Ii property. I'm nat rc:ferendng ttlt: n1"c;h or ttie Dlgllom --
6 recorded codicil to his wfll instructed Judd on hllw to 6 Bi\1 Creek property b~U6e he doe!ll'l't .say ~"o It 90@!1 tt>. 
7 dlspo11& of the llig creek property which he 11avs he's going 7 UNIDENlllilED SP!aAKE!l.: Could l say s:omettllng tQ 
IJ to gNe to two people. That spadllc lnlltrucUon Is In 8 t hii;;, Judge? 
9 mere. 9 MR, FLEENOR: No. And the other thing, you"lo 
10 As far il5 Wl'let"S lelt alter the rand! and the w, ur 10 reart - you've read the deed as lll$8r\llng th~ llfe Interest 
11 tt,e Big Creelc property Ii; 1 bunch of (lnaud1blee) 't1 wllim iii true but It's mona l;h.in tl'121t. lt's • ba111ifer on 
12 memorabmn, family items. And, you know, e111 Ju.lld puts In 12 death deed. Not Qttly dpes It reserve a life intere5t but 
' 
13 hls affidavit is th;it he was lnstr\Jctlell ta do It based on 13 ho tesel'lles tr1e turn:nt right to buy, a..il, pledge, 
14 whethe,r or not -- ttle actions of his 1,0ns in thii;; action 14 whatever, to Ito whc1t11Ver he Wlll'tts with ii;, So we'r,, going 
1~ and he has wlUtdrawn any obje(tian. 16 to argue that later IG that's not OIi affective deed. lhat 
· 18 So l think any chaltellge tu ~~ will has been 1ii should be pll,rt Qf tt,ii,; ertate as wall to p115:; to the two 
11 d;_,:ided by the Court; wh@n Mr. Ftaenor and Mr. 1homos 17 boys. 
18 Everett didn't show vi> t'or ~urt and I believe tt,11t the 1t, COUR.T: Ms. tallatum, ilny olfler (lnaudiblQ,17 
' 19 rest of ma property should be distributed .. Judd's be.en 19 MS. CAllAHAN; Judge, I gue.ss my response wou1<1 bi! 
2Q directed to do. 20 thilt l think that tha decsdenrs recotcllngs spedfta,ny 
21 COUlt'r. All t19ht. Mr. Aeenor, I'll glv~ you • 21 sav how th11 Big Creek prepetty should Ii$ dls:po~ of. I 
22 final word. 22 believe ttlat the Court, 1r tile ,~uo it r1i~, to lot>k at 
.13 Mlt. FU:ENOR: Right, I ouess just brleftV l:s lfla 23 the deed, It was -- if you look r,t lf1« dono~s Intent, If 
24' argument th11t b~11,e the two soil$ were dlslnher!Uld 24 you look at ~Ile a1T1da111~ or admissible mvidenc~ ev11rv11m1 
:lll pri,cu.ida- them fram receiving under the 88f.llte lu Just 25 lnbmded -- everyone '°1c!w, 11:Very one Of the famll)' jCCOpt 
9 11 
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for Tht1rn11s Everett whP illso received his - well, retelvad 
prop~ esi.entfollv 1.mder fnlse pnttenae. but thet It w.-1, 
Gordon Thomas' 1111:ent that his grandson, Jo9eph L.tnham, 
Thomas Ev1tratt's son, receive ltle propett:y bc:Cc1use Thoma5 
fven=tt Lanham didn't support hl11 son ,md they wet,1 
c:ompletely eatnnged at the time of his death. 
And If that lsstic 1~ brought before rhe Court, l 
belfl!ve the case law's c:lt!ar that the Court ~n look at the 
dollar's Intent, pllnil evir:f•mce comes In a, to the donor'.1 
Intent ( inaudlble) i;o the onlv res!Clual property ~- well, 
l11t me back ~p julit a seconcl. 
1'1e say, that thet'e 111 no other dJepositive things 
In the will, The stuff lr, the safe Is given to Judd and he 
can do with It what he wantB. It w111, given to him. 1t 
~aan't as a power of attorney. so WJr-, Flo::enor's wrong 
there. 1 lhlnk rhat the rest otthe property Is sruff th.It 
may have tq be sold to ~y (or att;omey's flleS and quiet 
Htle adfon and I think thitt the wlWs c:lHr that Judd 
shoyld be able to dilitritiute It the 1VIIY he sees flt 
aa:ordlng m ttls wishe9-01' Gordon Thomas Lanham, 
COURT: Mr. Fleenor, you have the last word, 
MR. FU:ENOR: All r'I0ht. No, ( don't have 11nvtt)ing 
el&e to add lflec;11pt fort mei,n she'c tryin.11 to argue fac:;ts 
tfl:at are not in l!Vidence. Cleany, even given his intent 
ilt some point, the law l.'J clear. Thill's why w~r.e asking 
12 
for- ,ummary judgment, There's no cltsposltrte. provl~lons in 
this will, 
COURT: l 1rn going tx> Qrant sum111arv Judgment on 
t>ehalf of the personal N!f>resentatlve and I 'm golnQ to 
deny, Mr, Fleenor, your motion for summary judgment. I 
find based on the will {Inaudible) adrliJHlbl11 to show th~ 
donor's Intent, What the deceHed \'!iln\ed is dlspos~ Qf 
(lneudlble} ;ind through parolt evidence, you c:11r1 determine 
his Intent. 
The two boy!: Wltfl! i;peclffcally dlSJnhartwd. I'm 
not golll9 to overlide hi~ wl§!les. You know, 1 find that 
even in the light most ravorable to the 11dver..e pnrtv, tl111t 
there's no genuine Ii.sue of meteriel f'llct implying we need 
a trial at d'lls point. The rule's clear the donor's Intent 
w&$ estBbllshvd by the conCJJm:nt recQl1ilng$. ~-
callahan, you'll pn.:pare the otdl!!r of summary judgment •• 
,-.~. CAU.AHAN: I wlll, 
COUR'f': -- on behalf or the pel'$onal r"presentattve 
1110d they have hl!)~llr courts to take a look ist what this 
court deddes but It's real c;lear to me ~at Mr. Gordon 
Thomas Lanham wanted end It's n!al c;lear tnllt not'. 6nly In 
my mind doas he dispose of th11 pr4lperty, but also his 
wishes Jre contnlned ln the recon:tlngs or wt1111t hlli Intent · 
was, Ulilt ttlat waulil ba admissible and thitt',; the order or 



























11t1Dmey', feer: tMd costs In th@ motion l'or !ummary 
Jlldlilment. 
MS. CAUAHAN: Thilnk you, )~dge, 
COURT: Th11 Cwrt's tn ~~&11, 
(Proceelkrtg5 concludl!d.) 
14 
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I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed 
transcriber, do h~reby certify: 
That the foi:egoing transcript ie a tran5cript of a 
disk made of the proceedings ia The Matte~ of Go~don Thol\\as 
Lanham, Gem County Case No, CV2013-886, before the 
nonorable Tyler D. Smith, Magistrate of the Magistrate 
Division of ths Pistriot court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Gem, that· the foregoing pages 1 through 14 of thia 
transcript contains as accura~e ~nd complete a 
transcription of said disk as I was able to make. 
IN WITNESS WflEREOF, l have here~nto set my hand 
this 19th day of 
Oc~ 
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CASE NO. CV2013-886 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON MOTION AND CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court June 20, 2014 on a Motion for 
Summary judgment flied by Claimant-Petitioner Thomas Everett Lanham and 
on a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal 
Representative, Judd Lanham. The Court considered the filings, affidavits 
and Memoranda submitted before the hearing, and considered oral 
arguments of counsel made at the hearing. 
ORIG\NAL 
FINDI·NGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 
REPRESE.NTATIVE - PAGE 1 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham passed away December 5th, 
2013, after long-declining health problems. In the time leading up to his 
death, decedent met with friends and family and his attorney and disc.ussed 
hls various kinds of assets and his intent for transferring them upon his 
death. Some of those people who participated In those discussions signed 
affidavits that were included in the record. 
2. Decedent periodically dictated his thoughts Into an audio 
recorder. That audio was transcribed and typed Into the form of a will . 
Decedent signed the will before witnesses. Decedent's and the witnesses' 
signatures were notarized and that will was submitted for probate. 
3. Decedent made additional recordings after he executed the wlll. 
The audio recordings made by decedent were part of the record before the 
Court as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Judd Lanham, the Personal 
Representative. The record also Included affid~vits from Keith Colby Lanham 
and Cathy Lanham GIiiihan, submitted by the Personal Representative. 
4. The Court finds no reason to doubt the validity of the wlll. From 
the affidavits and especially the audio recordings, it Is clear that decedent 
Gordon Thomas Lanham possessed undiminished mental capacities at the 
time of he executed the will. He demonstrated a thorough grasp of the 
extent and nature of his assets. He also demonstrated a good grasp of his 
potential heirs, and his relationships with them and sound reasons for 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2 
80 
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treating each as he did. There is no evidence suggesting that anyone 
exercised undue influence or coercion over decedent. In fact, in spite of 
decedent's failing health and physical maladies, It appears he was a strong 
willed and independent thinker at the time he executed the wlll.1 
s. Claimant Thomas Everett Lanham advanced several claims, but 
he failed to support his claims and arguments with one iota of credible, 
admlsslble evidence. Based upon the language of the will itself, the 
affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire record, the Court finds In 
favor of the Personal Representative on every factual dispute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The will of decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham is legal, valid, and 
binding. 
2. Decedent's intent Is sufficiently clear from the language of the 
will, particularly as bolstered and explained by contemporary audio 
recordings and the affidavits submitted, to allow administration and, If 
necessary, judicial enforcement. As to the claimant, Thomas Everett 
Lanham, decedent's Intent Is very clearly that claimant take by the will only 
one dollar ($1.00) and a bed and there is no lawful reason to frustrate 
decedent's intent. 
1. The Court notes that a court trial had been scheduled for early April on the Issue 
of the wlll's validity but that neither claimant, Thomas Everett Lanham, Jr., nor his attorney, 
Mr. Douglas Fleenor appeared at the time and date scheduled. The Personal 
Representative's request for costs and attorney fees Is pending. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSONAL 




3. There are no issues of material fact remaining to be determined 
by the Court and the Personal Representative Is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and the Court therefore GRANTS the Personal 
Representative's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ATTORNEY FESS AND COSTS 
The Issue of an award of costs and attorneys fees will be taken up at 
a future time and date. 
" SO ORDERED this ·1-tf day of June, 2014. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM and KEITH C. ) Case No. CV-2016-8252 
LANHAM, ) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiffs, ) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. ) 
) 





Plaintiffs concede that the decedent may have intended to disinherit them under the terms of 
the Will. If so, this intention was frustrated by (1) his failure to make a specific devise of the two 
real properties and (2) his failure to make a general bequest by the device of a residuary clause. A 
testator can effectuate disinheritance only by a specific bequest or by a general residuary bequest. 
The decedent here did neither. 
Defendant's supplemental brief misapprehends the issue presented as one of testamentary 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
Electronically Filed
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intent. Testamentary intent is trumped by the failure to devise. The failure of plaintiffs' father to 
make a bequest of the real property, either specifically or by a residuary clause, required that the real 
properties pass by intestate succession. As noted in plaintiffs' summary judgment brief, a testator's 
ability to avoid the laws of intestate succession can only be exercised by disposing of the property 
by will.1  No amount of extrinsic evidence respecting testamentary intent can neutralize the laws of 
intestacy which is a rule followed by American and English jurisprudence. See footnote 1 and In 
re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). For that matter, even language in the Will 
which purports to effectuate disinheritance cannot do so where the testator fails to dispose of an item 
of property and there is no residuary clause. Id. 
In ruling that the Will disposed of the entirety of the Lanham Estate, the magistrate 
committed an error of law. This decision would have been reversed on appeal had there been a 
timely appeal. Contrary to defense counsel's reliance on newly "uncovered information", the 
"information" respecting the testator's intention to disinherit the plaintiffs is simply irrelevant. 
Although a moot point given its irrelevancy, defendant's assertion that there was "substantial and 
competent evidence" of the intent to disinherit strikes a discordant note as applied to the underlying 
Rule 56(c) proceedings. 
'See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 8, 9. Southgate v. 
Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 118 N.W. 600; In re McKay Estate, 357 Mich. 447, 98 N.W.2d 604; Boisseau v. 
Aldridges, 5 Leigh 222, 32 Va. 222, 27 Am Dec. 590; Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 8 S.E. 672, 2 
L.R.A. 848; Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 60 S.W. 639; Pickering v. Stamford, (1797), 3 Ves. Jun. 492 
(30 Eng. Rep. 1121; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Beay. 318 (49 Eng. Rep. 361; In the Estate of Brown, 106 
N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960). 
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DEFENDANT'S CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
ARE NOT ON POINT.  
The defendant cites Riverside (cross motions for summary judgment are, effectively, a 
stipulation by the parties that there are no genuine issues of material fact) and Cougar Bay (court's 
findings of fact will be accepted on appeal where there is substantial, though conflicting, evidence 
to support the findings). 
The underlying decision by the magistrate was a summary judgment, not findings of fact. 
Cougar Bay is not on point: it deals with findings of fact and conclusions of law, not summary 
judgment disposition. 
Riverside is limited to the scenario where each party bases its position on the same set of 
facts., i.e., the parties agree that there are "no genuine issues of material fact". Id., 103 Idaho at 519. 
Absent such agreement, cross motions for summary judgment do not eliminate factual issues. See 
Moss v. Mid-American, 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754 (1982); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 
205, 998 P.2d 1118 (2000); Kempthorne v. Blaine County, 139 Idaho 348, 349, 79 P.3d 960 (2003). 
The cross-motions here do not render the summary judgment bullet-proof on appeal. The 
personal representative rested on a point of fact (testamentary intent); whereas, Mr. Fleenor, on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, rested on a point of law (the existence of partial intestacy). More to the point, 
as noted throughout plaintiffs' briefing, testamentary intent is irrelevant given that the real properties 
must pass by intestate succession. 
THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
IS BOTH INADMISSIBLE AND IRRELEVANT 
The first rule in construction of a will is to look to its "four corners" in order to ascertain the 
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testator's intent. See In re Steelsmith Estate, 139 Idaho 216, 218, 76 P.3d 960 (2003); In re Jane 
Doe, 1 48 Idaho 432, 435, 224 P.3d 499 (2009); In re Wilkins Estate, 137 Idaho 315, 318, 48 P.3d 644 
(2002). 
Extrinsic evidence as to the testator's intent may be employed where the will contains an 
ambiguity. There is no ambiguity, and Gordon Lanham's testamentary intent is not relevant given 
the failure to devise the real properties. 
First, as to Tom and Keith, there is no ambiguity: The Will left Tom and Keith a bed and one 
dollar and nothing else. Even if relevant, absent an ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. 
Secondly, defendant seeks to employ the three affidavits as evidence that the testator did not 
intend for Tom and Keith to receive the subject real property. His intention is not relevant. The 
problem here is as follows: (a) there was no disposition of the real property; and (b) absent such 
disposition, the laws of intestacy come into play under the authority cited in plaintiff's earlier brief 
See footnote 1. The decedent may have intended for his sons to receive only what is referenced in 
the Will; but that intention is trumped (and rendered irrelevant) by his failure to dispose of the real 
property, either by a specific devise or by a residuary clause. 
CONTRARY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION, THE WILL 
DID NOT CONTAIN A RESIDUARY CLAUSE 
Defendant points out that the magistrate construed the Will as containing a " residual (sic) 
clause". See Exhibit F, p. 5. For multiple and independent reasons, the will did not contain a 
residuary clause: 
(1) The magistrate refers to the "residual clause" but does not recite language in the Will that 
constitutes the residuary clause nor does he identify the residuary de'isee. Exhibit F, p. 5. By its very 
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nature, a residuary clause must "dispose of any estate property". See Black's Law Dictionary (7th 
Edition), p. 1311. 
(2) A residuary clause must contain an identified "residuary devisee". Idaho Code § 
15-2-606 and § 15-3-906(a)(1)(C). See, e.g., In re Hartwig's Estate, 70 Idaho 77, 81, 211 P.2d 399 
(1949). 
(3) The power of attorney does not empower Judd Lanham post-death because the 
power of attorney does not survive the death of the principal. See Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co. 
161 Idaho 107, 383 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2016). 
(4) It is not clear that Judd Lanham was given a free hand to dispose of the Estate 
because the will constrained him to do so only "as stated in my Last Will and Testament." Exhibit A, 
p. 5. With respect to Big Creek property, the testator recited "I want to think about the 47 acres in Big 
Creek.", thus eschewing any testamentary disposition. 
Dated this 16th  day of May, 2017. 
/s/ Allen B. Ellis 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 16th  day of May, 2017, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard L. Stubbs U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Carey Perkins, LLP Hand delivery 
P.O. Box 519 Overnight delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 X E-File 
/s/ Allen B. Ellis 
Allen B. Ellis 
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 Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment concedes that Gordon Lanham intended to leave Thomas and Keith 
Lanham each a bed, one dollar, and nothing else. However, Plaintiffs assert that Gordon 
Lanham failed to create a residuary clause, and as a result the two real properties (Big 
Creek and Gem County) must pass intestate. In making this argument Plaintiffs allege 
that “Gordon Lanham’s testamentary intent is not relevant given his failure to devise the 
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000245
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real properties.” However, a plain reading of the will reveals that Gordon Lanham intended 
to create a residuary clause by attempting to confer a power of appointment on Judd Max 
Lanham. Further, in the event it is ambiguous as to whether Gordon Lanham intended to 
create a residuary clause in the will, the Magistrate Judge was permitted to review 
extrinsic evidence to determine Gordon Lanham’s intent.  
 Ultimately, by utilizing either a plain reading of the will, or reviewing extrinsic 
evidence, Gordon Lanham’s intent was clear: he wanted to disinherit Thomas and Keith 
Lanham, and grant Judd Lanham the power to distribute any remaining property as he 
saw fit. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that the will was valid and disposed of 
Gordon Lanham’s entire estate. Plaintiffs’ claims would not have been successful on 
appeal, and Defendant requests the Court grant his motion for summary judgment.  
II. 
GORDON LANHAM CREATED A RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN HIS LAST WILL AND 
TESTAMENT 
 
 Plaintiffs acknowledge that when construing a will, you must first look within 
its “four corners” to ascertain the testator’s intent. (Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pgs. 3-4). It is well established in 
Idaho that “when interpreting a will, the intention of the testator must be given effect.” 
Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983). 
 A general residuary clause is created when the testator passes all property 
owned at the time of death not otherwise disposed of by the will unless a contrary intention 
appears in the will. In re Hartwig’s Estate, 70 Idaho 77, 82, 211 P.2d 399, 402 (1949) 
(citing 57 am. Jur. 948-949). In reviewing the will to determine whether a residuary clause 
has been created “the reasonable and natural presumption is that the testator intends to 
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dispose of his entire estate…Therefore in the construction of doubtful clauses in a will, 
that interpretation is to be adopted, if possible, which avoids partial intestacy, unless it 
clearly appears that the testator intended to die intestate as to part of his property.” Id.  
 Gordon Lanham’s Will repeatedly attempts to dispose of his entire estate 
through language such as: 
 • “I want to state in here that the executor of my Will is Judd Max 
Lanham and I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am 
dead. I want him to be able to distribute my personal property and my personal effects in 
any way that he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording about the personal effects.”  
 • “I want to state in here again that the executor of my Will is Judd Max 
Lanham and I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am 
dead. I want him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in 
my Last Will and Testament.” 
 Despite Gordon Lanham’s clear language in the will, Plaintiffs are alleging 
that because Gordon Lanham did not specifically devise the Big Creek and Gem County 
properties to anyone by name in the will, that they must pass intestate to Thomas and 
Keith Lanham. However, this does not comport with Gordon Lanham’s intent to disinherit 
Thomas and Keith Lanham, or his attempt to create a residuary clause by granting Judd 
Max Lanham the authority to distribute his property and personal effects “in any way that 
he sees fit.” The language in Gordon Lanham’s will is sufficient to support a finding that 
a residuary clause was created and that Gordon Lanham intended to dispose of his entire 
estate. Further, Plaintiffs’ contention that “Gordon Lanham’s testamentary intent is not 
relevant given the failure to devise the real properties” does not comply with Idaho law. 
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See Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983).  
III. 
IF GORDON LANHAM DID NOT CREATE A CLEAR RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN HIS 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, THIS AMBIGUITY MAY BE RESOLVED THROUGH 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
 
 Next, Plaintiffs have alleged that extrinsic evidence regarding the testator’s 
intent may only be employed where the will contains an ambiguity. (Plaintiffs’ 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pgs. 3-
4). Whether an ambiguity exists in a document is a question of law, and the factfinder 
may “resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity and find the intentions of the 
testator.” Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 475, 700 P.2d 96, 97 (1985). As 
mentioned previously, Idaho law requires that “the intention of the testator must be given 
effect.” Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041 (1983). 
 If an ambiguity exists as to Gordon Lanham’s intent to create a residuary 
clause, the Magistrate Court acted within its discretion to review extrinsic evidence, 
including the three affidavits and the audio recording of Gordon Lanham’s will, to 
determine Gordon Lanham’s intent. After reviewing this admissible and relevant 
evidence, the Court found Gordon Lanham’s Will was “explicit and clear that he wanted 
Judd to dispose of anything left that wasn’t disposed of.” See, Exhibit F.  The Magistrate 
Judge reviewed sufficient evidence in order to make the determination that Gordon 
Lanham intended to create a residuary clause. As a result, this finding would not have 




 Either through a plain reading of the “four corners” of the will, or through 
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reviewing extrinsic evidence, it is clear that Gordon Lanham intended to dispose of his 
entire estate by granting Judd Lanham the power to distribute any property not specifically 
bequeathed in the will. Plaintiffs have admitted that Gordon Lanham intended to disinherit 
them through the will, and the Court should not allow them to recover now when it is 
explicitly against the testator’s intent. Accordingly, because the Magistrate Court’s 
decision would have been sustained on appeal, and even if Defendant Fleenor had 
breached a duty Plaintiffs suffered no harm, Defendant respectfully requests the Court 
grant his motion for summary judgment. 
  DATED this   22nd   day of May, 2017. 
 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
 
 
By:_ /s/ Richard L. Stubbs_______                  
      Richard L. Stubbs, of the Firm 
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filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICourt/E-Filing system 
which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the ICourt/E-Filing Registered Participants as 
follows: 
 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
12639 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 140 
Boise, Idaho  83713 
Telephone (208) 345-7832 
Attorneys for Plaintiff   
[  ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[  ] Hand-Delivered 
[  ] Overnight Mail 
[  ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
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  Richard L. Stubbs 
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Case No. CV-OC-16-8252 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This is an action for legal malpractice.  The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Lanham 
was admitted to probate in Gem County. References in this decision to the “decedent” are to   
Gordon Lanham. His cousin, Judd Lanham, was appointed personal representative. Plaintiffs 
Thomas and Keith Lanham are Gordon Lanham’s children.  He left them each one dollar in his 
will.  Plaintiff Thomas Lanham unsuccessfully contested the will as to its validity and as to its 
inclusion of certain property in the probate estate.  The contest of the will was originally joined 
by plaintiff Keith Lanham.  Keith Lanham withdrew his objection prior to the hearing before the 
probate judge. Plaintiff Thomas Lanham was represented in the probate proceedings by 
defendant Douglas Fleenor. Plaintiff Keith Lanham was represented by separate counsel.  An 
appeal from the magistrate’s decision was held to be untimely, and this lawsuit followed.  
This matter is now before the Court for a second time on the renewed motions for 
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probate, but maintain the will did not effectively dispose of real estate owned by Gordon 
Lanham.  In the first decision, this Court dismissed Keith Lanham on grounds that he was not 
Defendant Fleenor’s client and that Defendant Fleenor otherwise owed him no duty.  Both 
parties maintain that had the appeal in the probate matter gone forward on the merits, each would 
have prevailed. The Court determined that the outcome of any hypothetical appeal was a legal 
issue to be determined by the Court as an issue of law, but denied the remaining motions of both 
parties for lack of a complete record. The previous decision noted: 
The record does not tell us what “affidavits, the audio recordings and the entire 
record” is the basis for the probate court to “find in favor of the Personal 
Representative on every factual dispute.”  Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence of 
exactly which appellate record would be presented in the hypothetical appeal along 
with the argument for exactly the relief that would be available in a properly 
perfected appeal. 
… 
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue suffers the same frailty.  
Absent a complete record and argument that would be before an appellate court in 
the hypothetical appeal, this Court is not prepared to say the magistrate ruling was 
correct.  There are a number of interesting issues, including the question of what is 
required to create a power of appointment, whether the will in this case does so, what 
evidence is admissible to make that determination and what issues were before the 
trial court. 
 
Memorandum Decision entered November 22, 2016, pp. 3-4. 
Thereafter the Parties entered a stipulation regarding the issues to be decided on summary 
judgment that provided in part: 
 WHEREAS the parties have fully briefed the issue presented, and the matter can 
be submitted for decision at such time as the underlying record has been filed with 
the Court, subject to the Court's discretion to require oral argument. 
 Therefore, [the parties] stipulate and agree to submit the following issues to the 
Court for resolution without further briefing: Plaintiffs’ issue: had the underlying 
notice of appeal for In the Matter of the Estate of Gordon T. Lanham been timely 
filed, Plaintiffs Thomas Lanham and Keith Lanham would have been adjudicated the 
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intestate heirs to the decedent's real property. Defendant's issue: a timely appeal 
would have been unsuccessful. 
Later the parties requested and the Court granted a request for additional briefing. 
The parties augmented the record with audio disks that contain the recordings from which 
the decedent’s will was transcribed.  Notwithstanding that there appear to be other documents in 
the record in the probate case, the parties are apparently intend to have the Court decide this 
matter based upon the record currently in this case.  The record in this case, in addition to the 
audio recordings, consists of the Affidavit of Catherine Lanham Gillihan; the Affidavit of Judd 
Lanham; the Affidavit of Keith Lanham; the Verified Petition for Removal of P. Gordon Lanham 
as Personal Representative and for Declaration of Intestacy and Other Relief; the Last Will and 
Testament of Gordon Lanham; various documents attached to the Declaration of Allan Ellis 
including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law apparently entered by Judge Smith; a 
Judgment apparently entered by Judge Smith; and an Inventory. Other documents in the file, 
such as the briefs of the parties in the magistrate court, are not germane to the issue before this 
Court. 
The probate judge decided this case on cross motions for summary judgement.  In doing 
so, he entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  In doing so, he violated the well-
established rule that a trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh 
evidence or resolve controverted factual issues.  Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 7, 
205 P.3d 650, 656 (2009).  However, whether or not an appeal of the magistrate’s judgment 
would have been successful does not rise and fall on this error.  So long as the record is clear and 
there are no unresolved evidentiary rulings by the trial Court in reaching the summary judgment, 
this Court can review the hypothetical appeal.  Id.   In an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment, the appellate standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in 
passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the 
' . '  l
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pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact, such that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Id. See I.R.C.P. 56(c).  If the evidence reveals 
no genuine issue as to any material fact, then all that remains is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 685–86, 183 P.3d 771, 
773–74 (2008).  Here the question is the construction of the will.  The Court is free to disregard 
the Findings of Fact by the magistrate and review the record as it stood before the magistrate. 
For purposes of the issues presented here, the record reveals some uncontroverted facts.  
The decedent Gordon Thomas Lanham died, leaving two children, Thomas and Keith.  At the 
time of his death he owned three parcels of real property.  He left a will. The will is homemade.  
It is apparently a transcription of recorded statements of the Decedent.  The will has no 
identifiable residuary clause as that term is generally understood.  Nor does the will explicitly 
directly dispose of the real estate.  In the will decedent directed, in three places, that his cousin 
Judd Max Lanham dispose of decedent’s property. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
It is important to keep in mind that the validity of the will is not in question.  It is the 
interpretation of its content that is disputed.  
 “[I]n construing the provisions of a will to ascertain the meaning of a testator, the 
cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the testator's intent; and ... [t]his intent is 
to be ascertained from a full view of everything within the four corners of the 
instrument. ”  
In re Doe, 148 Idaho 432, 435, 224 P.3d 499, 502, (2009) (quoting Wilkins v. Wilkins, 
137 Idaho 315, 319, 48 P.3d 644, 648 (2002). Plaintiffs argue that, while the will may be valid, it 
fails to dispose of the real property owned by Decedent.  Plaintiffs correctly argue the will has no 
identifiable residuary clause as that term is generally understood.  Nor does the will explicitly 
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directly dispose of the real estate.  Defendant argues that the decedent clearly and explicitly 
wanted to disinherit Plaintiffs: 
 
Thanksgiving is over and I just wanted to add to this program that my son, 
Thomas Everett Lanham, 48 years old, has already been given all he needs to 
have and that I am going to leave $1 more dollar against whatever is legal to him 
and then he is going to be on his own. Last will and Testament of Gordon Thomas 
Lanham, p. 1. 
 
While the magistrate erred in issuing “Findings of Fact,” his ultimate conclusion that 
there was no genuine issue of fact as to the intent of the descendant to disinherit plaintiffs is 
correct.  It does not follow that Plaintiffs may not inherit anything from their father. This would 
not be the first time that a person the testator sought to disinherit succeeded in obtaining some of 
the decedent’s property.  It is important to distinguish determination of the decedent’s intent as to 
ambiguous provisions in a will from the more general question of whether the decedent wanted 
to disinherit his children.  See, e.g, McClain v. Hardy, 184 Or. App. 448, 450, 56 P.3d 501 
(2002).  See also, Matter of Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d 184 (1992) and case collected therein: 
 
[A] disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or strongly phrased, operates 
only to prevent a claimant from taking under the will itself, or to obviate the claim 
of pretermission, but does not and cannot operate to prevent heirs at law from 
taking under statutory rules of inheritance when the decedent has died intestate as 
to any or all of his property.  
Estate of Baxter, 827 P.2d at 186–87. 
As stated in an earlier New York case: 
 
“In order to cut off the right of a distributee to inherit property, there must be a valid 
and legal bequest or devise to other persons. Mere words of disinheritance are 
insufficient to effect such purpose.”  
In re Bayles' Estate, 113 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (Sur. Ct. 1952). 
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 Testamentary intent is a question of law to be determined from the will itself if the will is 
unambiguous.  Even though the will does not expressly dispose of the real estate, the inquiry 
does not end there.  A testator may defer to the judgment of another in determining the ultimate 
disposition of probate property though use of a power of appointment.  The Idaho Probate Code 
recognizes powers of appointment but has precious little else to say about them.  I.C. §15-12-
102(8) defines a “presently exercisable general power of appointment” but the definition is 
concerned with what constitutes “presently exercisable” rather than what constitutes a power of 
appointment.  Idaho Code §15-2-610, cited by Defendant, merely explains that a power of 
appointment is not exercised by the mere existence of a residuary clause in the holder’s will.  
The statute does not speak to the creation of a power of appointment.1  
The parties have not cited and this Court could not find any Idaho cases explaining or 
instructing what is required to create a power of appointment.  However, other courts seem to be 
in general agreement that there are no special or technical words required for creating a power of 
appointment.  For example, First Union Nat’l Bank v. Ingold, 136 N.C. App. 262, 523 S.E.2d 
725 (1999) (“[A] power of appointment may be created not only by express words, but also by 
implication of law and, further, no technical language need be used”);2 Irwin Union Bank & Tr. 
Co. v. Long, 160 Ind. App. 509, 312 N.E.2d 908 (1974) (it is not necessary that the actual words 
‘power of appointment’ be used in order to create such a power);  In re Kuttler's Estate, 160 Cal. 
App. 2d 332, 325 P.2d 624 (1958) (no particular form of words is necessary to the creation of a 
power of appointment);  In re Rowlands' Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952) (No special 
words are needed to create a power of appointment). 
                                                          
1 “… [T]his Code has therefore generally avoided any provisions relating to powers of appointment.”  
Uniform Law Comments, Idaho Code Ann. §15-2-610 (West). 
 
2 But see, Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank, 216 Va. 482, 219 S.E.2d 868 (1975) (A power of appointment 
is a unique legal creature. It is created, never by implication or by operation of law, but only by deliberate act.)  
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From this it is clear that the Court must first determine if the will is ambiguous as to the 
creation of a power of appointment.  If not, the intention of the testator must be given effect. 
When a court interprets a will, it will not look beyond the four corners of the will in determining 
the testator's intent. If the language of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and well-
understood meaning, it will be enforced as written.  Whether a document is ambiguous is a 
question of law over which appellate courts exercise free review.  Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 
241, 254 P.3d 1231, 1237 (2011).  If the language is ambiguous, interpretation of the will is a 
question of fact.  The factfinder may resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity and 
find the intentions of the testator.  Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 475, 700 P.2d 
96, 97 (Ct. App. 1985).   
Here the language of the will is ambiguous if the paragraphs related to creation of the 
power of appointment are read in isolation, but not when the will is read as a whole.  Near the 
beginning of the will decedent states: 
  
“I am going to make my friend and cousin Judd Max Lanham executor to my estate 
and give him Power of Attorney over all my personal and real property.” 
A few paragraphs later, still on the first page, he recites: 
  
“…and I want to state in here that the executor of my Will is Judd Max Lanham and 
I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am dead. I 
want him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects in any way 
that he sees fit and I will try and put all the wording about the personal effects.”   
At the very end of the will, he repeats: 
 
 “I want to state in here again that the executor of my Will is Judd Max Lanham and 
I am giving him a Power of Attorney for full control now and even after I am dead. I 
want him to be able to distribute my property and my personal effects as stated in my 
Last Will and Testament.” 
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 This language shows the clear intent to create a general power of appointment and give 
his friend and cousin the power to dispose of the real estate.  “A general power of appointment is 
an extraordinary power, and the law tolerates only limited ambiguity when determining whether 
such a power exists.” Matter of Estate of Krokowsky, 182 Ariz. 277, 280, 896 P.2d 247, 250 
(1995).   In order to grant such an extraordinary power, the law requires that the grantor must (1) 
intend to create a power, (2) indicate by whom the power is held, and (3) specify the property 
over which the power is to be exercised. Id. All three conditions exist here. Use of the words 
“power of attorney” are simply a layman’s miscues of a legal term of art.  Giving Judd Lanham 
full control “even after I am dead” is sufficient. Gordon Lanham’s intent was to create a power 
of appointment, so that Judd could distribute his assets after death. The will was effective to 
dispose of the contested real estate through the power of appointment.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate erred in resorting to extrinsic evidence and in issuing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in resolving an issue on summary judgement.  However, because the 
ultimate outcome of the case is the same, the error is harmless.  Had the appeal in this case been 
timely filed, it would have been unsuccessful.   
 Because it appears that in the absence of a successful appeal, Plaintiff suffered no injury 
caused by the negligence, if any, of Defendant Fleenor, the case will be dismissed.  Defendant is 
directed to submit a form of judgment complying with IRCP 54. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
DATED:  ___________________ 
 
       ___________________________ 
       RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
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JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
 
  
 JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
  
 1. This matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
 DATED this ___ day of August, 2017. 
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            Richard D. Greenwood 
            District Judge 
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Ellis Law, PLLC 
2537 W. State Street, Suite 140 
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Telephone (208) 345-7832 
Attorneys for Plaintiff   
[  ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[  ] Hand-Delivered 
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[  ] Facsimile (208) 345-9564 
[  ] ICourt/E-Filing 
aellis@aellislaw.com 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Justin R. Volle 
PERKINS, MITCHELL, POPE & 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM 
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Case No. CV -OC-20 16-8252 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named plaintiff/appellant, Thomas E. Lanham appeals against the above-
named respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of Dismissal entered September 
6, 2017, by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood presiding. 
2. The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
identified in paragraph (1) above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( a)(l ), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
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in the appeal is as follows: Whether the claim of appellant Thomas E. Lanham that respondent. 
Fleenor committed professional negligence is subject to dismissal because, absent a meritorious 
appeal in the underlying action, the dilatory notice of appeal was not a proximate cause of appellant's 
financial loss. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any,portion of the record. 
5. The appellant does not request a reporter's transcript. 
6. The appellant requests those portions of the clerk's record automatically included 
under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following: 
a. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed May 6, 2016; 
b. Declaration of Allen B. Ellis, including exhibits, filed June 13, 2016; 
~· Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed August 31, 20 16; 
d. Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Partial Summary Judgment filed August 31, 20 16; 
e. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 7, 2016; 
f. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment fil.ed September 
7, 2016; 
g. Plaintiffs Answering Brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed October 
3, 2016; 
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
October 3, 2016; 
i. Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Affidavit in Opposition of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed October 3, 2016; 
j. Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed October 
10, 2016; 
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k. Defendant Douglas Fleenor's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
1. Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 22, 2016; 
m. Stipulation on the Issue to be Resolved in Summary Judgment Proceedings filed February 
13, 2017; 
n. Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment Based on Newly Obtained Evidence filed April18, 2017; 
o. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed May 4, 2017; 
p. Affidavit of Samantha L. Lundberg in Support· of Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
q. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed May 16, 2017; 
r. Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed May 22, 2017; and 
s. Memorandum and Order Re: Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 17, 
2017. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk:s record has been paid. 
(b) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
000265
'.I 
Dated this 16th day of October, 2017. 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for plaintiff/appellant Thomas E. Lanham 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 16th day of October, 2017, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Richard L. Stubbs 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83 701 
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__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
__ Hand delivery 
__ Overnight delivery 
X Facsimile (345-8660) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM, 
Supreme Court Case No. 45488 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
and 
KEITH C. LANHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: · 
1. Two (2) CDs submitted with the Stipulation on the Issue to be Resolved in Summary 
Judgment Proceedings, filed February 13,2017. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 6th day of December, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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Supreme Court Case No. 45488 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
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and 
KEITH C. LANHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ALLEN B. ELLIS RICHARD L. STUBBS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THOMAS E. LANHAM, 
Supreme Court Case No. 45488 
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and 




DOUGLAS E. FLEENOR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and docliments that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 16th 
day of October, 2017. 
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